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The fast and easy global movement of capital throughout the financial system, from 
lenders to borrowers and through intermediaries and financial market participants, has 
been recognized as a source of instability associated with illiquidity and financial crises. 
The purpose of this research was to better understand how regulation either enables or 
constrains capital movement. The theoretical framework comprised 2 contrasting public 
policymaking models, Arrow’s rational-comprehensive model and Kingdon’s garbage 
can model, which were used to derive opposing hypotheses. The research question 
addressed the nature of the relationship between Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) 
regulations and the flow of capital into Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (CMOs) 
when lenders share their borrower-related loan risks through intermediaries with other 
market participants. This quantitative study was a quasiexperimental time series design 
incorporating an autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) model using 
secondary data published by the U.S. government. The 2 independent variables were 
regulatory periods involving 2 CDSs regulations and the dependent variable was capital 
in the U.S. financial system that is deployed to CMOs. The Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act of 2000’s ARIMA model (1,2,1) was significant at p < .05 and was 
negatively correlated to the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008’s ARIMA 
model (1,1,0), r = .91, n = 18, p < .001. These results suggest that regulations cannot be 
relaxed and then reinstated with predictable results. The potential for positive social 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Introduction 
The Great Recession was a calamity to financial institutions and individuals alike 
featuring the enduring issue of the complicated relationship between government and 
commerce. The topic of this quantitative research study is the public policy of the U.S. 
federal government as it is related to the control and regulation of privately held U.S. 
financial institutions. This quantitative study was conducted in order to better understand 
financial institutions’ deployment of capital to Collateralized Mortgage Obligations 
(CMOs) and to determine whether regulatory decisions on Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) 
were statistically significantly related to changes in CMOs during the period 1989 to 
2013 through a quasiexperimental time series design incorporating an autoregressive 
integrated moving average (ARIMA) model. The terms CMOs and CDSs are defined in 
the Definitions section16. There is the potential for positive social change from financial 
institutions that are stable and in which depositors and borrowers mutually benefit from 
banking transactions. 
In Chapter 1 I present the background to the 2008 financial crisis and then 
introduce the problem statement addressed by this quantitative study. I then briefly state 
the purpose of the study that is followed by the quantitative research question and a null 
and two alternate hypotheses. The hypotheses were analyzed within the context of the 
combined theoretical framework of rational actor and garbage can policy models, which 





with sections devoted to definitions, assumptions, scope and delimitations, and 
limitations. Finally, I review the significance of the study for its implications to positive 
social change and summarize the chapter highlights. 
Background 
The U.S. financial system experienced a crisis in 2008 that led to economic 
contraction, causing hardships for people worldwide (Cable, 2009; Deaton, 2011). 
Significant public policy actions in the U.S. financial system preceded the crisis, 
including the global banking capital agreements under the Basel Accords that began in 
1988 and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA; 15 U.S.C. § 6801-6809) 
deregulation of financial institutions (Bordo, 2008; De Grauwe, 2008a). Under the 
GLBA, financial institution activities associated with commercial banking, investment 
banking, and insurance that had been segregated under Glass-Steagall Act (GSA) 
restrictions enacted by President Franklin Roosevelt in 1933 were permitted to combine 
(Cornford, 2009). Such regulatory changes and financial innovations had historically 
been precursors to financial crises (Ferguson, 2008; Kindleberger & Aliber, 2005) that 
were in turn interwoven with business cycles which are patterns of economic growth and 
contraction (National Bureau of Economic Research [NBER], 2010).  
Economic cycles are part of the broader movements of population growth and 
human development (Fischer, 1996, p. 239). These cycles can appear coherent when the 
focus on an occurrence zooms out toward vantages of years where random variation 





movements requires various vantage points for the examination of their causes across 
time while simultaneously being able to zoom in on quarterly results to understand these 
causes in detail. The financial crises associated with these cycles have always erupted in 
problems never before experienced (Caprio & Honohan, 2005; Eichengreen, 2002) and as 
predictable surprises that some had actually predicted (Posner, 2009, pp. 252-254; 
Watkins & Bazerman, 2003). 
Predicting the onset and ending of a financial crisis is daunting because of the 
complexities of these situations and competing vantage points. Centuries of financial 
cycles show that asset bubbles and associated banking crises have been an enduring and 
recurring feature of the economy (Ferguson, 2008; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009). In contrast, 
the notion of the black swan, a rare and unexpected event, holds that unique 
circumstances with a minuscule probability of occurring determine the direction of 
human history (Taleb, 2007, p. 18). The point of no return occurs when the crucial 
problem emerges, separating the condition from its presentation (Gladwell, 2000). Just 2 
years before the financial crisis of 2008, Nobel Laureate economist Stiglitz warned that 
the financial system was not working well (2006, p. 245). The tipping point came when 
approximately 3 million U.S. homeowners could no longer afford to make mortgage 
payments (Blomquist, 2013; Levy, 2010), triggering the 2008 Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC; Felsenheimer & Gisdakis, 2008, pp. 47, 197, 199; Immergluck, 2009, p. 128). 
Public administrators and key policymakers are responsible for the governance 





financial system stability as a public good, measured by the resources a government is 
willing to commit for intervention in supporting financial institutions, was generally 
accepted only in the approximately five years preceding the GFC (Quintyn & Taylor, 
2002). Even key policymakers in this era (Gergen, 2000; Greenspan, 2007; Paulson, 
2010; Rubin & Weisberg, 2003; Woodward, 2000) failed to recognize that the ominous 
events they were experiencing were consistent with the development of financial crises 
(Fischer, 1997; Kindleberger & Aliber, 2005; Qian, Reinhart, & Rogoff, 2010). 
Confusion and dismay accompanied the GFC events (Augar, 2009), causing one 
practitioner to call regulatory management of the financial system “incomprehensible” 
(Grant, 2009, p. 20). A skeptic imputed the crisis to “fear and greed” (Grumet, 2008, p. 
7), while a cynic said the GFC was “insanity” (Lewis, 2009, p. 1). 
The deregulatory era for the financial system that had begun in 1980 and lasted 
for a generation ended with the GFC (Cassell & Hoffman, 2009). This ending was 
epitomized by the U.S. government action in 2008 taking direct control of the housing 
finance enterprises: the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC, a.k.a. 
Freddie Mac) and the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA, a.k.a. Fannie 
Mae), under the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA; Cassell & Hoffman, 
2009; Jaffee, 2009). From the body of published research on financial regulation, the 
discipline of public policy and administration appeared to have been passive prior to the 
GFC in 2008 and the discipline of economics was unsuccessful at predicting the GFC 





the financial system relationships associated with the events of the GFC, which was 
reflected in the existing research literature. Adding to this body of theoretical and 
empirical research, this quantitative research study was needed to fill an existing gap in 
the literature and to demonstrate the nature of the relationship between the independent 
variables—2000’s the Commodity Futures Modernization Act (CFMA) and 2008’s the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA)—and the dependent variable—capital 
deployed to CMOs in U.S. financial institutions and measured by millions of U.S. dollars 
in quarterly intervals which were involved in the triggers of the GFC. These regulations 
include responses to the GFC, such as the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP, 2008) 
contained in the EESA. 
Problem Statement 
The fast and easy global movement of capital throughout the financial system, 
from lenders to borrowers and through intermediaries and financial market participants, 
has been recognized as a source of financial instability associated with illiquidity and 
financial crises in general (Ashcraft & Schuermann, 2008; Begg, 2009; Billio, 
Getmansky, Lo, & Pelizzon, 2010; Booth, 2008; Brown et al., 2009; Kirabaeva & Razin, 
2009; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2008a, 2008b, 2009; Rossi, 2010). Yet little is currently known 
about how regulation either enables or constrains capital movement globally (Lee, 2012). 
Understanding the effect of regulation on financial stability is important for the 
regulatory response to the GFC, and scientifically based quantitative research (such as 





2008). Traditional economic research lacked a valid or reliable method to predict 
financial crises based upon capital movement (Caballero, 2010; Friedman, 1986), and 
there is a gap in the quantitative research literature demonstrating how capital in the 
financial system moves in response to regulation (Aizenman & Pasricha, 2009; Barth, 
Caprio, & Levine, 2008; Eichengreen, Mody, Nedeljkovic, & Sarno, 2009; Ford, 2010; 
Marquis & Huang, 2009). 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this quantitative study was to better understand how the 
movement of capital in the system of privately owned financial institutions is related to 
regulatory actions. Regulations are legislated by Congress and then enforced primarily by 
the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s (DOT) Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC) and the Federal Reserve System (FRS). The approach to this quantitative study 
was to identify regulatory actions that might have been related to the financial system 
stability by involvement in the GFC triggers (Birdsall, Caicedo, & de la Torre, 2010). 
Knowledge of the relationship between regulations and financial system results may help 
to identify public policy correlates of financial instability (Blundell-Wignall, Atkinson, & 
Lee, 2008; Cherny & Craig, 2009; Haubrich & Lucas, 2007; Naceur & Omran, 2011). 
Understanding the mechanisms of financial instability is necessary in order to avoid 
future financial crises, which may both precede and follow this current GFC instability 





and limiting available credit that in turn may result in stock market crashes and real estate 
busts (Bordo & Haubrich, 2009; Mian, Sufi, & Trebbi, 2011). 
This quantitative research study used a quantitative research design with a 
quarterly time series analysis from September 1989 (3Q) to March 2013 (1Q) and 
incorporated the autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) model (de Smith, 
2011; Glass, Gottman, & Willson, 2008; National Institute of Standards and Technology 
[NIST], 2012). ARIMA models are used for forecasting time series and are a refined 
version of random-walk models (Glass et al., 2008). The data in ARIMA models are 
made stationary by transforming them into nonseasonal differences and with variance-
stabilizing logs (de Smith, 2011; Glass et al., 2008; NIST, 2012; Parsad, Bhar, Bhatia, & 
Gupta, 2012). The nonseasonal ARIMA model is a (p,d,q) model in which p is the 
number of autoregressive terms, q is the number of moving average terms, and d is the 
number of differences in the series after seasonality has been removed, which if present 
with a value greater than one indicates the time series can be made stationary only by 
integrating these differences (Glass et al., 2008). If the first difference of the series is 
predicted in the model to be constant, then a random walk is present and is drifting when 
there is an average upward or downward trend (Glass et al., 2008). The random walk is 
refined in the ARIMA model’s forecasting equation by adding lags of the differenced 
series (the number of autoregressive terms p) and lags of the forecast errors (the number 
of moving average terms q) that together remove the correlation of the historical values in 





details on the time series regression analysis and further statistical refinements related to 
the ARIMA model in Chapter 2. Further, I detail the application of the ARIMA model to 
the modeling parameters in this quantitative study in Chapter 3. 
The intent of this quantitative study was to identify perturbations in the financial 
system related to the performance of CMOs, which in turn are related to CDS regulatory 
decisions. The independent variables were (a) 2000’s the CFMA and (b) 2008’s the 
EESA, and the dependent variable was capital deployed to CMOs in U.S. financial 
institutions and measured by millions of U.S. dollars in quarterly intervals which were 
involved in the triggers of the GFC. A variable was needed to control for the effects of 
history in ARIMA models that was independent of the hypothesized regulatory 
interventions (Glass et al., 2008). The selected control variable was the labor 
participation rate (LPR; expressed as a percent) which is the employment to working age 
population ratio and based on the existing literature should have little relationship to 
CDSs or the capital flows into CMOs. As an example this LPR was 67% in 2000 and 
66% in 2008 (DOL, BLS, 2013). 
Research Question and Hypotheses 
This study was based on the following quantitative research question: What is the 
nature of the relationship between the independent variables—CDSs regulations (the 
CFMA and the EESA) and the dependent variable—flow of capital into CMOs (as 
measured by millions of U.S. dollars each quarter) when lenders share their borrower-





The null (H0) and alternate (HA1 and HA2) hypotheses were based upon the 
theoretical framework in which two contrasting public policymaking models are 
considered (the rational-comprehensive model and the garbage can model) for two CDS 
regulations (the CFMA and the EESA).  
Null hypothesis (H0): There is no statistically significant relationship between the 
independent variables—CDSs regulations (the CFMA and the EESA) and the dependent 
variable—flow of capital into CMOs (as measured by millions of U.S. dollars each 
quarter) when lenders share their borrower-related loan risks through intermediaries with 
other market participants. 
The first alternate hypothesis (HA1) was derived from the garbage can policy 
model in which a reactive policy was implemented, with a negative relationship. The 
garbage can model is associated with reactive policymaking and is defined in detail in the 
Definitions section. A negative relationship is a policy result in which the presence of the 
regulation is associated with the measure of an unfavorable result. 
Alternate research hypothesis A1 (HA1): There is a negative and statistically 
significant relationship between the independent variables—CDSs regulations (the 
CFMA and the EESA) and the dependent variable—flow of capital into CMOs (as 
measured by millions of U.S. dollars each quarter) when lenders share their borrower-
related loan risks through intermediaries with other market participants. 
The second alternate hypothesis (HA2) was derived from the rational-





positive relationship between CDS policy and increasing CMO capital flows. The 
rational-comprehensive policy model is associated with proactive policymaking and is 
defined in detail in the Definitions section. A positive relationship is a policy result in 
which the presence of the regulation is associated with the measure of a favorable result. 
Alternate research hypothesis A2 (HA2): There is a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between the independent variables—CDSs regulations (the 
CFMA and the EESA) and the dependent variable—flow of capital into CMOs (as 
measured by millions of U.S. dollars each quarter) when lenders share their borrower-
related loan risks through intermediaries with other market participants. 
An ARIMA model was used for analysis of time series data. ARIMA model 
policy periods are formulated and then analyzed for significance using a one-way 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) F-test and t-test statistics, with alpha ( ) set at .05 (I am 
95% confident that the results did not occur by chance). Adjustments were made to the 
data in the policy periods using the ARIMA model in order to detect discrete episodes of 
nonseasonal differences in the time series data. The null hypothesis is treated as no 
association between the independent and dependent variables. Direction is quantified by 
best fit ARIMA parameters which are the time series regression analysis and statistical 
tests that are detailed in Chapter 2. The data sources were financial statistics published by 





Theoretical Framework of the Study 
The theoretical framework for this quantitative research study is public 
policymaking through contrasting models of the rational-comprehensive approach 
(Arrow, 1987) and the garbage can approach (Kingdon, 2003). The rational-
comprehensive approach is a model of public policymaking focused on analysis and the 
examination of alternatives in order to select the optimal alternative (Arrow, 1987; 
Simon, 1957). The garbage can approach, by contrast, is a model of public policymaking 
that is loosely structured and strongly influenced by political motivations and shifting 
coalitions. Policymaking for banking activity involves the application of the federal 
government’s power under the U.S. Constitution granting the power to regulate 
commerce (Hamilton, Jay, & Madison, 1788/2006; U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3). Theories 
that are based on an assumption of rationality have become the dominant way of 
analyzing behavior, including certain commercial behaviors that are regulated in public 
policymaking, as opposed to political motivation (Anderson, 2006).  
The Rational-Comprehensive Policy Model 
The rational-comprehensive policy model is closely associated with the general 
outlook of economists and holds that objectives can be maximized through a specific 
process for making decisions rationally (Arrow, 1987; Simon, 1957). The rational-
comprehensive policy model assumes a decision maker is equipped with guiding goals, 
values, or objectives and that there is a problem in which alternatives can be clearly 





consequences, both favorable and unfavorable, are determined through cost-benefit and 
other analyses. This analysis is complete when the decision maker selects the optimal 
alternative that maximizes the goals, values, or objectives (Arrow, 1987; Simon, 1957). 
Elements of the rational-comprehensive model are in the public administration discipline, 
in theory and in practice (National Performance Review, 1993; Pious, 2004; Wilson, 
1989).  
The Garbage Can Policy Model 
The garbage can policy model posits a decision-making situation in which there is 
a collection of existing policy preferences that partisans seek to apply to various 
problems as the opportunities arise (Kingdon, 2003; Tomlin, 2007). Although the 
organized chaos of public organizations was the inspiration of the original garbage can 
model (Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972), Kingdon’s (2003) revision placed more emphasis 
on being organized than being chaotic, and included refined assumptions of the activities. 
There are process streams of roughly sequential activities occurring and involving the 
fluid participation of actors, starting with a problem being recognized, and with policy 
proposals being formed and then refined by technical specialists (Kingdon, 2003), and 
politics was added into the mix as the force behind the decision making. In some 
instances, a policy window would emerge from circumstances in which there was a 
critical moment with the opportunity for the coupling of a recognized problem and an 
available solution, producing new policy. The garbage can policy model is based in 





perspective that metaphorically recognizes the structures and patterns of policymaking to 
be in the form of clouds and not as clocks (Kingdon, 2003, p. 223), meaning policy is a 
result of timing and transient political forces and not mechanically produced through 
logical evaluation by expert decision makers. 
Comparison of Rational-Comprehensive and Garbage Can Models 
The rational-comprehensive and garbage can models of policymaking are both 
limited by the presence of constraints resulting from the failures of existing regulatory 
policy (Cooper, 2006, p. 16; Sparrow, 2000, 2008). The divergence of these two models 
is with the policymaking process. Policy actions resulting from circumstances in which a 
policy window is opened (Kingdon, 2003) can differ from situations in which alternatives 
are objectively formulated and considered (Arrow, 1987; Simon, 1957). Both 
policymaking models applied to a degree in the process that resulted in the CFMA (Born, 
2009; U.S. Senate Committee on Banking [SCB], 2005). The most important 
proclamation of the CFMA was the exclusion from regulation of transactions between 
financial institutions and their eligible counterparties in over-the-counter derivatives and 
foreign currency (SCB, 2005). Likewise, 2008’s TARP and eventual regulation of CDSs 
under the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DFA, 
a.k.a. Dodd-Frank) Title VII had indicators of policy windows and rationality (Arrow, 
1987; Jickling, 2010; Kingdon, 2003; Miller & Ruane, 2012; Nanto, 2009; Simon, 1957). 
The rational-comprehensive and garbage can policy models provide for 





2009; Lauckner, 2012). Policy produced by rational actors is intentional (Green, 2002; 
Lovett, 2006), and so the actual outcomes can be compared to the intended outcomes in 
order to minimize unintended consequences. As applied to CDS regulation, if this policy 
resulted from a rational-comprehensive process, it is expected that CDSs and CMOs 
would not be affected by unintended consequences, because consequences in this model 
are purposeful. In this rational-comprehensive model, preferences were attached to 
alternatives by legislators with clear goals, objectives, and values and bankers pursuing 
their own self-interest (Lovett, 2006). Regulators agreed with bankers on the value of 
diversifying risk from using CDSs and with intrusive CFMA rules could have harmed the 
financial system (SCB, 2005). Furthermore, regulating CDSs would have been contrary 
to the financial deregulation in GLBA (Kalinowski, 2011). During the GFC, there was 
similar agreement between congresspersons on the need to take pragmatic actions in 
TARP to prevent illiquidity from damaging the financial system and the economy 
(Ferguson & Johnson, 2009). The exchange required by Dodd-Frank for CDSs and other 
derivatives was a government-mandated market mechanism not sought by financial 
institutions (Ferguson & Johnson, 2009; Klieber, 2012). 
The garbage can model, in contrast to the rational-comprehensive model, is 
inclusive of outcomes that could include unintended consequences and disruption to the 
use of CDSs and CMOs (Kingdon, 2003; Klieber, 2012). In the garbage can model, the 
GFC had caused a policy window to open in which the proregulatory political faction in 





2010 (Jickling, 2010; Kingdon, 2003; Miller & Ruane, 2012; Nanto, 2009). This faction 
had opposed the deregulatory reforms of the GLBA and the CFMA and was ready to 
apply regulatory solutions to the problems identified in the GFC (Born, 2009; Ferguson 
& Johnson, 2009). In return for political support to aid the financial system, this faction 
introduced new financial institution regulations in the EESA’s TARP in 2008 and Dodd-
Frank in 2010 that were intended to restrict CDSs activities (Ferguson & Johnson, 2009). 
This process reflected a nonlinear, at times chaotic, policymaking process with no 
particular start or end (Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation [DTCC], 2012; U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial 
Innovation [SEC], 2012). 
Nature of the Study 
This quantitative study used a time series design incorporating an ARIMA model 
as this approach aligned well with the quantitative research question of determining the 
relationship between regulations and associated financial system results. The ARIMA 
model was a lagged moving average regression as defined in detail in the Purpose of the 
Study section in Chapter 1 and in Chapter 3. The variables include the independent 
variables of regulatory decisions involving CDSs which are defined as the CFMA and the 
EESA. The dependent variable is capital in the financial system that is deployed to 
CMOs, which is measured in millions of dollars each quarter. The strongest policy model 
explaining CMOs is tested against the control variable of the employment to working age 





ARIMA models to control for the effects of history (LPR). Financial statistics data 
published by the U.S. government were used in the analysis (as detailed in Appendices A 
and B). 
Definitions 
Key terms used in this study have specific meanings that are essential to the 
quantitative research topic and combine elements of public policy and economics from 
their use in academic and professional settings. The dependent and independent variables 
are defined in their operational definitions in Chapter 3. 
Asset Backed Security (ABS): A security owning cash flows that are associated 
with assets in an underlying loan pool, excluding mortgage securities guaranteed by the 
U.S. government. A financial institution is the seller of a loan pool to a security, in which 
the cash flows are structured into bonds for sale to investors based on market preferences 
of risk including for credit rating, maturity, and interest rate (Ashcraft & Schuermann, 
2008; Jarrow, 2011; Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association [SIFMA], 
2010). 
CAMELS: Acronym for the Federal Reserve Bank supervisory framework used to 
assess financial institution quality, based on scoring six factors: Capital adequacy, Asset 
quality, Management and administration quality, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to 





Capital arbitrage: Capital movement from one regulatory structure to another 
more favorable for profits while holding the amount of capital constant (De Grauwe, 
2008a; Frachot, 2010; Khademian, 2009).  
Capital flow: Passing of capital in the globalized financial system involving 
transactions between lenders and borrowers through market entities and including 
intermediary agents (Ashcraft & Schuermann, 2008; Begg, 2009; Chandrasekhar, in 
press; Tollefsen, 2010). 
Capital mobility: Capital movement across the boundaries of national borders and 
regulatory structures, which has the potential to destabilize the financial system (Bordo & 
Helbling, 2010; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2008a). 
Capital stability: Preferred state of capital in the financial system, favoring inertia 
and then moving in accordance to the policymaking of the central banker or from 
regulatory changes (Barth et al., 2008; Geyfman & Yeager, 2009; Skidelsky, 2009).  
Central bank: Publicly controlled banking and financial authority that manages a 
nation’s money and credit supply. The FRS is the U.S. central bank that maintains 
liquidity in the financial system by increasing or decreasing bank reserves requirements 
and by market intervention (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System [Board of 
Governors], 2005; Kilian & Manganelli, 2008; Obstfeld, Shambaugh, & Taylor, 2009). 
Collateralized: Feature of a security that has loans, or pools of already-securitized 





Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO): Investment instrument owning cash flows 
of principal or income, or both, from aggregated asset-backed securities that had been 
issued by financial institutions and other parties, from which its value derives. Asset 
classes of asset-backed securities include residential and commercial mortgages, 
automobile loans, credit cards, student loans, and various business-related loans and 
leases (Bond Market Association, 2003; Jarrow, 2011; SIFMA, 2010). 
Collateralized Mortgage Obligation (CMO): Investment instrument owning cash 
flows of principal or income, or both, from aggregated mortgage securities that had been 
issued by financial institutions and other parties, from which its value derives. CMOs are 
those CDOs in which all the underlying debts are residential or commercial mortgages 
(Bond Market Association, 2003; Estrella & Silver, 1984; Jarrow, 2011; SIFMA, 2010). 
Commercial bank: Privately owned, chartered depository institution and lender 
engaged in activities of commerce. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
regulates its cash reserves for liquidity and capital for lending risks (Bordo, 2008; 
Geyfman & Yeager, 2009; Walter, 2009). 
Credit Default Swap (CDS): Contract between counterparties (in which one or 
both of the parties are a financial institution) that insures securities and debt instruments, 
including CMOs, against adverse credit events and boosts financial system liquidity by 
providing a market value of the insured instrument without requiring a trade (Cherny & 





Derivative: Contract between two or more parties in which the value of one asset 
is determined by fluctuations in another asset (Jarrow, 2011; Mengle, 2007).  
Excess risk: Financial institution having an excess supply of funds coupled with 
excess borrower demand in a way that results in loans with latent credit losses for which 
there is insufficient financial institution capital (Felsenheimer & Gisdakis, 2008, p. 19; 
Jarrow, 2011). 
Federal funds rate: Key interest rate affected by the FRS monetary policy and 
that member financial institutions use to lend to each other overnight (Angeriz, 2009; 
Board of Governors, 2005). 
Financial crisis: Events conjointly impacting the real economy and the financial 
system associated with economic contraction and government intervention to support 
liquidity (Dungan, 2008; Kindleberger & Aliber, 2005; Mian et al., 2011). 
Financial institution: A commercial bank, investment bank, universal bank, 
savings and loan, credit union, insurance company, or a nonbank commercial company 
that is predominantly engaged in financial activities like a mortgage company issuing 
ABSs (Board of Governors, 2013a; EESA § 3, cl. 5; Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council [FFIEC], 2013; Jarrow, 2011).  
Financial institution regulatory structure: The collection of rules and regulations 
governing the operation and supervision of financial institution capital and risk (Jarrow, 





Financial system: Comprehensive collection of private and publicly supported 
U.S. financial institutions participating under various regulatory arrangements in banking 
and related activities in which the institutions are dependent on their collective liquidity 
(Board of Governors, 2005; Fisher, 2008). 
Garbage can model: Public policymaking model based on the garbage can theory 
in which policy emerges reactively from circumstances when there is a window of 
opportunity for policy action amid loosely formed decision-making processes in an 
organization that is strongly influenced by politics and shifting coalitions (Cohen, March, 
& Olsen, 1972; Kingdon, 2003). 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC): Instability in the U.S. financial system related to 
the housing market that emerged in 2008 and spread to other countries, leading to 
economic contraction (Aizenman & Pasricha, 2009; Bordo & Haubrich, 2009; Deaton, 
2011; Nanto, 2009). 
Investment bank: Privately owned financial services institution engaged in 
securities activities involving issuing, managing, and trading stocks, bonds, notes, 
securities, and debentures. Its underwriting, sale, and securities distribution activities are 
regulated under GLBA (Bordo, 2008; Geyfman & Yeager, 2009). 
Liquidity: Availability of cash assets sufficient to settle banking transactions at 
the end of the business day (Board of Governors, 2005; Diamond & Rajan, 2009; 





Macroeconomics: Aggregated economic behavior and results associated with the 
total goods and services produced in the real economy in conjunction with the financial 
system (Ashraf, Gershman, & Howitt, 2011; Gerding, 2011; Kilian & Manganelli, 2008). 
Macroprudential: The FRS policymaking objectives of financial stability and 
macroeconomic performance that require prudent control of large-scale economic 
relationships (Aizenman, 2009; Board of Governors, 2005; Negrilă, 2009; Schinasi, 
2003).  
Mortgage Backed Security (MBS): A security owning cash flows that are 
associated with assets in an underlying loan pool of mortgage loans, including mortgage 
securities guaranteed by the U.S. government. A financial institution is the seller of a 
mortgage loan pool to a security, in which the cash flows are structured into bonds for 
sale to investors based on market preferences of risk including for credit rating, maturity, 
and interest rate. MBSs directly own mortgage loans, unlike CMOs that can own MBSs, 
ABSs, and/or CDSs (Jarrow, 2011; SIFMA, 2010). 
Mortgage Derivative Instrument: Instrument in which the value of an asset is 
determined by the underlying mortgage loan performance of another asset, primarily as a 
result of the timing of principal repayments, instances of borrower default, and the 
housing market values. Such instruments consist of ABSs, CDSs, and CMOs (Cherny & 





Mortgage Derivative Risk: Exposure of the financial system’s capital and 
liquidity to mortgage derivative instruments owned by financial institutions (Cherny & 
Craig, 2009; Jarrow, 2011; Mengle, 2007). 
Parameters: Factors that are hypothesized to set the conditions of operations for 
the ARIMA model involving CDSs and CMOs (Glass et al., 2008; NIST, 2012). 
Rational-comprehensive model: Public policymaking model based on the rational-
comprehensive theory in which policy is a proactive process of deliberative, analytical 
decision making that is guided by clear goals, values, or objectives in order to select the 
optimal alternative for implementation (Arrow, 1987; Simon, 1957). 
Regulation: Statutes and administrative rules governing the conduct and 
supervision of banking activity (Anderson, 2006, pp. 11-13; SCB, 2011). 
Securitization: Method of financing that enables lenders to access capital in the 
marketplace and that enhances liquidity. Loans that had been originated by a lender are 
pooled into a legal entity, which is then sold to investors as bonds based on the expected 
cash flow of the underlying loans (Ashcraft & Schuermann, 2008; Begg, 2008; Jarrow, 
2011; SIFMA, 2010). 
Subprime Mortgage Loan: Mortgage loan in which the underlying borrower has 
heightened default risk as indicated by a credit score of 650 (or less) or debt-to-income 
ratio of 40% (or more; Ashcraft & Schuermann, 2008; Jarrow, 2011; SIFMA, 2010). 
Universal bank: Privately owned, chartered depository institution and lender 





regulated by the FDIC and its investment banking activities are regulated under GLBA 
(Bordo, 2008; Geyfman & Yeager, 2009; Walter, 2009). 
Assumptions, Scope and Delimitations, and Limitations 
The scope of this quantitative research study is defined in this section together 
with assumptions used in the quantitative research design, the delimitations of research, 
and limitations related to the quantitative design that threaten its validity.  
Assumptions 
The secondary data used in this quantitative research study were published by the 
U.S. government, including the FRS and the U.S. DOL, Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS, 
2013). These data were assumed to be current, accurate, and complete when reported, but 
were analyzed for outliers as part of the ARIMA modeling process (IBM, 2012; NIST, 
2012). Although these are government data, there is the risk that the financial institutions 
either submitted incorrect information or that true data were incorrectly tabulated and 
reported. Discontinuity in data collected by the FRS can arise from changes in definitions 
or valuations and from breaks in receiving data, though the value of discontinuity is 
reported to be zero for most periods and data series (Board of Governors, 2013a), which 
means that data from this source are in general highly accurate and near complete. The 
assumption that FRS data are correct is necessary because I lacked the independent 
means to verify the data. It is also assumed that the U.S. financial system regulations and 
banking supervision are lawful, despite concerns by some economists and legal scholars 





government during the GFC were unconstitutional. This assumption is necessary because 
of the potential delay associated with the confirmation of legality through judicial review 
that could involve a multiyear legal process. 
Scope and Delimitations 
The scope of this quantitative research study was U.S. financial institutions during 
the recent GFC. The population corresponding to U.S. financial institutions was the basis 
for data sampling, and research results are generalized to this scope (Creswell, 2009). The 
focus of this quantitative study was on financial institution regulations because these 
were enacted at a point in time and can be operationalized to measure related results in 
the financial system (Eichengreen et al., 2009; He, 2010; Jordà, Schularick, & Taylor, 
2012). Financial institutions of countries other than the U.S. were excluded from the 
scope of this quantitative research study. Although the U.S. participates in the global 
financial system, there lacks a standardized regulatory structure among the national 
central banks (Kose et al., 2009) and there was no associated global regulatory 
supervision (“Global Regulation,” 2009).  
The scope of the research study excluded the U.S. monetary policy of the FRS in 
which macroeconomics principles were applied to manage economic performance, which 
also impacted financial institution results (Board of Governors, 2005). Despite 
delimitation, macroeconomics remained influential in public policy because economic 
performance was the context for applying many regulatory decisions. Lower interest rates 





had remained constant and loose (Angeriz, 2009; Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
2013c; Kalinowski, 2011) and therefore the quantitative research design must have a 
control variable that was not a macroeconomics measure targeting monetary policy 
(targets include gross domestic product [GDP], the unemployment rate, price indices; 
Board of Governors, 2005). 
Limitations 
Quantitative methodology limits the universe of independent variables that could 
be used to explain the U.S. capital flow aspect of the dependent variable CMO because 
these variables must be a coherent grouping based in academic literature (Creswell, 
2009). The quasiexperimental design in this quantitative research study included inherent 
weaknesses associated with using time series methods. Some of these inherent 
weaknesses were the lack of a control group and the inability to control for concurrent 
historical events (Glass et al., 2008). As a result, a control variable of LPR was included 
in the ARIMA. Additionally, there was the risk of extrapolation of results beyond the 
time frame and data setting of the quantitative study. There are loose controls in that 
quasiexperimental samples are drawn purposefully for an experimental group and 
consequently lack random sampling and a control group (Glass et al., 2008). Data 
analysis is used as a substitute for controls, including ARIMA modeling, regression 
analysis, and statistical procedures to address time series data issues (Glass et al., 2008). 





definitions, like capital, were defined or measured differently over time. I address validity 
concerns regarding the operationalization of variables in Chapter 3 (Creswell, 2009). 
Significance of the Study 
Financial institutions are essential to the performance of the economy (Das, 
Chenard, & Quintyn, 2004) and identifying instances of regulatory policy that are related 
to adverse results will help to improve the stability of the financial system (Cherny & 
Craig, 2009; Haubrich & Lucas, 2007). Essential human needs are met through economic 
relationships that depend upon these institutions (Fisher, 2008), which becomes more 
apparent in times of financial system dysfunction when job loss, homelessness, and 
hardship in the economy are amplified (Lusardi, 2011). Enhancing the stability of 
financial institutions benefits the public good (Quintyn & Taylor, 2002), especially as 
financial problems easily spread in the increasingly globalized economy (Eichengreen et 
al., 2009; Lin & Martin, 2010; Vicente & Araújo, 2010). 
Professionals involved in the ongoing U.S. response to the GFC as either the 
regulator or the regulated would benefit from the findings of this quantitative research 
study. It is important for academia and practitioners to recognize the relationships 
between regulations and financial system results because policy actions must be neither 
overapplied nor underapplied, so that unintended policy consequences are not generated 
(Aizenman, 2009; Goulder, Jacobsen, & Van Benthem, 2009). Furthermore, 





public interest against negative spillover from private markets, which threatens the social 
welfare (McCarty, 2001).  
Social change is needed in order to address the borrower and lender relationship 
that was complicated by the rise of financial intermediaries and left weakened at the end 
of the Great Recession (Warren, 2008). Access to credit for prime and subprime 
borrowers to purchase a new home, refinance a mortgage loan, or purchase goods and 
services is the social purpose of liquidity (Akerlof & Shiller, 2009). Yet, while liquidity 
is a social construct based upon a depositor willing put a dollar in the bank for lending to 
a borrower, the relief from illiquidity was only provided to those U.S. financial 
institutions that created the credit problem (Walter, 2009). Borrowers instead experienced 
record levels of foreclosed homes (Mian et al., 2011) while individual mortgage holders 
who were foreclosed upon (thus losing all their existing equity even at then current 
market prices) and society collectively bore the financial institutions’ losses as a result of 
government actions during the GFC that socialized this risk (Khademian, 2009). The trust 
that is essential to the borrower and lender relationship was breached and so ongoing 
liquidity depends on its restoration, whether through actions by U.S. financial institutions 
or U.S. regulators as their proxy (Statman, 2009). 
Summary 
This quantitative scientifically based research study was a public policy and 
administration inquiry into the problem of capital movement and financial system 





following: What is the nature of the relationship between the independent variables—
CDSs regulations (the CFMA and the EESA) and the dependent variable—flow of capital 
into CMOs (as measured by millions of U.S. dollars each quarter) when lenders share 
their borrower-related loan risks through intermediaries with other market participants? 
The quasiexperimental design that was used to answer this question was an 
ARIMA lagged time series used for public policy analysis. By probing this problem as a 
public policy concern, the principles and processes of public policymaking and 
evaluation were considered, contributing to the ongoing policy dialogue of financial 
stability and liquidity.  
In Chapter 1, I presented the overview of the quantitative research study. I explore 
the quantitative research question in Chapter 2 (the literature review), which is evaluated 
on the theoretical basis of governance by the FRS and includes current research on 
financial stability, regulations, and proposed quantitative research design. The themes 
and trends from the existing research literature are developed and applied to the 
quantitative research methodology, which I discuss in Chapter 3. I present the results 
from the quantitative research in Chapter 4 and discuss these results and their 





Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
The U.S. financial system succumbed to a GFC in 2008 despite a robust economy 
and decades of national and global efforts to build safe and sound financial institutions. 
In the aftermath of the GFC, there was a flurry of quantitative and qualitative scholarly 
research (2008 to 2013) to attempt to understand the crisis and its precursors and 
components. The output of this research literature followed five different themes based 
upon the perspective and data of the researcher: capital movement, regulatory structure, 
financial innovation, mortgage derivative instruments, methods and designs used in past 
analyses. A common point in these themes was that the GFC was preceded by excess risk 
in the U.S. financial system. This quantitative research study was undertaken to 
determine how the dependent variable—capital deployed to CMOs—is related to the 
independent variables—U.S. regulatory decisions CDSs (the CFMA and the EESA). 
In Chapter 2 I provide a synthesis of the literature reviewed and begin with an 
overview of the search method. I provide a brief history of the theoretical basis of the 
U.S. financial system stability and follow that with a summary of current research on the 
theoretical foundation approaches of garbage can model and rational-comprehensive 
model. I summarize the GFC triggers and review the literature in the context of the crisis 
and the associated mortgage derivative risk in the U.S. financial system. At the end of 





empirical and theoretical literature so that they can be applied in Chapter 3 (Research 
Methodology). 
Search Method 
The Internet was the predominant search method, using online libraries, academic 
article databases, and government-published gray literature (written material not typically 
published in peer-reviewed journals; American Psychological Association (APA), 2010; 
Borum, 2004, pp. 6-9). I searched these databases using an iterative process based upon 
keywords in order to identify the relevant public policy and economic literature. I took a 
multidisciplinary database approach because the quantitative research topic spanned 
public policy, business, economic, political, and social science research literature. I also 
searched for literature in the Elton B. Stephens Company (EBSCO) EBSCOhost 
multidisciplinary collection: Academic Search Complete, Business Source Complete, 
Military and Government Collection, Political Science, and SocINDEX with Full Text. I 
also searched databases for articles and gray literature from the FRS, NBER, the World 
Bank (WB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Because the 2008 financial 
crisis was global, I took an expansive perspective by researching authors and articles 
from outside the United States, including the United Kingdom, Europe and the European 
Union, Asia, Australia, South America, and Canada, in English only. 
I generated search terms used in the database research from a keyword analysis of 
365 working papers issued between December 2008 and October 2010 by NBER, the 





official U.S. business cycles (Moore & Zarnowitz, 1986; NBER, 2010). The three 
primary search terms identified were financial (in 134 working papers), risk (in 120 
working papers), and regulation (in 43 working papers). Through this process, I 
identified some additional search terms including crisis, systemic, control, stability, and 
consequences. I supplemented these search terms with keywords associated with GFC 
financial instruments: derivative, credit default swap, collateralized, and securitization. 
Keywords were used singularly and in Boolean combinations by searching both title and 
abstract fields for articles published between 2007 and 2013. There were 346 references 
cited in the text. 
Theoretical Basis 
The theoretical basis of this quantitative research study was the stability of the 
U.S. financial system, which was examined within the public policymaking context of the 
rational-comprehensive theory and the garbage can theory as contrasting frameworks for 
policymaking models. The Board of Governors of the FRS is a federal government 
agency responsible for economic performance and financial stability (Board of 
Governors, 2005). The board’s chairperson, vice chairperson, and seven board members 
are appointed by the President of the United States and confirmed by the U.S. Senate 
(Board of Governors, 2005). The chairperson of the board of governors during the GFC 
was Bernanke, whose position bore the macroprudential responsibility and operational 
control for the monetary policy (Raines, Leathers, & Richardson, 2009; Schinasi, 2003; 





this theoretical basis, particularly those studies relating to monetary policy (Angeriz, 
2009; Aspachs, Goodhart, Tsomocos, & Zicchino, 2007; Geyfman & Yeager, 2009; 
Mikesell, 2007; Negrilă, 2009). 
The primary role of the FRS in the U.S. economic system is to conduct the 
monetary policy through the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) by influencing 
monetary and credit conditions in pursuit of optimal economic development, largely 
through manipulation of the Federal funds rate (Board of Governors, 2005). Monetary 
policy is intended to produce maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-
term interest rates (Angeriz, 2009; Goodhart & Tsomocos, 2007). The most significant of 
the FRS’s monetary policy tools is the open market operations conducted by the FOMC, 
in which the U.S. Treasury bonds are bought or sold to increase or decrease liquidity and 
thus impact the cost of bank lending. The FRS also implements monetary policy through 
the federal funds rate which is the rate that member depository institutions trade balances 
(Angeriz, 2009; Board of Governors, 2005). 
The duty of the FRS related to financial stability is to contain systemic risks that 
may arise in financial markets (Board of Governors, 2005). The safety and soundness of 
the banking and financial system is ensured through the supervision and regulation of 
financial institutions (Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, & Richardson, 2009; Board of 
Governors, 2005; Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2013a; de la Torre & Ize, 2009). 
The framework for this supervision is the components of the rating systems: Capital 





market risk (CAMELS; Board of Governors, 2005), which was an approach for assessing 
the presence of potential instability in regulated financial institutions. The body of 
existing research literature related to the GFC confirmed the presence of failure in each of 
the six CAMELS components. 
The operational capabilities of the FRS include banking supervision and the 
intervention authority to control liquidity in the banking system as warranted by events 
(Board of Governors, 2005; Wagner, 2010). After the GFC, intervention powers were 
expanded with the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) that was established 
under Dodd-Frank in 2010. The purpose of the FSOC is to provide comprehensive 
monitoring of the U.S. financial system, identify risks to its stability and to respond to 
emerging risks such as those experienced during the GFC (DOT, 2013). Yet, a key 
operating constraint of the FRS is the need to coordinate monetary policy with the U.S. 
fiscal policymaking of taxation and government spending (Super, 2005). 
The contrasting theoretical frameworks of the rational-comprehensive theory 
(Arrow, 1987; Simon, 1957) and the garbage can theory (Kingdon, 2003) were used in 
the currently reviewed research on public policymaking, including separately (Lauckner, 
2012; Lee, 2012) and in combination (Keeney, 2012). These two frameworks, which I 
reviewed in Chapter 1, were unreconciled as public policymaking models because of the 
chaotic processes aligned with the garbage can approach and the logical consequences 
aligned with the rational-comprehensive approach (Keeney, 2012). Regulatory policy in 





2012), while other federal policymaking had been examined using the garbage can model 
with comparably sound methodology (Lauckner, 2012). Rather than introducing potential 
researcher bias by favoring a worldview that was alternately chaotic or logical, these 
contrasting frameworks were incorporated into this ARIMA model research design and 
structured as opposing alternate hypotheses for testing so that the outcome determined the 
policymaking type. 
Research Design 
Quantitative research designs among the literature reviewed demonstrated the 
relationships of economic and regulatory variables to the 2008 GFC (Billio et al., 2010; 
Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier, & Stulz, 2011). Time series analyses added to this body of 
knowledge by identifying financial system changes over extended periods of years and 
decades (Das et al., 2004; Fahlenbrach et al., 2011; Hinich, Foster, & Wild, 2006). The 
time series research methodology used in GFC research was a type of regression analysis 
consistent with quantitative theory (Creswell, 2009; Glass et al., 2008) and with 
economic measurement (DeLong & Summers, 1986; Friedman, 1986; Gorton, 1994).  
Times Series Regression and ARIMA Analysis 
The results from time series regression analyses provided a precedent for research 
design methodology and for time frames to further study and analyze (Richey, 2008; 
Shahbaz, Shamin, & Aamir, 2010; Wang, Zhou, & Zhou, 2011). Regression analyses 





according to research objectives and statistical refinements were applied based upon the 
problem inherent in the data.  
The Breusch-Pagan test was used to test data for heteroskedasticity of variable 
residuals, which showed whether the values of the independent variable resulted in 
differing levels of variances (Richey, 2008). The application of this test statistic was to 
transform raw data into a form that could be analyzed further in a bell curve with 
regression statistics (NIST, 2012). The data transformation in Breusch-Pagan was a 
curve-fitting method incorporating estimated Feasible GLS to value the variable residuals 
so that test statistics could be compared to variances, rather than using an assumed GLS 
(NIST, 2012; Parsad et al., 2012; Richey, 2008). The importance of GLS was in refining 
the technique for estimating unknown parameters based upon the specific data set being 
analyzed. The generalized least squares (GLS) model was used when the time series data 
had state-level subsets (Richey, 2008). A traditional macroeconomic analysis had fully 
modified ordinary least squares (OLS) for long-term association and for short-term error 
correction (Shahbaz et al., 2010).  
The Ng-Perron test was used to determine the integrating order of variables based 
on the  coefficient and the associated p-value (Shahbaz et al., 2010; NIST, 2012). The 
common application of this test statistic was to analyze pairs of asset prices to determine 
whether the pairing was random or not (Ng & Perron, 2000). A key data problem with 





selection of time series lags with good size and power (> .80) even when the sample size 
was limited (Ng & Perron, 2000; Shahbaz et al., 2010).  
The Granger causality test was used to demonstrate cause and effect to known 
covariation relationships (Wang et al., 2011). The value of this test statistic is in 
facilitating development path analyses and causal models (Billio et al., 2010; Parsad et 
al., 2012). The logic underlying the procedure was that a cause appears before an effect 
and this should be identifiable in the data such that X1 Granger-causes X2 to the extent 
that past values of X1 predicts a value of X2 more than do the past value of X2 alone 
(NIST, 2012; Parsad et al., 2012; Seth, 2007; StatSoft, 2012b). 
ARIMA modeling was used to identify parameter differences from a 
nonstationary time series (Adams, Akano, & Asemota, 2011). The preliminary 
transformation involved the process of differencing in which the data were divided into 
series that had stationary autocorrelations (Adams et al., 2011; NIST, 2012). 
Autocorrelation referred to the correlation of a time series with its own past and future 
values (NIST, 2012). The stationary series were analyzed for autocorrelation and partial 
autocorrelation features in order to estimate the AR (autoregressive) and MA (moving 
average) parts of the ARIMA parameters, including the examination of plotted data and 
“subjective” interpretation (Adams et al., 2011, p. 31). Partial autocorrelation refers to the 
correlation of a time series with itself and with the contributions of previous lags being 
removed. Partial autocorrelations cut off when the desired autocorrelation term is reached 





The adequacy of the ARIMA model parameters were diagnosed for statistical 
significance with p-values and for goodness of fit using stationary R2, Bayesian 
information criteria (BIC), standard error of the estimate, and Q-statistic (Adams et al., 
2011), which are each explained in this section. The p-value was the probability of 
obtaining a time series test statistic at least as extreme as the result that was observed, 
assuming the null hypothesis was true (NIST, 2012; Parsad et al., 2012). The p-values 
were compared to the 1% and 10% levels (Adams et al., 2011), with the lower the p-
value, the more strongly the time series test statistic rejected the null hypothesis (NIST, 
2012; Parsad et al., 2012). The stationary R2 was the fraction of variance explained by the 
stationary times series model (Adams et al., 2011; Green & Salkind, 2008; IBM, 2012). 
The BIC was used for considering the adequacy of an ARIMA model in comparison to its 
alternatives (Adams et al., 2011). The BIC was a fitting of two models to the data in order 
to determine the version with the smaller differences between observed and expected 
values by using the likelihood ratio test (Adams et al., 2011; Bollen, Harden, Ray, & 
Zavisca, in press; NIST, 2012). The standard error of the estimate was the measure of the 
accuracy of AR (autoregressive) and MA (moving average) parts of the ARIMA model in 
predicting the observed values (Adams et al., 2011; NIST, 2012). The Q-statistic was 
expected to be statistically insignificant in order to demonstrate a well-fitted ARIMA 
model, based on the Ljung-Box test for randomness of autocorrelations in the time series 





Variables and Date Ranges 
The number of independent variables in the quantitative studies reviewed mostly 
ranged from 2 to 8 (Billio et al., 2010; Bordo & Haubrich, 2009; Das et al., 2004), with 
up to 8 used when there was a less obvious structure to the research design (Das et al., 
2004; He, 2010). These independent variables were determined through qualitative 
methods, mixed methods, and quantitative methods. Causal analysis that was a topic of 
qualitative research during the GFC (Poole, 2010) was refined in the crisis aftermath 
(Jickling, 2010; Nanto, 2009). The qualitative causal analyses generated led to the 
identification of independent variables used in later quantitative designs, such as the 
classification of financial institutions by regulatory structure (Billio et al., 2010). Mixed 
methods research resulted in analytical frameworks like capital mobility and financial 
institution risk (Bordo, 2008; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2008a).  
Date ranges of studies incorporating the GFC began with various events in order 
to coordinate with the research purpose. The most common demarcation for those 
purposes involving long-term globalization and financial system deregulation and 
innovation was 1980 (in order to isolate a uniform regulatory environment; Aizenman, 
2009; Phillips, 2008; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2008a). Studies involving U.S. financial 
institutions often had a date range beginning after the resolution of the 1988 savings and 
loan crisis (in order to isolate a uniform marketplace; Cassell & Hoffman, 2009), 





Current Research on the Financial Crisis 
The scholarly and incremental dialogue on financial system stability was 
disrupted swiftly in 2008 at the time of the GFC. Unfolding events of the emergent GFC 
were seldom forewarned in the literature and these events, involving the theme of capital 
movement, defied simple explanations. Suddenly, seasoned policymakers and researchers 
were confounded with the presence of instability and crisis in the rapidly globalizing 
financial system (Statman, 2009). This globalizing financial system was supposed to have 
been made more stable in the 1990s as a result of major regulatory overhauls of the U.S. 
financial system, which was a key theme in the literature (Bucur, 2009; Dobson, 2008; 
Drew, 2010; Mussa, 2009; Statman, 2009). 
The resulting shift in the research literature broadened the academic discussion 
beyond the largely quantitative output of the economics discipline. Simultaneously, the 
tone in some publications gained in expressions of urgency and conviction as the GFC 
became a matter of public policy (Breen, 2010; De Grauwe, 2008a; Issa, 2010; Paul, 
2010; Weissman & Donohue, 2009). The U.S. model of capitalism, closely tied to its 
political values, faced an existential threat from the GFC (Whitley, 2009) that was being 
defended even while financial institution failures spread among nations (Gamble, 2009; 
Marks, 2009; Milne & Wood, 2009). Some authors added anchored their arguments in 
Constitutional viewpoints thereby adding public policy depth to the topic of banking 
regulation by examining the legal bounds of public policymaking associated with 





The increasingly prolific output of research was generated from multidisciplinary 
authors of varying perspectives, with much of the research including an aspect of theme 
of subprime mortgage securitization and mortgage derivative instruments. NBER 
supported U.S. government policymakers with economic analyses (Aizenman, 2009; 
Moore & Zarnowitz, 1986). Respected research journal authors went to press in book 
form (Immergluck, 2009; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009), and well-established authors 
published books that added accurate and factual historical context to the crisis (Ferguson, 
2008; Phillips, 2008). Useful articles included analyses of the GFC (Acharya, Philippon, 
Richardson, & Roubini, 2009), an element of the GFC (Lea, 2010), or an important detail 
like the process of subprime mortgage securitization (Ashcraft & Schuermann, 2008). 
Conversely, among the articles reviewed there were instances of subtle bias favoring 
free-market economic theory (Barth et al., 2008), overt bias related to the economic role 
of the United States (“Global Regulation,” 2009), and factual error in ascribing 
responsibility for the GFC (Gökay, 2009). To provide for quality and diversity in 
research sources, the various authors, or their journals, were sampled and compared to a 
benchmark journal for commonality in citations of authors and journals. Volume 31 of 
the Journal of Post-Keynesian Economics that was published in 2009 was used as the 
benchmark journal.  
Articles written before the GFC were particularly useful in assessing the literature 
without the bias of hindsight (Aspachs et al., 2007). Yet, hindsight hardly seemed 





(Ferguson, 2008; Fox, 2009; Kindleberger & Aliber, 2005). The pre-GFC literature 
provided for methodological insight (DeLong & Summers, 1986) and for the 
identification of public policy independent and dependent variables aligning with the 
GFC literature (Caprio & Honohan, 2005; Eichengreen, 2002; Haubrich & Lucas, 2007; 
Neill, 2010). 
As promised in Chapter 1, I have included a critical assessment of research 
regarding the GFC in U.S. financial institutions and have paid attention to its crucial 
details in the literature review. I begin the literature review with the background to the 
trigger events of the GFC, which is a synthesis of empirical data from research journals 
and key books (Felsenheimer & Gisdakis, 2008; Immergluck, 2009; Phillips, 2008). 
Next, I cover the macro-oriented topics of capital movement and financial institution 
regulatory structures as well as the narrower topics of financial instrument innovation and 
mortgage derivative instruments. 
Financial Instruments and the Global Financial Crisis Triggers 
The GFC triggers that set markets into motion represented a linkage of the 
research themes of the financial crisis to the details of financial instruments (Booth, 
2008). The consideration of regulatory issues associated with the GFC must account for 
regulatory changes that long-preceded the crisis and the market events that defined the 
crisis (Rossi, 2010). The relevance of the GFC triggers was guided by research of earlier 
financial crises that had triggers that were similarly a relatively small part of the economy 





an empirical and approximated manner, in order to generate comparisons over time 
(Geyfman & Yeager, 2009). 
The GFC trigger events dated to the fourth quarter of 2007 with the collapse of 
the U.S. asset securitization market and its financial instruments mechanisms (Acharya, 
Philippon, et al., 2009; Felsenheimer & Gisdakis, 2008, pp. 32, 175, 200). Asset 
securitization was an innovation in credit and debt instruments whereby financial 
institutions made loans that were sold into a security, and then the institution issued 
bonds to investors based on these aggregated loan assets (Phillips, 2008, p. 71; Rossi, 
2010). U.S. originated securities were sold throughout the world’s financial markets to 
investors (Jarrow, 2011) and were later repackaged by intermediaries into derivative 
securities, or CDOs including CMOs. Multiple asset classes were securitized, but the 
practice started with and centered upon subprime mortgage loans to homeowners with 
impaired or falsified (mortgage originator tweaked) borrower qualifications (Ashcraft & 
Schuermann, 2008; Felsenheimer & Gisdakis, 2008, pp. 118-122; Frame, Lehnert, & 
Jarrow, 2011; Friedland, 2009; Prescott, 2008). 
The valuation of the GFC’s trigger was the amount of securitized assets including 
subprime loans and was estimated at $3 trillion U.S. dollars (Ferguson, 2008, p. 4). In an 
annual global economy of $47 trillion U.S. dollars of goods and services, these trigger 
securities represented a moderate 6.4% of U.S. annual economic output (Ferguson, 2008, 
p. 4). When considered as assets, these securities compared to 5.9% of the valuation of 





the global bond market (Ferguson, 2008, p. 4). As a component of global capital markets 
valued at $175 trillion U.S. dollars (Sinclair, 2009, p. 452), the $3 trillion U.S. dollars of 
securitized assets were merely 1.7%, which indicated a modest global risk. The trigger 
valuation diminished by two thirds to less than $1 trillion U.S. dollars when considering 
just the losses on the then current value of the underlying assets of foreclosed homes 
(Felsenheimer & Gisdakis, 2008, p. 121). Conversely, the trigger valuation was 
magnified by derivative transactions like CDOs and its CMOs subset together with credit 
default and interest rate swaps (often exchanging a fixed for a floating payment) derived 
from contracts underlying loans and securities (Eichengreen et al., 2009; ISDA, 2012b). 
These swaps grew from $473 trillion to $680 trillion U.S. dollars between 2006 and 2009 
while remaining tenfold the annual global economy (Born, 2009; Ferguson, 2008, p. 4). 
The CDSs of $60 trillion U.S. dollars at the onset of the GFC was greater than the annual 
output of the global economy (Huian, 2010), which clearly indicated a significant global 
risk. Furthermore, these CDSs equated to nearly one third of the global capital markets’ 
valuation (Sinclair, 2009, p. 452). 
Key long-term market trends that preceded the GFC were related to the trigger 
and dated to the 1980s (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2008a). In the 1980s, debt levels that had 
been stable since the end of World War II began to grow at a pace not experienced before 
(Phillips, 2008, p. 7), and as demonstrated by debt levels of U.S. businesses and 
consumers. Domestic U.S. debt for financing businesses progressively doubled during the 





following decade, the 2000s had home mortgage debt double between 2001 and 2007 
driven by consumer consumption (Phillips, 2008, p. 51), lax lending standards, and 
abusive banking practices (Friedland, 2009; Warren, 2008). Concurrently, increasing 
home prices (and the related growing intangible equity) replaced the stock market as the 
main asset for U.S. residents (Phillips, 2008, p. 13). 
Financial institutions participated in long-term market trends by shifting capital 
into home mortgages and doubled their capital allocation for home mortgages from 30% 
to 60% of capital (Phillips, 2008, p. 32). In order to keep generating fees from new loans, 
lenders freed capital by selling their loans to the Government Sponsored Enterprises 
(GSEs) supporting the secondary market for home mortgages (Cassell & Hoffman, 
2009). Operating with an implied guarantee of the U.S. government, GSE financial 
commitments spiked between 2001 and 2007 (Felsenheimer & Gisdakis, 2008, pp. 111, 
132). By 2010, home mortgages owned by GSEs were a government-backed obligation 
of $6.7 trillion U.S. dollars (Federal Housing Finance Agency, 2011), representing 40% 
of the size of the U.S. economy (Ferguson & Johnson, 2009). 
The home mortgage debt spike from 2001 to 2007 was significant for its size, the 
coupling of risk with the U.S. government, and the increasing loan risk (Rossi, 2010). At 
its peak over half of all new home loans originated from mortgage banking companies, 
which were growing outside the regulatory controls imposed on commercial banks 
(Immergluck, 2009, p. 65). Meanwhile, subprime loans grew 330% from under $180 





(Felsenheimer & Gisdakis, 2008, p. 118). The quality of subprime loans was lower in 
2007 than it had been in 2001 (Rossi, 2010), based on consumer debt levels and loans 
with fully documented income. During this period consumer debt levels rose to 42% (in 
2007) from 40% (in 2001) of monthly debt payments compared to income (Immergluck, 
2009, pp. 86, 130). Concurrently, loans with income from employment and investments 
fully documented fell to 50% (in 2007) of new loans from 72% (in 2001), and 
homeowners had less equity despite the increasing house values (Immergluck, 2009, pp. 
86, 130; Rossi, 2010). These and various borrower quality attributes were combined in 
individual loans that layered risk upon risk (Rossi, 2010). 
As trigger events neared, interest rates were raised by the FOMC beginning in 
2004 over concerns with an inflationary economic growth rate (Felsenheimer & Gisdakis, 
2008, p. 36; Schinasi, 2003). First-time and existing homeowners responded by changing 
to adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) that had a lower starting interest rate than fixed rate 
mortgages (FRMs; Woods, 2009, p. 21), but that were subject to large increases based 
upon the Prime Rate and/or included balloon payments (and sometimes the homeowner 
was unaware of this fact). During 2007 alone, there were $500 billion U.S. dollars of 
ARM loans outstanding set to adjust into higher interest rates to the borrowers (Phillips, 
2008, p. 11). Although the risk was up, the cost of money remained cheap for borrowers 
(De Grauwe, Lannoo, & Mayer, 2008). Ongoing asset securitization reinforced cheap 
money because the most favorable Standard and Poor’s bond rating of AAA covered 





The trend of cheap, risky money conjoined with a slowing economy where homeowners 
financially had less ability and less motivation to make monthly mortgage payments 
(Rossi, 2010).  
A mortgage banking company, New Century Mortgage (NCM), might have been 
the weakest point in this weakened financial system (Rossi, 2010), and its failure in 2007 
was a trigger of the GFC (Felsenheimer & Gisdakis, 2008, p. 26; Marks, 2009). 
Delinquency in monthly mortgage payments rose to such a level that not enough cash 
was leaving NCM securitizations to fund its ongoing operations, resulting in bond rating 
downgrades to subprime securities market-wide (Felsenheimer & Gisdakis, 2008, pp. 47, 
197, 199; Immergluck, 2009, p. 128). As NCM was failing with expected credit losses on 
subprime mortgages, there was widespread concern that accounting rules on fair value 
would be required to be immediately recognized (Barua & Gujarathi, 2009; Felsenheimer 
& Gisdakis, 2008, p. 121; Wallace, 2009). The contagion spread quickly from mortgage 
banking companies into those banks involved in subprime mortgage such that a chain of 
bank failures ended only with U.S. government rescue (Eichengreen et al., 2009; 
Felsenheimer & Gisdakis, 2008, pp. 124-125). Lending standards quickly tightened after 
the GFC onset, but not enough to prevent the failure and nationalization of the GSEs or 
the failure of most mortgage companies (Cassell & Hoffman, 2009; Felsenheimer & 
Gisdakis, 2008, pp. 39, 49, 131; Marks, 2009). 
The culmination of long- and short-term trends was that total U.S. household debt 





borrowers (Phillips, 2008, p. 43). Housing values fell steadily during the GFC, entwining 
the negative trends in the financial system and the real economy (Felsenheimer & 
Gisdakis, 2008, p. 22; Rossi, 2010). By February 2009, the median U.S. house value 
stood at $175,000 compared to the May 2006 peak of $225,000 (Ferguson, 2008, p. 263; 
Hull, 2008). The bubble pattern of the 1990s technology-driven stock market repeated 
itself with remarkable similarity in the bursting housing bubble of 2008 (Fleckenstein & 
Sheehan, 2008, p. 12; Guttmann, 2009; Phillips, 2008, p. 188; Rossi, 2010). 
Capital Movement: Stability, Mobility, and Arbitrage 
Capital movement was described in the research literature in terms of its stability 
(Barth et al., 2008; Schinasi, 2003), mobility (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2008a), and arbitrage 
(De Grauwe, 2008a; Frachot, 2010; Lumpkin, 2010; Rossi, 2010). Stability, mobility, and 
arbitrage were related constructs that at times overlapped when used to describe capital 
movement in a multifaceted, interconnected financial system (Bair, 2008; Billio et al., 
2010; Wagner, 2010). Together, these constructs formed a structure to demonstrate how 
capital moved in a way that was related to the crisis in the U.S. financial system. Because 
one phenomenon like the GFC cannot be explained with another phenomenon like capital 
movement, these constructs are linked to actions in financial institutions and synthesized 
in this literature review.  
Capital stability means that capital favors inertia and then moves in accordance to 
the policymaking of the central banker or from regulatory changes (Geyfman & Yeager, 





supply equals demand (Skidelsky, 2009). The movement of capital represents instability, 
which worsens qualitatively by the redeployment of capital into a higher-risk use. 
Instability emerges either from a poor macroeconomic environment or from the 
deterioration of a component of the financial system (Barth et al., 2008; Fetisov, 2009). 
The practical problem is the central bankers managing macroeconomic policy are 
simultaneously managing stability (Geyfman & Yeager, 2009). When instability emerges 
in the midst of robust economic performance as in 2007, these policies were especially 
difficult to manage because instability cannot be readily fixed by loosening monetary 
policy (Booth, 2008; Kindleberger & Aliber, 2005, p. 239).  
Capital mobility means the ease of movement across the boundaries of national 
borders and regulatory structures, which could destabilize the financial system (Bordo & 
Helbling, 2010; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2008a). The global nature of the GFC is consistent 
with the presence of capital mobility, and research had shown the multinational aspect of 
such crises to be a normative feature (Kindleberger & Aliber, 2005, p. 106). Although 
capital mobility is associated with instability in a mutually reinforcing way, its negative 
implications are less apparent in the short-term than the long-term. Clear evidence of the 
ongoing global economic cycles and financial crises related to capital mobility is derived 
from analysis of an 800-year time horizon (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2008a).  
Capital arbitrage means that capital moved from one regulatory structure to 
another more favorable for profits while holding the amount of capital constant and 





2008a; Frachot, 2010; Khademian, 2009). Yet, the time frame for arbitrage is problematic 
when the setting changes from economics to public policy. Arbitrage implies a 
simultaneous transaction of buying and selling to profit from inefficient market structures 
while it might take years for capital to move in response to regulatory structures (Frachot, 
2010). In economics, harm from capital arbitrage is the public’s exposure to irrationality 
during the period for the market to self-correct (Ambachtsheer, 2008). From a public 
policy perspective, temporarily irrational markets created consequences that the 
government and its citizens might have been unwilling to endure (Fox, 2009). 
The conceptual synthesis is of capital moving quickly and easily around the 
global financial system while leaving a mark on the real economy. The inertia related to 
financial system stability could be disrupted by regulatory and monetary policy changes, 
with instability as a byproduct (He, 2010). The alignment of forces like capital mobility, 
regulatory arbitrage, and systemic instability favored the conditions associated with the 
onset of the financial crisis in the United States that led to the GFC. 
Banking Regulatory Framework and Financial Stability 
A change of banking regulatory frameworks was rare in U.S. history and 
profoundly impacted the financial system and the real economy when it was changed 
(Peretz & Schroedel, 2009). In the 1990s, legislation changed this framework while 
concurrently changing commercial bank capital rules by adopting the global capital 
standards in the Basel Accords (Berger, DeYoung, Flannery, Lee, & Öztekin, 2008; Kose 





shifted its financial strategy and deregulated its financial markets with the GLBA of 1999 
(Cornford, 2009). This regulatory framework exchange was inherently destabilizing to 
the United States financial system (Wagner, 2010). 
Regulatory framework. Banking serves a vital role in capitalism both as a 
component of the economy and as a provider of business investment (De Grauwe, 
2008a). The basic activity of commercial banking is to make loans to individuals and 
businesses in order to earn a profit from interest on loan balances (Benmelech & 
Moskowitz, 2010). The money that a bank lends comes from the investment of capital 
into the bank and from customers’ cash deposited into the bank. This relationship is 
termed leverage because a single dollar of capital can be leveraged by using the bank’s 
liabilities in the form of customer deposits (Jordà et al., 2012). In a basic example, for 
one dollar of bank capital there are nine dollars of cash deposits coupled with the capital 
in order to support 10 dollars of bank assets like mortgage loans. In a good economy, 
bank capital should grow from its earnings, but during a bad economy there must be 
enough bank capital to cover its loan losses (Geyfman & Yeager, 2009). 
The control of bank capital is the main purpose of the banking regulatory 
framework and its associated rules and structures (Ellul & Yerramilli, 2010; Kilian & 
Manganelli, 2008). Frameworks are determined through the political process, making 
political philosophy and economic theory as influential to the structure as the practical 
operating requirements (Brady, 2008). Regulations were incorporated continually into the 





use of capital to risk. Regulation became an important tool of democratic accountability 
as a proxy for the trust that was previously formed based upon personal knowledge of the 
individual and institutional reputation of the bank (Statman, 2009). Banks required 
ongoing supervision to assure that the financial system remained liquid and financial 
institutions remained solvent (Fujiwara et al., 2011). Control of bank capital had to be 
accomplished in an efficacious way yet consistent with democratic governance so that 
nonelected officials lacked excessive authority that could potentially stifle the free 
markets (Barth et al., 2008; Hafeez, 2003; Statman, 2009). 
The governance of bank capital is the responsibility of the FRS the U.S. central 
bank. The FRS operates quasi-independently in the regulatory framework that was 
legislated by Congress with the concurrence of the President of the United States (Peretz 
& Schroedel, 2009). Central bank duties and responsibilities were established about 400 
years ago in England, providing tradition and precedence in the creation of the U.S. FRS 
during the early twentieth century (Aspachs et al., 2007; Geyfman & Yeager, 2009). The 
functioning of the U.S. financial markets, including the commercial banking system, 
became the responsibility of the central bank (Arner, 2007, p. 136; Board of Governors, 
2005). When a crisis emerged the U.S. central bankers, led by the chairperson of the FRS 
board of governors, were expected to restore financial stability and minimize spillover 
damage to the real economy (Geyfman & Yeager, 2009; Tambovtsev, 2009).  
Financial stability and macroeconomic performance are the dual policymaking 





responsibilities because these required prudent control of large-scale economic 
relationships (Aizenman, 2009; Negrilă, 2009). The problem was that financial stability 
was often treated as a byproduct of monetary policy, rather than as a separate process of 
regulation and supervision (Arner, 2007, p. 34; Aspachs et al., 2007). The consistent 
result was that financial stability did not directly follow from effective management of 
the economy through the FRS (Aspachs et al., 2007; Geyfman & Yeager, 2009). 
The 1999 GLBA regulatory framework was designed to allow for discretion in the 
treatment of specific issues that could arise over time (Cornford, 2009), yet with problem 
solving and policymaking within the legal confines of the framework (Anderson, 2006, 
pp. 122-136). Decisions made within the regulatory framework were subjected to 
ongoing political processes and influences, bringing in factors other than rationality 
(Kingdon, 2003, pp. 77-82). The point is that the financial system, at the GFC onset, was 
not the predetermined result of the GLBA. Rather, alternatives forgone and policy 
options subsequently selected had produced the end state of the financial system that had 
the potential for crisis.  
Although the GLBA could be described as the national regulatory framework, 
Basel was the global regulatory architecture (Elson, 2010; Peretz & Schroedel, 2009; 
Wagner, 2010). The framework had to function within the architecture yet was not 
determined by it. Completion of the financial system details within the framework also 
satisfied the architectural requirements. The Basel Accords addressed banking capital yet 





GLBA from the 1933 GSA, which preceded Basel (Mussa, 2009; Wagner, 2009). The 
accords allowed for financial supervision through either unified or multiple national 
regulators (Mussa, 2009; Wagner, 2010).  
Basel and the GLBA were never formally linked, but the development of the 
GLBA in the 1990s took place within the context of rapid financial globalization that was 
perceived by some to be a rational U.S. response that was consistent with the Basel 
architecture (Barth et al., 2008; Geyfman & Yeager, 2009; Grant, 2010). Competitive 
pressure mounted from European banks already operating in the United States as 
universal banks (De Grauwe, 2008b; Garcia, 2009; Rajan, 2003, p. 247). Even as the U.S. 
commercial banks under the GLBA developed into the universal banks already used in 
Europe, the European authorities were allowing bank mergers across national borders that 
accelerated the market consolidation of banks (Garcia, 2009). Thus, banking 
development associated with the Basel architecture was dynamic during the period that 
the U.S. financial framework was shifting from the GSA to the GLBA (Barth et al., 
2008).  
Financial stability and risk mitigation strategy. The purpose of the GLBA, or 
the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, was deregulation of the financial 
system, including commercial and investment banks (Statman, 2009). It was a bipartisan 
political effort between the Democratic administration of President Clinton and the 
Republican-led Congress (Grumet, 2008). The GLBA authorized mergers between banks 





that had previously been restricted to investment banks (Billio et al., 2010; Papaioannou, 
2009). In so doing, Congress removed barriers that had been established by the GSA 
(Papaioannou, 2009). 
The GLBA and the GSA represented different risk mitigation strategies to achieve 
stability, safety, and soundness in the financial system (Statman, 2009). Risk mitigated 
through the monoline regulatory principle was accomplished by isolating and containing 
a type of risk within a single business line (Jaffee, 2009). The GSA exhibited traits of the 
monoline principle by isolating revenues from commercial banking and insurance from 
the more risky investment banking. When isolated, investment banks were shown 
empirically to be the riskier component of universal banking, consistent with the 
experience of their failure during the GFC (Bordo, 2008). Alternatively, risk was 
mitigated in the financial system through the diversification of mixing revenues, which 
was the approach in the GLBA (Jaffee, 2009; Neale, Clark, & Drake, 2010). 
The risk mitigation conflict between monoline businesses and diversification 
strategies reflected underlying political philosophy and economic theory about markets in 
industrialized nations (Boyd & De Nicoló, 2005; Brück, 2009; Jaffee, 2009). 
Diversification strategy was consistent with the free-market orientation in which personal 
choices, made freely, moved markets rationally and regulated markets naturally (Neale et 
al., 2010; Statman, 2009). The monoline strategy was consistent with the regulated-
market orientation in which the government took responsibility for decisions that directed 





generally aligned with intervention because many of them shared an understanding of the 
financial crisis as endogenous to financial markets (Sinclair, 2009). That is, crisis came 
from within financial markets and thereby justified the inclination for supervisory 
processes that prevent risks. For those with an exogenous understanding, the financial 
markets cannot be wrong (like with housing values), and so crisis must come from 
external causes (Sinclair, 2009). The policy conflict concerned government action. If 
viewed as endogenous, government actions fixed flaws in the financial markets; if 
viewed as exogenous, government actions caused flaws (Sinclair, 2009). This 
fundamental difference, explained by one’s orientation, hardened into a dividing line 
such that regulatory sensibilities paralleled beliefs in economics and politics (Gregg, 
2010). 
Amid the irreconcilable differences between free-market and regulated-market 
orientations, operating risks remained and so ongoing rules and regulations were still 
needed to address unexpected events (Tambovtsev, 2009). When losses occurred in the 
financial system, the public debt guarantee and the spontaneous actions by the 
government determined whether a loss was contained, shared, or socialized (including 
through debt forgiveness; Khademian, 2009; Walter, 2009). Losses contained to a firm 
that caused it might result in that firm’s failure (Eichengreen et al., 2009; Stulz, 2010). 
Losses incurred through systemically acceptable risk was partially shared by systemically 
important firms that created the burden, which was done indirectly through regulatory 





Systemically acceptable risk shared by society originated with government debt 
guarantees like the one for Fannie Mae, a Great Depression-era housing program begun 
in 1938 (Federal Housing Finance Agency, Office of Inspector General, 2013; Shlaes, 
2008).  
The trade-off, in theory, was the firm’s acceptance of regulation in exchange for 
protection in the event of the financial system’s instability. Beyond a trade-off was the 
concept that an industry created a demand for regulation for its own benefit, which was 
then provided by government (Kingdon, 2003). Rather than being viewed as a burden, 
regulation in this concept became desirable because of the failure of contract disputes to 
be settled fairly, impartially, and in a timely manner by the courts (Shleifer, 2010). An 
example of the practical desire for regulation was the benefits for firms covered by the 
too big to fail doctrine that gave these firms preferential treatment during the response to 
the GFC (SCB, 2011; Walter, 2009). 
The GLBA and financial stability. There was a consensus in the aftermath of 
the GFC that an important factor in the crisis was the repeal of the GSA and the passage 
of the GLBA and associated deregulation (Ferguson & Johnson, 2009; Grant, 2010; 
Grumet, 2008; Peretz & Schroedel, 2009; Raines et al., 2009; Statman, 2009). Opinions 
diverged on whether or not the GSA should have been reinstated, and some actively 
advocated the investment banking restrictions found in the GSA (De Grauwe, 2008b; 





made banks weaker and more prone to crisis (Barth et al., 2008), supporting the 
appropriateness of the GLBA.  
The prevailing argument for the GLBA risk mitigation model was that universal 
banking was simply a return to the banking system used in the United States before 
economic interventionists like President Franklin Roosevelt (Bordo, 2008). The GLBA 
was consistent with the economic ideas of the 1980s that favored lessened regulation, 
lower taxes, and freer trade (Duina & Buxbaum, 2008). This GLBA regulatory 
framework was similar to that of some European countries, whose banks were considered 
to have had a regulatory advantage by competing as universal banks against the U.S. 
financial institutions (Avgouleas, 2009; Garcia, 2009). The evidence in support of the 
universal bank was the extensive history in Europe of this regulatory structure producing 
stability and efficiency in banking (Grant, 2010). The contrary argument was that the 
GLBA “deregulatory process has sown seeds of instability into the banking system” (De 
Grauwe, 2008a, para. 5), that was manifested in the GFC.  
The GLBA might have been theoretically flawed (De Grauwe, 2008a), or it might 
have had merely practical flaws conjoined with bad timing (Statman, 2009) and a lack of 
efficacious supervision (Bergsten, 2009). Not all claims made in the published debate 
were supported by evidence, particularly while the crisis was still emerging. The 
conclusion that the financial system was destroyed in 1999 by the repeal of the GSA was 
unsupported by evidence (Weissman & Donohue, 2009). Additionally, some expert 





objective method to assess the claims (Bergsten, 2009). Empirical evidence showed that 8 
years after the passage of the GLBA the economy produced the sole U.S. business cycle 
since the Great Depression to include a real estate bust along with a credit crunch (Bordo 
& Haubrich, 2009).  
The change of the regulatory framework to the GLBA was inherently 
destabilizing to the financial system as banking capital moved in its entirety from one 
regulatory framework to another (Wagner, 2010). Empirical evidence from non-U.S. 
national banking systems demonstrated that deregulation like the GLBA increased the 
probability of banking crises when combined with weak regulatory supervision 
(Angkinand, Sawangngoenyuang, & Wihlborg, 2010). The adverse effects of these non-
U.S. banking crises reversed as supervision became stronger, demonstrating the 
limitations of the regulatory framework as a destabilizing factor and the importance of 
subsequent regulatory actions (Angkinand et al., 2010). Consistent with non-U.S. 
experience, the mere presence of instability from the GLBA was not claimed to be the 
mechanism of the GFC rather it was this instability in combination with other conditions 
and factors (De Grauwe, 2008a). The condition of high capital mobility was associated 
with the condition of instability in a mutually reinforcing relationship (Reinhart & 
Rogoff, 2008a) such that greater capital mobility brought instability, and greater 





Innovation in Financial Institutions and Capital Mobility 
Innovations that linked the real economy and the financial system were also 
related to increases in capital mobility (Bordo, 2008; Peretz & Schroedel, 2009). During 
the 1980s, innovation in the real economy accelerated so quickly that core business 
earnings were equaled by earnings from new business activities for many successful 
companies within a 7-year cycle (Senge, 1990). Coupled with this innovation in the real 
economy were regulatory changes to the financial system in the 1990s and its attendant 
financial instrument innovation (Bordo, 2008). By the 2000s, the economy was robust yet 
with credit risk increasing in the U.S. financial system (Bordo, 2008) and being shared 
globally during a period of high capital mobility (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Levine, 2009; 
Reinhart & Rogoff, 2008a). The three long-term cycles of riskier commercial bank 
lending, high capital mobility, and U.S. economic growth all ceased abruptly in 2007 
(Bordo & Haubrich, 2009). 
Risks in financial instrument innovation. Long-term trends and risks that 
attended innovation coalesced into financial system instability. The nexus of financial 
innovation during the period between the 1980s and the GFC was the U.S. housing 
market and its related financial instruments (Bordo, 2008; De Grauwe, 2008a, 2008b; De 
Grauwe et al., 2008). U.S. housing provided favorable market conditions for innovation 
because of its established performance of low risk without asset price bubbles (Favilukis, 
Kohn, Ludvigson, & Van Nieuwerburgh, 2012; Ferguson, 2008, pp. 261-269). Although 





lending risk and capital mobility (Bordo & Haubrich, 2009; Statman, 2009), these effects 
were indirect because the use of such instruments in the marketplace was discretionary 
and random (Sánchez, 2010).  
In contrast to uncertainties that are incalculable, risk is the variation in loss that 
can be defined and measured (Adler, Mansilla, & Wezel, 2009; Bordo & Haubrich, 2009; 
Ojo, 2010). Loss is the difference between the loan balance and the recovery of the 
nonperforming loan balance through the repossession and sale of the underlying loan 
collateral like a house (Adler et al., 2009). The magnitude, or extent, of loss differs from 
its amplitude, or the range of movement from an equilibrium performance point (Bordo 
& Haubrich, 2009). Loss contains these elements and their interactions that must be 
associated with practices and events in order to ascertain risk (Adler et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, bank assets like loans require capital sufficient for this risk. Yet there 
remains a serious flaw. If risk is defined by loss, then the required capital is ultimately 
determined by the past performance of the assets. Financial institutions are exposed to the 
gap that is created when asset performance deteriorates beyond historical precedence, and 
its supporting capital is found to be inadequate for the losses (Kindleberger & Aliber, 
2005). Consequently, this risk gap is widened by innovation.  
The risks associated with GFC-related innovation revolved around homeowners’ 
credit risk (Diamond & Rajan, 2009). These risks included the level of credit risk in the 
financial system, changes to the patterns of credit loss, and capital mobility (Diamond & 





and could cause asset price bubbles (Diamond & Rajan, 2009; Reinhart & Rogoff, 
2008a). Regular cycles of the level of credit risk in the commercial banking system that 
had been long-established under GSA were disrupted by the GLBA and then sustained by 
lending and innovative financial instruments (Diamond & Rajan, 2009; Geyfman & 
Yeager, 2009). Universal banks created in the GLBA changed the pattern of credit losses 
by combining investment banking risks with commercial banking risks (De Grauwe, 
2008a, 2008b). Financial instrument innovations involving securitization (such as CDOs, 
CMOs, and CDSs) theoretically improved risk management by spreading risk among 
more financial institutions and investors (Bordo, 2008; Geyfman & Yeager, 2009) but 
also exposing more institutions and investors to higher risk. Yet this innovation masked 
negative trends in the risk of the underlying assets and placed more institutions and 
investors at risk of loss (Dungan, 2008; Felsenheimer & Gisdakis, 2008, p. 254; Kramer, 
2008; Yezer, 2010). 
Bank risk cycle. The long-dormant commercial bank lending cycle emerged from 
dormancy during the GFC. Empirical evidence of overall riskier commercial bank credit 
was identified in the aftermath of the GFC, rather than by the practice of regularly 
tracking key risk indicators that have acceptable tolerances (Bordo, 2008). This 
measurement of credit risk used interest rates for the pricing of corporate loans to 
represent the market interest rate by using the corporate bond rating of Baa as a 
benchmark (Jarrow, 2011). With this measurement, risk was quantified to be the 





DOT 10-year Constant Maturity Treasury (CMT) bond rate (Bordo, 2008). This credit 
risk indicator was at equilibrium when the interest rate difference between the market and 
risk-free rates was at 2% and indicated an impending financial crisis at 3%. By 2008, the 
difference that had been widening for years was over 3%, and the GFC was already 
underway (Bordo, 2008). 
Capital mobility cycle. Risk within the financial system grew at the same time 
that capital moved largely without regulatory restriction and across global markets 
(Arner, 2007, pp. 64-65; Bordo & Helbling, 2010; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2008a). The 
capital mobility cycle described a global phenomenon (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2008a) that 
was part of the cycles of global history and human development (Fischer, 1996; 
Friedman, 2006). Identifying this phenomenon was a significant contribution from 
contemporaneous research about the 2008 U.S. financial crisis because it included an 
analytical framework explaining the historical relationship between the global capital 
movement and economic crises (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2008a, 2008b). With data that 
extended 800 years deep into recorded history, it was demonstrated that periods of high 
international capital mobility preceded international banking crises (Beck et al., 2009; 
Reinhart & Rogoff, 2008a). The period from1980 to 2007 was categorized as high capital 
mobility (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2008a), and its endpoint was the GFC (Bordo, 2008). 
The analytical framework of historical capital cycles was capital mobility 
according to the period categories of low, low-to-moderate, moderate, and high capital 





economic results that dated to the fourteenth century and that spanned 66 countries across 
all the inhabited continents. Seven distinct capital mobility periods were identified during 
the period 1800 to 2007, which were classified according to the four capital mobility 
categories. The two periods of low capital mobility (1915 - 1919; 1930 - 1969) coincided 
historically with World War I combat in Europe (1915 - 1919) and with post-World War 
II financial stability (1930 - 1969). Between periods of high capital mobility and low 
capital mobility were the moderate and low-to-moderate periods. The decade of the 
1920s was a period of moderate capital mobility (1920 - 1929), although it ended with a 
stock market crash and the onset of the Great Depression. The two periods of the low-to-
moderate capital mobility (1800 - 1879; 1970 - 1979) ended with the onset of high capital 
mobility. In addition to the business cycle that ended in 2007, one other period of high 
capital mobility had ended in 1914, marking the endpoint of U.S. industrialization 
(Reinhart & Rogoff, 2008a). 
Evidence of risk associated with high capital mobility was found in the global 
flows of capital that existed before the GFC (Kirabaeva & Razin, 2009). A significant 
capital imbalance was created by inflows of non-U.S. capital into the U.S. financial 
system from Europe, Asia, and South America (Bergsten, 2009). This capital influx 
caused excessive liquidity in the U.S. financial system, which had the effect of 
encouraging financial institutions to deploy capital into incrementally riskier assets such 
as subprime mortgages (Bordo, 2008; Diamond & Rajan, 2009; Guttmann, 2009). 





high money supplies had the effect of encouraging borrowing (Bordo, 2008; Diamond & 
Rajan, 2009; Guttmann, 2009). 
Business cycle. The onset of the economic recession in December 2007 was the 
end point of the U.S. business cycle that began in 2001, and it was the fifth economic 
contraction since 1980 (Bordo & Haubrich, 2009; Peretz & Schroedel, 2009). Growth 
and contraction is such a regular feature of the economy that each U.S. business cycle is 
delineated and officially declared by NBER (2010). Despite advances in understanding 
U.S. business cycles, there was no successful method for predicting future business 
cycles (Friedman, 1986; Gregg, 2010). Furthermore, because these official cycles were 
confined to the U.S. economy there lacked explanatory power for economic movement 
on the global scale (Bordo, 2008; NBER, 2010). U.S. business cycles were identified by 
the various factors of banking crises, real estate busts, stock market crashes, tight 
monetary policy, and credit crunches (Bordo & Haubrich, 2009). Irregular events from 
within the financial system also combined to worsen the severity of economic downturns, 
which occurred during the GFC (Bordo & Haubrich, 2009).  
The commercial bank credit risk cycle, the U.S. business cycle, and the 
international capital mobility cycle were positively related to one another in cycles that 
ended in 2007. These relationships are important because of their confluence, despite the 
lack of established causation among the three cycles. That is, in the mid-1990s, 
innovative financial instruments used for real estate lending were introduced into an 





capital supplied from throughout the world, which also reinforced U.S. economic growth. 
The lynchpin of these relationships was innovative financial instruments using global 
capital for real estate lending by U.S. financial institutions, and its removal triggered the 
GFC. 
Mortgage Securitization Derivatives and Regulatory Arbitrage 
The key financial innovation of the GLBA era was mortgage securitization and its 
associated derivative transactions (Bordo, 2008; Eichengreen et al., 2009) that eventually 
threatened the stability of the financial system (Cherny & Craig, 2009) and was 
prominent in events of the GFC (Acharya, Philippon, et al., 2009; Booth, 2008; 
Felsenheimer & Gisdakis, 2008, pp. 32, 175, 200). Although innovation presented 
systemic risk (Hellwig, 2009), there was little attention to this risk as public policy 
matters (Haubrich & Lucas, 2007; Hlinka, 2008). Perhaps this inattention was due to the 
political values of deregulation under the GLBA (Weissman & Donohue, 2009), or due to 
the lack of transparency within the banking system that impaired supervision (Bordo, 
Redish, & Rockoff, 2012; Dincer & Eichengreen, 2009). With little public policy 
attention or restraining regulation, competition under the GLBA reinforced innovation as 
firms sought to maintain parity with the financial performance of their peers (Boyd & 
Nicoló, 2005; Langenohl, 2008). The significance of securitization in the market was 
probably not exaggerated that each securitization created a void to be filled by new 





The foundation of mortgage securitization practices was the issuance of ABSs 
composed of subprime mortgage loans and other mortgage loans that did not conform to 
the lending rules of the GSEs (Ashcraft & Schuermann, 2008; Ding, Li, Quercia, & 
Ratcliffe, 2010; Jarrow, 2011). In the ABS practice, the bank sold their loans as a single 
pool into the ABS, with each ABS being a unique security that issued bonds (Hu, 2001). 
The bank recognized income from the sale of the mortgage loans, which was based upon 
the estimated future cash flows from the loans in the security. In return for the mortgages, 
the bank got back through the proceeds of the bonds the capital originally lent and then 
used this capital to repeat the process the following quarter (Hu, 2001). Other asset 
classes such as car loans, student loans, leases, credit cards, and other instruments with an 
underlying cash flow came to be securitized using the ABS structure (Jarrow, 2011). The 
ABS instrument was modeled after the MBSs that were composed of mortgage loans 
conforming to the lending rules of the GSEs (Rossi, 2010).  
The rising borrower risk and housing values that were evident after 1980 became 
encased in mortgage securitization practices and culminated in an asset valuation bubble 
of inflated housing prices between 2002 and 2007 (Felsenheimer & Gisdakis, 2008, p. 22; 
Mian et al., 2011; Phillips, 2008, pp. 86, 114; Rossi, 2010; Shiller, 2012). In 1980, there 
was an annual foreclosure rate of 0.5% associated with a housing market index (HMI) 
value of 43.63 (Hlinka, 2008; Shiller, 2012). The HMI measured U.S. residential real 
estate prices and had a value after World War II of 7.50, compared to the 1890 index base 





stock had been evident for nearly a century (Shiller, 2012). After having only doubled in 
the 50 years before World War II, values then more than quintupled in the 35 years 
following World War II (Shiller, 2012). At the point of the GLBA deregulation in 1999, 
there was evidence of rising borrower risk along with rising house values. Both of these 
measurements had doubled during the 19 years between 1980 and 1999, such that the 
annual foreclosure rate of 1.1% was associated with the housing market index value of 
92.08 (Shiller, 2012). Just before the GFC, there was another doubling in the U.S. 
housing market index value to its peak of 189.93 that took place in the mere 7 years 
between 1999 and 2006 (Shiller, 2012), at which point the annual foreclosure rate had 
been stabilized around 1%. 
ABS and subprime mortgage securitization. Subprime mortgage securitization 
began mechanically with the sale of mortgage loans by a financial institution to an ABS 
(Barnett-Hart, 2009; Hu, 2011). The collateral used to secure the bonds were peoples’ 
homes, which were the houses that backed the separate mortgage loans in the aggregated 
pool of loans (Ashcraft & Schuermann, 2008). Bonds issued through this securitization 
process paid higher interest rates than U.S. government treasury bonds but were exposed 
to risk associated with shifting values in the housing market (Bordo, 2008; Felsenheimer 
& Gisdakis, 2008, pp. 22, 36, 213; Phillips, 2008, pp. 86, 114). U.S. government and 
ABS bonds were investment grade and carried the highest rating of AAA issued 
independently by the credit rating agencies (Jarrow, 2011). In order to account for the 





sold to investors as AAA bonds (De Grauwe et al., 2008). This 80% of the ABS was 
insured by an independent bond guarantor, while the remainder was uninsured (De 
Grauwe et al., 2008). 
Every ABS bondholder had an ownership interest in every mortgage loan because 
securitization bonds were sold based upon the aggregated cash flows from the underlying 
loans, with classes of bonds in the ABS termed tranches associated with specified cash 
flows (Geyfman & Yeager, 2009; Hellwig, 2009; Rossi, 2010; SIFMA, 2010). As a 
consequence, a single securitized mortgage loan was owned by the specific security in 
which it was put, creating contractual requirements and ownership interests that were 
unique to each security (Ashcraft & Schuermann, 2008). The ownership structure for a 
loan was further complicated by subsequent transactions involving the security. Contracts 
derived from the security were created to share both the interest rate risk and the credit 
default risk among counterparties (Mousavi & Shefrin, 2010). Contracts involving shared 
risks could then be privately traded within the GLBA-defined financial system or outside 
of it (Haubrich & Lucas, 2007). 
Mortgage financing practices that developed under securitization separated the 
lender from the borrower in convoluted relationships involving intermediaries and 
various financial market participants (Pearson & Pearson, 2007; Sinclair, 2009). 
Financial institutions that regularly participated in the mortgage process were specialized 
and represented a variety of the legal structures that existed under GLBA. Investment 





companies, commercial banks, investment banks, universal banks, and insurance 
companies (Geyfman & Yeager, 2009). In the 90 days before a quarterly securitization 
issuance, a single mortgage loan could pass through multiple legal structures, each with 
different regulations and supervision (Friedland, 2009; Hellwig, 2009; Jarrow, 2011). At 
origination, a loan could be arranged by a third party mortgage broker for funding 
through a mortgage bank. In the secondary market phase, a correspondent mortgage bank 
could have bought the loan and sold it at a profit to a commercial bank. To prepare for 
securitization, commercial banks sometimes used a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) to 
pool (or, warehouse) the loan temporarily (Jarrow, 2011). Additionally, another SPV 
could be used to fund a new securitization with the loan in it, which was then finally sold 
to the ABS (Friedland, 2009; Hellwig, 2009; Jarrow, 2011). Yet, mortgage financing was 
made complicated not just because of securitization rather from the subsequent CDSs and 
CMOs derivative transactions. 
Mortgage securitization derivative transactions. The development of derivative 
transactions conjoined with the innovation in mortgage financing (Eichengreen et al., 
2009; Rossi, 2010) and represented a new intellectual hazard to the financial system 
(Miller & Rosenfeld, 2010). The ABS security type was divided into specific types of 
cash flows by having senior, mezzanine, and junior tranches (Jarrow, 2011). The 80% 
senior tranche was AAA-rated and the other tranches were a mix of investment grade and 
speculative grade (or junk; Jarrow, 2011). Additionally, these securities required 





2010), which was another cash flow associated with the security that could be sold by its 
owner. Cash flowed into tranches for payments to bondholders according to the cash 
waterfall, which defined the cash prioritization (Jarrow, 2011). Once the ABS bonds 
were sold to investors worldwide, investors were able to resell the bonds based upon 
valuations of their worth. CMO derivative securities were ownership vehicles to buy and 
resell ABS bonds, and were based upon the ABS tranche model. To offset the risk of 
credit loss associated with the ABS cash flows, CDS contracts were used to cap the 
potential losses through an agreement with a counterparty willing to give this insurance 
(Cherny & Craig, 2009; Eichengreen et al., 2009).  
CMO derivative transactions. CMOs were investment instruments used to own 
certain cash flows from the tranches of other mortgage securities, which made these 
derivative transactions in that their value derived from a separate investment instrument’s 
value (Bond Market Association [BMA], 2003; Estrella & Silver, 1984; Haubrich & 
Lucas, 2007; SIFMA, 2010). CMOs could own any combination of original bonds issued 
from ABSs and MBSs, derivative bonds from other CMOs, or CDSs (Haubrich & Lucas, 
2007; Jarrow, 2011). Although some banks retained portions of the mortgage securities 
they issued, these too were assets that could be sold, securitized in a new CMO, or 
merged into other banks (Rossi, 2010; SIFMA, 2010). 
CMOs were first issued in June 1983 during a period of high inflation and high 
interest rates that made it difficult for financial institutions to predict principal 





mitigate this risk and make the return of principal more predictable was to own a wider 
range of maturity dates, which was made possible through the CMO structure (Estrella & 
Silver, 1984). Instead of owning a single tranche with similar loan characteristics, the 
investor could diversify with a CMO purchase and own a smaller portion of multiple 
tranches (BMA, 2003; Estrella & Silver, 1984; Haubrich & Lucas, 2007; SIFMA, 2010). 
CMOs made financial planning more effective for financial institutions (Nicolò & 
Pelizzon, 2006). Institutions could buy a CMO bond with the expected return of the 
principal over 18 months, for example, rather than directly buying two MBSs with 
expected returns of principal over just 6 and 24 months. The CMO structure became a 
risk mitigation tool for any type of loan characteristic that an investor wanted to diversify 
(Nicolò & Pelizzon, 2006; SIFMA, 2010). Institutions that had mortgage portfolios with 
geographic concentration could protect against regional variation in loan performance 
(Nicolò & Pelizzon, 2006; SIFMA, 2010). A CMO could be used in selling the portfolio 
in order to buy a CMO bond that comprised loans originated nationally. Furthermore, 
commercial banks still had access to borrow funds from the Federal Reserve Bank 
discount window, whether pledging assets that were mortgage portfolios or market-
purchased CMOs (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2013a).  
CDS derivative transactions. The purpose of CDSs for financial institutions was 
to reduce bank risk from the unpredictability of credit loss (Cherny & Craig, 2009; 
Jarrow, 2011). Credit loss was determined by the incidents of borrower default together 





The spirit of deregulation found in GLBA during 1999 was reflected in the nonregulation 
of CDSs and other financial derivatives like interest rate swaps during 2000 in the 
aftermath of the GLBA (Kalinowski, 2011; Sánchez, 2010). These emergent financial 
risks were explicitly rejected as a topic of regulation in the CFMA of 2000, which was 
consistent with the trend of economic deregulation (Kalinowski, 2011; Kingdon, 2003).  
The CFMA proclamations were reaffirmed in the 2005 renewal of the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), which was required every 5 years, before having 
restrictions introduced as part of the Dodd-Frank financial regulation in 2010 (Jickling, 
2005; Klieber, 2012; SCB, 2005). There was no requirement in CDS transactions to hold 
capital in reserve in order to protect against the potential impact in the event of 
counterparty failure. The lessened perceived risk exposure from using CDSs led some 
banks to reduce their capital buffer accordingly (Karras, 2009). The self-regulation of 
derivatives that was affirmed for CDSs kept those transactions private, unrecorded, and 
outside the control of central clearing exchanges (Acharya, Engle, Figlewski, Lynch, & 
Subrahmanyam, 2009).  
CDSs were first issued in February 1994 in order to share the credit risk 
associated with a large commercial bank loan (Duhon, 2012; Noeth & Sengupta, 2012). 
The demand for credit derivatives increased as commercial banks applied this risk 
mitigation tool to diversify credit risk similar to the practices used for interest rate risk 
and currency risk (Mengle, 2007). In 1985, about the time CMOs were expanding, over-





independent, global trade association that was formed to make transactions safe and 
efficient (International Swaps and Derivatives Association [ISDA], 2012a). Along with 
the growth in size and scope of the derivatives market came increasing standardization in 
the contracts and sophistication, such as indices of CDS valuations (Born, 2009; ISDA, 
2012a, 2012b, 2012c; Noeth & Sengupta, 2012). 
CDSs had fundamental differences in comparison to traditional insurance features 
(Noeth & Sengupta, 2012), which during the GFC were related to the acceleration of 
default events. CDS contract buyers did not have to own the underlying asset like a CMO 
or ABS, referred to as the reference entity (Mengle, 2007), thereby enabling its use as a 
speculation tool for housing market values (Jarrow, 2011; Nesvetailova, 2007; Noeth & 
Sengupta, 2012). The CDS contracts could be made quickly and easily, facilitated by a 
simple approach to calculating the seller’s price and buyer’s value (Noeth & Sengupta, 
2012). The value of a CDS was equal to the expected loss rate times the face value of the 
instrument being insured (Noeth & Sengupta, 2012). 
Another key CDS feature was that the buyer paid a periodic fee to the 
counterparty for protection against a specifically defined credit event involving the 
reference entity (Mengle, 2007). Starting in 2007, the accumulated impact from rising 
loan delinquencies, home foreclosures, and falling housing values led to widespread 
credit events (Hlinka, 2008; Shiller, 2012) invoking the protection seller’s obligation to 
compensate the buyer (Mengle, 2007). The impact of those credit events to the 





when considering declining borrower credit quality (Bordo, 2008; Immergluck, 2009; 
Jarrow, 2011; Rossi, 2010) and housing values (Mengle, 2007; Noeth & Sengupta, 2012).  
CDS and financial institution liquidity. The daily operating liquidity of the 
financial system was maintained during the GFC despite a significant threat of illiquidity 
linking key financial institutions (Diamond & Rajan, 2009; Eichengreen et al., 2009; 
Milne & Wood, 2009; Scott, 2010). Operating liquidity is a risk to financial institutions 
because a banking system is illiquid by nature (Akerlof & Shiller, 2009). The 
fundamental relationship in banking is that savings is short-term in duration and lending 
is long-term in duration; by design, there simply would not be enough capital liquid to 
settle the demand for simultaneous withdrawal of savings (Fujiwara et al., 2011). In other 
words, operating liquidity may be sustained, but systemic liquidity does not exist. CDS 
derivatives complicated the operating liquidity of financial institutions because these 
could be ABS or MBS derivatives, or derivatives of CMO derivatives. The shift of 
derivative structures from being tools of risk mitigation to being tools of market 
speculation was perfected with the synthetic CMO, composed of CDSs (Jarrow, 2011). 
The synthetic CMO became the structure preferred by high-risk-taking speculators 
(Jarrow, 2011). 
During the financial crisis, CDSs were the mechanism of illiquidity between 
Lehman Brothers and the American Insurance Group, Inc. (AIG) that accelerated the 
crisis throughout the financial system (Born, 2009; Fisher, 2008; McDonald & Robinson, 





Lehman Brothers as an insuring counterparty to their CDS transactions. This bankruptcy 
left AIG responsible for losses that Lehman Brothers had insured it against and, in turn, 
as an illiquid counterparty to AIG’s CDS transactions in which it insured others (Born, 
2009; Stulz, 2010). Concerns over the enforcement of bankruptcy claims only accelerated 
the system-wide crisis because bankruptcy protection gave preferential treatment to CDS 
contracts, benefitting Lehman Brothers in this instance (Peristiani & Savino, 2011; Roe, 
2011). The FRS intervened during the GFC and aggressively accepted collateral for loans 
to their member banks in order to support liquidity (Blankart & Fasten, 2009). This 
intervention was consistent with the FRS’s central banker role as the lender of last resort 
(Board of Governors, 2005) in stopping the downward-spiraling illiquidity of the 
financial system (Blankart & Fasten, 2009; International Monetary Fund, 2009; Obstfeld 
et al., 2009). 
The threat of illiquidity that almost felled the financial system originated with a 
CDS counterparty relationship outside of commercial banking (Eichengreen et al., 2009; 
Stulz, 2010). AIG was regulated like a GSA insurance company and Lehman Brothers 
like a GSA investment bank (Bordo, 2008) although once the crisis started there was a 
“perception that banks’ fortunes were linked” (Eichengreen et al., 2009, p. 4). This 
perception that the banking system was at risk of collapse from illiquidity was reflected 
in the comparison of risk factors in common to banks as a class relative to U.S. high-yield 
bond spreads (the gap between bid and ask prices). Risk factors associated with banks in 





correlation to bond spreads in July 2007 before the crisis to 77% in September 2008 
during the crisis (Eichengreen et al., 2009). This correlation indicated the higher 
perceived risk of banks as a class, or system (Eichengreen et al., 2009). The change in 
perceived risk reflected the interdependency of banks from increased counterparty risk 
and increased funding-related liquidity risk that followed the failure of Lehman Brothers 
(Eichengreen et al., 2009).  
The burst of mortgage financing innovation and the accompanying higher-risk 
assets (Jarrow, 2011) entered into the financial system with fragmented governance and 
accountability among multiple regulators (Bevir, 2009; Pitti, 2009). Federal supervision 
and monitoring for securitization-related activity in the GLBA framework was “a 
complex muddle, involving problems of co-ordination and inter-agency rivalry” 
(Goodhart & Tsomocos, 2007, p. 8). The potential for harm was raised by the presence of 
perverse incentives for bankers’ gain by doing wrong (Jackson, 2010; Jarrow, 2011; 
Kling, 2010). Practices developed informally to address securitization and other related 
details left untreated by federal supervision (Bordo et al., 2012; Geyfman & Yeager, 
2009). Transparency in the financial system became limited from the inability by banks, 
regulators, and rating agencies to assess the risks related to mortgage assets 
(Papaioannou, 2009; Pitti, 2009). CDS transactions worsened this risk assessment 
capability because banks were allowed to report their CDS position net of all buyer and 





undisclosed risk exposure to their capital positions (Aizenman & Pasricha, 2009; 
Avgouleas, 2009; Cherny & Craig, 2009).  
Regulation and arbitrage. In public policymaking, the object of banking 
regulation and supervision is the relationship between capital and risk (Adler et al., 2009; 
Bordo et al., 2012). Public law involving financial institutions was justified by the 
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3) and 
spanned the government from the executive, legislative, and quasi-independent entities 
and included judicial review (Arkes, 2010). Although public policy governance of capital 
and risk was deliberate, specific policy decisions created consequences both intended and 
unintended that impacted financial institutions (Acharya, Pedersen, et al., 2009; Allen, 
Babus, & Carletti, 2010; de la Torre & Ize, 2009; Goulder et al., 2009; Pacces, 2010). 
The deployment of capital was made by financial institutions to maximize the return on 
capital (Frachot, 2010). Regulation influenced this capital deployment so that over time 
the economic use of capital conformed to its regulation (Frachot, 2010). 
Financial institution regulation and mortgage origination. U.S. supervisory and 
monitoring authority over financial institutions started with the Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency (OCC), part of the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Board of 
Governors, 2005). The OCC was created in the National Banking Act of 1864 that 
established the commercial banking regulatory framework. The Federal Reserve Act of 
1913 added the FRS to the framework, followed by the FDIC in 1933 as part of the GSA, 





significant structural complexity came with the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA) of 
1956 (Aspachs et al., 2007; Board of Governors, 2005). The BHCA allowed for nonbank 
subsidiaries and was later amended, in 1970, to permit one-bank holding companies in 
such a way that encouraged financial system development (Aspachs et al., 2007; Board of 
Governors, 2005). 
About the time of the BHCA, in 1970, residential mortgage loan origination 
began to shift steadily away from savings and loan firms to mortgage banking companies 
that did not take deposits (Marks, 2009). As a result of the interaction between long-term 
market and regulatory changes, market share reversed (Friedland, 2009; Hellwig, 2009; 
Rossi, 2010). Mortgages from savings and loans shrank from 50% to 10% of the market 
while mortgage banking companies grew to be 50% of the market (Immergluck, 2009, p. 
65). Although mortgage loans were subject to federal lending laws, the capital used for 
loans by mortgage banking companies was unregulated while loans made by savings and 
loan companies remained regulated (Marks, 2009). 
Unregulated mortgage banking companies grew further after 1980 when the 
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) eliminated 
interest rate limits (He, 2010; Marks, 2009). With little regulatory restriction, home 
equity requirements were lowered by lenders that created higher interest rates, higher 
risk, and higher credit demand (Campbell & Hercowitz, 2010). After the savings and loan 
crisis of 1988, the mortgage market was reconfigured through the Financial Institutions 





FIRREA supported mortgage lending through GSEs and secondary markets rather than 
by savings and loan companies (Cassell & Hoffman, 2009). 
In 1996, the central bankers of the Basel agreement from the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) in Switzerland standardized the classification of capital 
(Basel Committee on International Supervision, 2005; Cornford, 2009; Moosa, 2010). In 
doing so, capital level requirements were implemented among the central banks of the 
world, a primary objective of the Basel Concordant of 1975 (Basel Committee on 
International Supervision, 2005; Cornford, 2009; Moosa, 2010). The Basel Capital 
Accord, or Basel I, of 1988 was enacted by the U.S. in 1989 and significantly amended in 
1996 (Board of Governors, 2005), with an effect of increasing the flow of capital across 
national borders. This global standardization process was ever-present in the U.S. 
commercial banking and the financial system from 1975 through 2010, including with 
Basel II of 2004 and Basel III of 2010 (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011; 
Basel Committee on International Supervision, 2005; Cornford, 2009; Moosa, 2010). The 
most significant of the capital changes were decreased requirements in Basel I in January 
1996 and increased requirements in Basel III in December 2010 (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 2011; Moosa, 2010). Despite the United States’ adherence to these 
global capital standards from Basel, the government had no higher authority than the 
Constitution and so these standards were restricted to voluntary acceptance by U.S. 





The United States followed the Basel I amendment in 1996 with the GLBA in 
1999 and the accompanying deregulation of Great Depression-era barriers to capital 
movement (Barth et al., 2008; Moosa, 2010), in part to align with Basel (Acharya, 
Wachtel, & Walter, 2009). Significant deregulation and nonregulation in housing 
financing accompanied the GLBA. In 1999, the secondary market change from 1992 
standardizing GSE operating charters to make Freddie Mac into a publicly traded 
company directly competing with Fannie Mae (Cassell & Hoffman, 2009) was enhanced 
to allow for GSE participation in subprime securitization (Jaffee, 2009). In 2000, the 
CFMA was an affirmation of the nonregulation of derivatives used to hedge mortgage 
securitization risks (Kalinowski, 2011; Sánchez, 2010). Taken together, Basel and the 
GLBA restructured banking relationships in the 1990s that had been firmly established 
across the world for decades (Peretz & Schroedel, 2009; Stiglitz, 2006, 2010).  
The GLBA and mortgage securitization. The GLBA and its capital rules for 
investment banking coincided with the growing market opportunity in subprime 
mortgage securitization and derivative transactions activities (Bordo, 2008). Between the 
GLBA passage in 1999 and the GFC in 2008, investment banks became the commercial 
banks’ Wall Street outlet for mortgage securitization and derivative transactions activities 
(Geyfman & Yeager, 2009). Yet, the claim that capital was moved and thereby impaired 
the financial system from “new instruments often devised to avoid regulation” (Bordo, 
2008, pp. 6-7) was only technically correct. Rather than new practices like securitization 





most efficiently within the developing regulatory framework, consistent with the earlier 
U.S. experiences and capitalist tenets (Lumpkin, 2010; Rajan, 2003). 
Investment bankers and their financial networks on Wall Street were well-suited 
for the activities required to issue a subprime securitization (Geyfman & Yeager, 2009). 
Many investment bank firms entered the securitization market from traditional GSA 
activities including bond underwriting and operations, and evolved to become 
participants in the securitization market (Hellwig, 2009; Papaioannou, 2009). After years 
of incremental increases in their participation, investment banks eventually used their 
capital to issue and own subprime securities. Subprime mortgage loans started as a 
specialty finance product yet became acceptable assets to commercial banks through this 
securitization process (Blundell-Wignall et al., 2008; Booth, 2008; Raines et al., 2009). 
Even after the GFC, securitization remained an essential feature of U.S. mortgage 
financing (Vickery & Wright, 2010).  
Mortgage securitizations and the associated derivative transactions in the GLBA 
regulatory regime also depended on favorable accounting treatment in order to recognize 
the benefits of these practices (Gerding, 2011). Accounting and auditing transformed 
from the mundane to the exotic and essential through the accounting treatment of 
subprime mortgage securitization (Al Janabi, 2008; Huian, 2010). This accounting was 
attractive because off balance sheet accounting meant the full amount of the debt 
associated with a subprime security was not included in financial statements (Kirzner, 





treatment was applied to recognize income for commercial banks’ gain on sale of 
mortgage loans into securities (Geyfman & Yeager, 2009), which was based on models 
of future loan performance.  
These accounting changes extended into the home foreclosure process, with fair 
value accounting of foreclosed properties using market-based prices (Wallace, 2009). 
Although intended to be a favorable accounting practice for securitization, the fair value 
worked procyclically and exacerbated the decline and slow recovery of the housing 
market (Goyal, 2009; Wallace, 2009). The complicated securitization accounting 
worsened the problem of transparency in commercial banks and in financial institutions 
in general (Bazerman, Loewenstein, & Moore, 2002; Levitt & Breeden, 2009; Wagner, 
2010). 
The GLBA regulatory framework resulted in preferential treatment of subprime 
mortgage securitization and derivative transactions activity (Bordo, 2008). This treatment 
was especially beneficial for investment banks operating with less regulation and lower 
capital requirements than commercial bank counterparts and with corresponding higher 
risk and higher leverage (Bordo, 2008; Geyfman & Yeager, 2009; Phillips, 2008, p. 35; 
Papaioannou, 2009). Capital moved easily between commercial bank and investment 
bank structures (Geyfman & Yeager, 2009). Yet the GLBA regulatory supervision was 
determined by financial institution type such that investment banking activity became 
regulated by the FRS only if it occurred in a universal bank (Bordo, 2008; Raines et al., 





investment banks (Raines et al., 2009). Investment banking was not changed by the 
GLBA, but the nature of investment banking changed under the GLBA because of 
subprime mortgage securitization and derivative transactions (Geyfman & Yeager, 2009). 
Within the Basel architecture, regulatory arbitrage of mortgage securitization 
related financing activity became commonplace (Lumpkin, 2010). The GLBA 
commercial banks competed globally against each other and against non-U.S. banks 
while lending each other money and together participating in securitization transactions 
(Goyal, 2009; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2008a, 2008b; Wehinger, 2008). This interbank 
lending was encouraged by Basel capital rules that had loans from banks to other banks 
rated as low risk, with a corresponding low capital requirement (Wagner, 2010; 
Wehinger, 2008). Over the long term, the financial system liquidity became overstated, 
and credit risk understated, by lending banks reporting loans to other banks as low risk 
while the borrowing banks used these funds for the financing of risky assets like 
mortgage securitization-related activity (Garcia, 2009). Depending on ownership 
percentages and the legal structure in SPV transactions, borrowing banks could 
participate in SPV financing transactions yet not disclose this financial exposure in 
regulatory reporting (Jarrow, 2011; Wagner, 2010; Wehinger, 2008). 
Derivatives regulation. CDS was similar to interbank lending in that 
counterparties included the GLBA-regulated financial institutions adding to the 
unreported, systemic risk (Gerding, 2011). The use of CDSs expanded rapidly outside the 





dynamic, and growing market according to Born (2009), the Chairperson of the CFTC. 
Policy positions as to the proper regulation for derivatives and swaps were articulated in 
2000 during the legislating of CFMA regulation. Consistent with the GLBA factions 
already established, Born (2009) and others advocated regulation and the prevailing 
faction led by the FRS opposed regulation (SCB, 2005). The prevailing viewpoint was 
that interest rate swaps had been successfully implemented and the capabilities of market 
participants made additional regulation for CDSs unnecessary (SCB, 2005). 
The stated purpose of the CFMA was “to promote legal certainty, enhance 
competition, and reduce systemic risk in markets for futures and over-the-counter 
derivatives” (2000, §2). In this legislation, the reduction of systemic risk from over-the-
counter derivatives was interpreted to leave CDSs unregulated as supported by the FRS 
(SCB, 2005). The CFMA of 2000 was an amendment to the Commodity Exchange Act of 
1936, which had been amended with multiple public laws before and after the 2000 act. 
Although Born (2009) had identified the growth in credit derivatives to support the 
position for its regulation, this growth had been relatively recent, and financial 
modernization was an ongoing process.  
Post-financial crisis regulation. Themes developed regarding credit derivatives 
regulation during the period between the CFMA in 2000 and the financial crisis in 2008. 
These themes were revisited in the EESA’s TARP legislation in 2008 and again with 
Dodd-Frank legislation in 2010 (Ferguson & Johnson, 2009; Klieber, 2012). The 





a government-mandated trading exchange was unnecessary (SCB, 2005). According to 
Congressional testimony given in 2005, “the Federal Reserve Board believes that the 
CFMA has unquestionably been a successful piece of legislation” (SCB, 2005, para. 2). 
In the capital marketplace, the assessment from FRS was not shared by an influential 
participant, Buffett who wrote that “derivatives are financial weapons of mass 
destruction, carrying dangers that, while now latent, are potentially lethal” (Berkshire 
Hathaway, Inc., 2002, p. 15). Just months before the GFC onset, the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Cleveland economist, Haubrich, and a Northwestern University professor, Lucas 
(2007), forewarned of CMOs. There was not enough information related to the risky uses 
of CMOs that was publicly available to assess the risk to the financial system (Haubrich 
& Lucas, 2007). 
The predominant viewpoint regarding CDS regulation shifted in dramatic fashion 
after the U.S. government responded to the financial crisis with TARP on October 3, 
2008 (Ferguson & Johnson, 2009; Klieber, 2012). This legislation was passed at the 
height of the crisis and was intended to increase capital in financial institutions in order to 
stabilize the financial system (Black & Hazelwood, 2012; Lawson, 2010). The long-
standing position at the FRS against regulation was left undefended. Business media 
reported that for CDSs, “pressure is rising on policy makers to regulate a market that’s 
moved beyond its origins protecting banks from loan losses” (Moses & Harrington, 2008, 
para. 3). Nobel Laureate economist and financial journalist Krugman (2009) blamed the 





incumbent Securities and Exchange Commission Chairperson Cox, and Commodity 
Futures Trading Commissioner Chilton expressed strong messages of support to regulate 
CDSs (Moses & Harrington, 2008). 
TARP contained emergency credit programs as part of the EESA (Board of 
Governors, 2012a; Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2013a) that indicated a shift 
toward the position of CDS regulation requiring a government mandated exchange. The 
EESA Section 105(c) called for the Secretary of the Treasury to review the effectiveness 
of oversight given the state of the financial markets. The EESA also required the 
Secretary to issue a Regulatory Modernization Report to include a recommendation for 
the regulation of over-the-counter swaps markets. More specifically, the recommendation 
of the Secretary contained in the legislation was to include “enhancement of the clearing 
and settlement of over-the-counter swaps” (§105(c)(1)(B)). Congressional research 
reports that followed the EESA in 2009 and 2010 included credit derivatives exchanges 
when highlighting the important issues of the financial crisis (Jickling, 2010; Nanto, 
2009). The emergency credit programs contained in TARP also effectively socialized 
financial institution risk through the spontaneous government action of directly injecting 
public funds into private financial institutions (Khademian, 2009; Walter, 2009). 
Dodd-Frank passed in July 2010, and its Title VII mandated that most derivatives 
instruments be traded on centralized exchanges. CDSs were of particular concern due to 
their role during the financial crisis related to illiquidity and TARP (Peristiani & Savino, 





significant involvement from regulators in the U.S. financial system to implement an 
over-the-counter derivatives exchange. The FRS’s role included coordination with other 
domestic and international authorities, strengthening the infrastructure of the derivatives 
market, and supervising derivatives market participants (SBC, 2011). The Financial 
Stability Oversight Council was created by the DOT (2013) and included derivatives in 
its scope of oversight. The SEC (2012) was responsible for implementing the derivatives 
and swaps exchange that began in October 2012, over two years after Dodd-Frank passed 
(DTCC, 2012).  
Financial institutions dynamically deployed capital into new legal structures 
according to the banking activity at hand rather than confining activity to that allowable 
in existing entities (Gerding, 2011; Wagner, 2010). An effect from years of this 
regulatory arbitrage was undercapitalization for the mortgage-related risks in the financial 
system (Gerding, 2011; Wagner, 2010). Simultaneously, banking capital and risk 
collectively shifted from being narrow and categorical under GSA to being systemic 
under GLBA (Hellwig, 2009; Neale et al., 2010) while not being regulated systemically 
(Negrilă, 2009). Preceding the GFC these accumulated regulatory and market changes 
made financial institutions less transparent, thereby impairing the supervision of banking 
activities (Bordo et al., 2012; De Grauwe, 2008a). As a result of all this, in financial 





Methodology and Analysis of Financial Institution Risk 
Empirical studies on the regulatory framework conducted before the financial 
crisis employed a variety of methods to analyze banking risk, including practitioner based 
models of synthetic banks and stress testing (Khademian, 2009). Additionally, monetary 
policy models were incorporated into the synthetic banks and stress testing models 
(Aspachs et al., 2007; Kilian & Manganelli, 2008; Moosa, 2010). Yet on the eve of the 
GFC, economists were still struggling to identify the theoretical framework for financial 
system stability and a methodology to analyze it beyond money supplies and interest 
rates (Aspachs et al., 2007; Caballero, 2010; Repullo, 2005). In 2007, the advancements 
in methods that had been made in identifying relationships in the financial system like 
regulation and financial results were “only just beginning to be addressed empirically” 
(Arner, 2007, p. 87). 
The synthetic bank method was used to model the stability of the financial system, 
but failed to demonstrate its intended predictive value (Geyfman & Yeager, 2009; 
Hermsen, 2010). A synthetic bank is a hypothetical bank using actual financial system 
data to simulate economic scenarios and financial system results (Geyfman & Yeager, 
2009; Weber, 2010). The purpose of the synthetic bank method was to potentially 
identify disruptions to the banking system that could threaten financial stability and to 
quantify the probability of default for the whole system (Hermsen, 2010; Weber, 2010). 
This analysis was similar to the economic models of Keynes using variables within a 





(Skidelsky, 2009). The benefit of synthetic bank analysis was to demonstrate the impact 
of changes made in the banking system because the United States lacked historical 
precedent for the performance of a universal bank system (Geyfman & Yeager, 2009). 
The obvious flaw with the method was the output was simply a function of the input 
assumptions (Geyfman & Yeager, 2009).  
A similar empirical method, stress testing, is the reverse of the synthetic bank 
analysis in that an actual bank was tested for hypothetical results. The purpose of the 
stress testing method was to determine the performance point where a commercial bank 
would fail (Aspachs et al., 2007; Marcelo, Rodríguez, & Trucharte, 2008). The results 
were useful to banks for their risk mitigation analysis and could be combined with other 
financial institutions for system-wide and central bank risk analysis (Aspachs et al., 
2007). When results were aggregated the stress test model was similar to the synthetic 
model because it was a representation of the financial system. The key assumption in 
these models was that knowing the probability of default was necessary to produce the 
appropriate regulatory controls for financial stability (Aspachs et al., 2007; Geyfman & 
Yeager, 2009; Marcelo et al., 2008; Negrilă, 2009). Although the quality of analysis 
improved with empirical modeling, there lacked evidence that these models could be 
either predictive of instability or useful for structuring regulations (Aspachs et al., 2007; 
Geyfman & Yeager, 2009; Naceur & Omran, 2011).  
The studies of empirical modeling efforts were insightful because synthetic bank 





limited to explaining past events and testing hypothetical situations (Aspachs et al., 2007; 
Gray, Bodie, & Merton, 2007). These models failed to predict the impending crisis, 
which might have been due either to undetected instability in the financial system or 
limitations of assumptions in the method like systemic liquidity (Geyfman & Yeager, 
2009). The evidence of predictive ability was limited to predicting regulatory changes 
once a financial crisis has started (Mousavi & Shefrin, 2010). Indeed, the failures of 
empirical modeling related to the GFC reflected long standing doubts in macroeconomics 
modeling to be a predictive discipline (DeLong & Summers, 1986; Friedman, 1986; 
Gregg, 2010). 
Empirical studies successfully defined key relationships between phenomena in 
the economy and the financial system, in the context of the GFC (Bordo, 2008; 
Eichengreen et al., 2009; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2008a). Most notably, the understanding of 
capital movement throughout the world was advanced by defining the relationship 
between the levels of capital mobility and global economic phases (Bair, 2008; Beck et 
al., 2009; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2008a). Factors that were related to the U.S. business 
cycles were identified, which in certain combinations also identified the severity of the 
cycle (Bordo & Haubrich, 2009). Other empirical studies yielded the housing value index 
(Shiller, 2005, 2012) and evidence of relationships between regulations and financial 
results involving various components of the financial system (Avery, Bostic, & Canner, 
2000; Billio et al., 2010; Dincer & Eichengreen, 2009; Eichengreen et al., 2009; He, 





methodology for the original analysis of financial statistical data involving the time frame 
of multiple years. 
Conclusion 
Public policies regarding U.S. financial system stability addressed complex 
economic matters while entangled with political values and tenets of capitalism (Gregg, 
2010; Key, 2012). In the United States, the FRS was entrusted to exercise prudence over 
the economy and the financial system (Board of Governors, 2005). Yet the regulations 
governing this complicated system emerged from rational actions and policy garbage 
cans alike, with the distinction not always clear (Keeney, 2012, Lauckner, 2012; Lee, 
2012). The regulatory framework shift to the GLBA from the GSA, regardless of its 
merit, was destabilizing to U.S. financial institutions and entwined with other historic 
changes (Cornford, 2009; Ferguson, 2008). The Basel Accords had enhanced capital 
mobility so that capital flowed easier among market participants worldwide (Peretz & 
Schroedel, 2009; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2008a). Innovations such as CMOs and CDSs 
brought new financial instruments and intermediaries into the financial system, with 
uncertain risks to lenders and borrowers (Gerding, 2011). 
A grave financial crisis, rather than financial system stability, resulted from 
market changes coupled with regulatory policies. Although the GFC had no sole cause, 
illiquidity was triggered by falling house values conjoined with mortgage securitization 
derivative instruments like CMOs and CDSs (Dincer & Eichengreen, 2009; Felsenheimer 





empirical evidence of the relationship between CDS regulations and CMOs and their 
associated risks. The research response to the GFC included the development of causal 
and pathway models incorporating empirical evidence in order to better understand 
financial system relationships and risks (Adams et al., 2011; Billio et al., 2010; Bordo, 
2008; Bordo & Haubrich, 2009; Wang et al., 2011). In Chapter 3, I apply the findings 
from the literature review to the quantitative research design, in terms of the regulations 






Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
In Chapter 3 I describe the quantitative research design used to evaluate the 
problem of CDS regulation and the corresponding results in the financial system. First I 
present the quantitative research question and hypotheses followed by an overview of the 
quantitative research design and the range of methodology options available. Then I 
include the quantitative research setting, descriptions of the population and the sampling 
frame from which the data are drawn. Further I describe the instrumentation, the ARIMA 
parameters and periods, and the operationalization of variables, and then I discuss the 
ARIMA method. I then present the data collection processes along with the statistical 
techniques associated with ARIMA modeling and considerations of validity and 
reliability. I summarize the quantitative research design with an overview of and 
discussion of results. 
Research Question and Hypotheses 
This study is based on the following quantitative research question: What is the 
nature of the relationship between the independent variables—CDSs regulations (the 
CFMA and the EESA)—and the dependent variable—flow of capital into CMOs (as 
measured by millions of U.S. dollars each quarter) when lenders share their borrower-
related loan risks through intermediaries with other market participants? 
The null (H0) and alternate (HA1 and HA2) hypotheses were based upon the 





considered (the garbage can model and the rational-comprehensive model) for two CDS 
regulations (the CFMA and the EESA).  
Null hypothesis (H0): There is no statistically significant relationship between the 
independent variables—CDSs regulations (the CFMA and the EESA) and the 
dependent variable—flow of capital into CMOs (as measured by millions of U.S. 
dollars each quarter) when lenders share their borrower-related loan risks through 
intermediaries with other market participants. 
The first alternate hypothesis (HA1) was derived from the garbage can policy 
model in which a reactive policy was implemented, with a negative relationship between 
CDS policy and CMO capital flows. The garbage can model is associated with reactive 
policymaking and is defined in detail in the Definitions section . A negative relationship 
is a policy result in which the presence of the regulation is associated with the measure of 
an unfavorable result. 
Alternate research hypothesis A1 (HA1): There is a negative and statistically 
significant relationship between the independent variables—CDSs regulations (the 
CFMA and the EESA) and the dependent variable—flow of capital into CMOs (as 
measured by millions of U.S. dollars each quarter) when lenders share their 
borrower-related loan risks through intermediaries with other market participants. 
The second alternate hypothesis (HA2) was derived from the rational-
comprehensive policy model in which a proactive policy was implemented, with a 





rational-comprehensive policy model is associated with proactive policymaking and is 
defined in detail in the Definitions section. A positive relationship is a policy result in 
which the presence of the regulation is associated with the measure of a favorable result. 
Alternate research hypothesis A2 (HA2): There is a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between the independent variables—CDSs regulations (the 
CFMA and the EESA) and the dependent variable—flow of capital into CMOs (as 
measured by millions of U.S. dollars each quarter) when lenders share their 
borrower-related loan risks through intermediaries with other market participants. 
The quantitative alternate research hypotheses (HA1 and HA2) that are set in 
opposition are derived from the CFMA of 2000. CFMA is the CDS regulation that 
allowed for the policy of unrestricted use of CDSs by U.S. financial institutions, which 
was favorable to CDSs. The existing empirical literature pointed to CFMA being derived 
from the rational-comprehensive model (HA2) of public policymaking (Barth et al., 2008; 
Billio et al., 2010), rather than from the garbage can model (HA1) of public 
policymaking. The ARIMA modeling period demarcating this regulation is January 2001 
through September 2008. 
Research Design and Approach 
Knowledge and theories are built inductively through the qualitative and tested 
deductively through the quantitative methods of inquiry within the context of a 
theoretical or conceptual framework (Creswell, 2009; Reynolds, 2010). The research 





rational-comprehensive model and the garbage can model. Possible approaches to 
research design from the literature review included quantitative studies of regulatory 
policy, macroeconomic policy, and capital flow (Kirabaeva & Razin, 2009; Lee, 2012; 
Song & Uzmanoglu, 2012; Taylor, 2009) and studies that focused on specific topics like 
CDSs, CMOs and CDOs, and TARP (Barnett-Hart, 2009; Black & Hazelwood, 2012; 
Peristiani & Savino, 2011). Qualitative studies involved regulatory policy (Higgs, 2010; 
Pacces, 2010), ethical evaluation, and legal case study approaches (Arkes, 2010; Breen, 
2010; Jackson, 2010; Kling, 2010; Lawson, 2010). Few of the reviewed designs were 
mixed methods (Newman, DeMarco, Newman, & Ridenour, 2003) involving case study 
and empirical evidence (Mussa, 2010). Based on the research question, the quantitative 
research design is the best fit for analyzing CDSs and CMOs by deductively testing for a 
relationship between these two constructs. 
The quantitative research design selected is a quantitative inquiry involving 
lagged time series analysis, which is used to explain the empirical relationship between 
public policy and financial system results (Inter-American Development Bank [IADB], 
2004). Time series is a classical, quasiexperimental structure incorporating regression 
analysis (Glass et al., 2008). The two independent variables are CDS regulations (the 
CFMA and the EESA) and the dependent variable is CMO assets in U.S. financial 
institutions, measured in millions of U.S. dollars each quarter (Jarrow, 2011). The 
relationship of the independent and dependent variables is modeled and the U.S. LPR 





variable for the effects of history and this particular control was selected because it is 
independent of the regulatory intervention (Glass et al., 2008). The ARIMA method was 
chosen in order to evaluate the change over time of the dependent variable. 
The date range for the quantitative research study starts with the enactment of 
FIRREA in August 1989, which was the terminal legislation of the 1980s Savings & 
Loan Crisis (Cassell & Hoffman, 2009). The end point of the date range is March 2013, 
after the implementation of CDS regulation under Dodd-Frank, the terminal legislation of 
the GFC (Miller & Ruane, 2012). Although Dodd-Frank was enacted in July 2010, key 
CDS provisions in the act were proposed in TARP during 2008 yet not fully implemented 
until October 2012 (DTCC, 2012; Nanto, 2009). 
Setting and Sample 
In this section of Chapter 3 I include an overview of the setting and the associated 
data that were used in the quantitative study, including descriptions of the population, 
sampling strategy, sample size, and the sample population to which the results should be 
generalizable (Trochim, 2006). The operationalization of variables and the corresponding 
analytical model are defined in the section that follows on instrumentation and materials. 
The setting is the U.S. financial system in which lenders and borrowers interact 
through intermediaries and capital flows among firms participating in the market. The 
financial system has multiple types of privately owned financial institutions and it is a 
subset of the global financial system that consists of the central banks with their 





The data are financial statistics of the U.S. financial system published by the FRS from 
the defined sampling frame. Samples are drawn from the population of financial 
institutions that is consistent with the operationalized variables and the ARIMA modeling 
specifications which are CDS regulations and their corresponding time frames that are 
detailed in Table 1.  
Population and Sampling Frame 
The population is all privately held U.S. financial institutions, which includes 
depositories and nondepositories. Large commercial bank depositories are the 1,734 
members of the FRS with assets greater than $300 million U.S. dollars that represent 
approximately 90% of the assets of member commercial banks (Board of Governors, 
2013d) and approximately 80% of the $13 trillion U.S. dollars in bank and thrift deposits 
insured by the FDIC (2013). Of the nondepository financial institutions with independent 
financial ratings in the United States, there are 275 life insurance companies, 677 
property and casualty insurance companies, 43 securities broker dealers participating in 
investment banking activities, and 168 finance companies (Standard and Poor’s Rating 
Services, 2013). Additionally, issuers of ABSs include financial institutions that issued 
some of 1,375 ABSs that have independent financial ratings (Standard and Poor’s Rating 
Services, 2013). 
A population member is a privately held financial institution. Those population 
members that are depositories include commercial banks operating in the United States 





of Governors, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013e). Those population members that are 
nondepositories include insurance companies, securities broker dealers, and finance 
companies and other issuers of ABSs (Board of Governors, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c; 
Independent Directors Council, 2010; REIT Wrecks, 2008; Thiruvengadam, 2010; DOT, 
2001; U.S. Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2010, 2011, 
2012a, 2012b; U.S. Senate, Joint Economic Committee, 2012). The FRS does not 
explicitly report on the financial institutions associated with its results, though limited 
information regarding financial institutions is publicly available (FFIEC, 2013). 
The sampling frame is financial institutions that are required to report financial 
results to the FRS (Board of Governors, 2005). This limitation excludes savings and loan 
companies and, in general, small financial institutions that have less than approximately 
$1.2 billion in assets (Board of Governors, FDIC, & OCC, 2012). Not all financial 
institutions are required to be members of the FRS, so membership is elective particularly 
for those in asset range of $300 million to $1.2 billion (Board of Governors, 2005, 
2013d). Financial results are aggregated by the FRS for publishing financial statistics 
(Board of Governors, 2013a). 
Sampling Strategy 
The sampling strategy was to purposefully draw data from U.S. government 
reports published electronically by the FRS that contain financial statistics based upon 
financial institutions’ aggregated results by accounts that are unobservable by institution 





intervals, which is consistent with the periodic valuations that financial institutions 
perform for assets that have market-based values such as CMOs. The FRS data are levels 
of outstanding assets and liabilities observed at the end of period and that are neither 
seasonally nor inflation adjusted (Board of Governors, 2012b, 2012c, 2013b, 2013c; 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2013b). All data were thus observed uniformly and 
in a way that was consistent with time series analysis (Glass et al., 2008). The unit of 
analysis is aggregated data from the entire sampling frame. A unit of data is a quarterly 
financial statistic from a financial time series each quarter. Each datum within the 
sampling frame is included so that no available data are skipped in the quarterly 
observations of units of data. The data collected in this sampling are stated as millions of 
U.S. dollars. 
Sample Size 
The ARIMA process involves the values associated with a single panel of time 
series data and the corresponding sample size is simply all the quarterly values within the 
window of the study, which is from the fourth quarter of 1989 through the first quarter of 
2013 and results in 95 unique data points. There is no required sample size with ARIMA 
modeling rather achieving statistically significant results is a function of the specific data 
being analyzed and the goodness of fit to the model (NIST, 2012; StatSoft, Inc., 2013).  
Sample of the Population 
These financial statistics are drawn according to the quantitative research design 





materials section. The FRS is an exclusive and authoritative source of this data, and the 
reporting process is an important part of their governance of the financial system (Board 
of Governors, 2005). These U.S. government official statistics were typical of secondary 
data used in independent empirical analyses (Howell, 2008; Kiecolt & Nathan, 1985; 
United Nations Statistical Institute for Asia and the Pacific, n.d.). The use of secondary 
data in general is appropriate when there is a strong relationship between the quantitative 
research question and the data used for testing hypotheses (Thomas, Bauer, & Heck, 
2005).  
Instrumentation and Materials 
In this section I include ARIMA modeling parameters, the definition and 
operationalization of variables, and an overview of the ARIMA modeling process. The 
instrumentation and data collection in this quantitative research methodology were 
designed to be sufficient for answering the quantitative research question through the 
testing of the null and alternate hypotheses (Creswell, 2009; Reynolds, 2010). The 
materials used in the instrument were researcher developed and based upon the literature 
review (Barnett-Hart, 2009; Black & Hazelwood, 2012; Peristiani & Savino, 2011), the 
selected theoretical framework (Arrow, 1987; Kingdon, 2003; Simon, 1957), and choices 
for ARIMA modeling in the quantitative research design and during the research project 





ARIMA Parameters for Modeling Periods 
Time series analysis is a fixed-effect model, in which it is assumed that successive 
values of data represent consecutive and equally spaced measurements over time (NIST, 
2012; Parsad et al., 2012; Yaffee, 2003). The phenomenon being studied was represented 
by quarterly data from which the nature of the phenomenon can be understood, but 
contingent on the appropriate selection of variables (Yaffee, 2003). The ARIMA method 
was used to identify patterns over time in data by indicating differences that are used to 
divide a nonstationary time series into stationary periods for further analysis using 
ARIMA modeling steps (Glass et al., 2008).  
The ARIMA modeling parameters were measurable factors that are hypothesized 
to set the conditions of operations for its subject (Glass et al., 2008). These parameters 
were used to develop the initial periods. The ARIMA modeling periods were 
subsequently determined by testing the initial periods using ANOVA F-tests and t tests 
for correlated samples (Glass et al., 2008; NIST, 2012). The modeling parameters are 
presented in Table 1. The associated variables are operationalized in the section that 












ARIMA Modeling Parameters for CMOs, CDSs, and Associated Indications 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Modeling parameters   Started  Indication 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
The Financial Institutions Reform,   Aug. 1989 Start of regulatory era 
Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989   after the savings  
(FIRREA)      and loan crisis 
 
The Commodity Futures Modernization Jan. 2001 Favorable CDS   
Act of 2000 (CFMA)     legislation  
     
The Emergency Economic Stabilization  Oct. 2008 Unfavorable CDS  
Act of 2008 (EESA) / Troubled Asset   legislation    
Relief Program (TARP)      
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
For the dependent variable CMO, the modeling parameters are demarcated by the 
independent variables’ (the CFMA and the EESA) CDS policy changes. These CMO 
parameters might have shifted from a baseline after the passage on December 21, 2000 of 
the CFMA legislation that was consistent with the GLBA deregulation and favorable to 
CDSs. A second shift in CMOs might have occurred with legislation unfavorable to 
CDSs in 2008. Three different CMO periods result from these two CDS-related 
interventions that are analyzed beginning with ANOVA F-tests and t tests: August 1989 
to December 2000, January 2001 to September 2008, October 2008 to March 2013.  
For a model control, parameters for the LPR were used in order to control for the 





2008). This parameter shifted after 1999, based upon a visual assessment of the graphed 
data, after which point the LPR appears to have steadily declined (DOL, BLS, 2013). The 
rationale for selecting this control variable was that the LPR is a macroeconomic 
measurement is independent of the intervention of CDS regulation, which is consistent 
with the selection criterion in the time series methodology (Glass et al., 2008). By 
comparison, GDP is a macroeconomic measurement that may not be independent of the 
intervention of CDS regulation and thus is not used. 
ARIMA Periods Using a One-Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) F-Tests and t 
Tests 
ANOVA F-tests and t tests were performed to determine whether the time series 
of the dependent variable is a uniform set of data or comprised two or more different 
periods associated with the two independent variables (Glass et al., 2008; NIST, 2012). 
ANOVA F-tests were used to compare the difference between two means in relation to 
the variation in the data, with the mean portraying the first moment and variance the 
second moment. If statistically significant periods are found, t tests for period 
comparisons were used. This tested whether or not each pair of periods has a mean 
difference to the dependent variable in order to identify the model that best fits the 
sampled data (Glass et al., 2008; NIST, 2012). 
Operationalization of Variables 
The theoretical basis of examining the nature of the relationship between CDSs 





which are the rational-comprehensive model and the garbage can model (Arrow, 1987; 
Kingdon, 2003; Simon, 1957). The dependent variable was CMO assets that are created 
when capital is deployed to these assets in the U.S. financial system (Estrella & Silver, 
1984; Haubrich & Lucas, 2007). The independent variables were CDS regulation periods 
that were identified in the research literature (Aizenman & Pasricha, 2009; Eichengreen 
et al., 2009; Roe, 2011) and determined by reviewing the primary source data of the acts 
of Congress. 
The variables used in the quantitative research study were operationalized for use 
in the ARIMA modeling. The dependent variable is CMO that was operationalized by the 
sum of the CMO asset categories reported by the FRS (Board of Governors, 2012b, 
2012c, 2013b) and is discussed in further detail in the data collection section. CDS 
regulations are independent variables operationalized by the enactments of the CFMA of 
2000 and the EESA of 2008 (that includes TARP). The control variable was 
operationalized by the LPR which was the employment to working age population ratio 
published by the U.S. government (DOL, BLS, 2013). 
ARIMA Method (p,d,q) 
The ARIMA method is an integration of autoregressive (AR) and moving average 
(MA) models in which the time series values may be differenced according to factors that 
are identified from the modeling process (Glass et al., 2008; Nau, 2014; NIST, 2012; 
StatSoft, Inc., 2013). The output from ARIMA models are shown in the form (p,d,q). In 





of differenced periods integrated in the time series is d, and the time-lagged intervals 
used from the MA part of the model is q (NIST, 2012). The ARIMA model output of 
(0,1,0) may also be stated as I(1) and indicates the presence of a random walk in which 
the future expected value is equal to the current value plus a constant. If the constant is 
zero, then a random walk without drift is indicated (NIST, 2012). 
The ARIMA method is commonly used with stochastic data when there is no 
clear indication of simple cause and effect mechanisms and the underlying process may 
be haphazard though associated with a data pattern. A good example is financial related 
data that vary on a monthly basis, perhaps resulting from a haphazard process that can be 
analyzed with ARIMA techniques (New England Actuarial Seminars [NEAS], 2008). 
The ARIMA process is used to model fluctuations so that components of trends and 
seasonal influences can be removed in order to identify a residual, which is then analyzed 
for randomness and for significance related to the different periods of the data (NEAS, 
2008; NIST, 2012; StatSoft, Inc., 2013). Trends in the CMO ARIMA model may be 
present that are related to housing values (Shiller, 2005, 2012) and to seasonal mortgage 
borrowing (Rossi, 2010; Yezer, 2010). 
The ARIMA modeling parameters in Table 1 based on CDS regulations resulted 
in three periods and each of these periods is analyzed for (p,d,q) for CMO and the 
control, which results in 6 (p,d,q) potential findings. The findings depend on the 
presence, or absence, in the data of autocorrelation and random-shock-related moving 





is present in a (p,d,q) model of (1,0,0), then the data are analyzed for partial 
autocorrelation of the residuals in a model of (1,0,1), including the examination of the 
data plot of the partial autocorrelation function (Adams et al., 2011; Dębowski, 2011; 
Glass et al., 2008; Inoue, 2008). If the partial autocorrelation cuts off after the lag p then 
the model is (1,0,0), whereas partial autocorrelation that dies out slowly indicates that the 
model is (1,0,1), based on the effects of a random shock q (Adams et al., 2011; Glass et 
al., 2008). The findings from the three modeled ARIMA periods in Table 1 are shown in 
the following form, for further statistical analysis: 
  Period 1 Model Period 2 Model Period 3 Model 
CMO  (p,d,q)  (p,d,q)  (p,d,q) 
control  (p,d,q)  (p,d,q)  (p,d,q) 
Data Collection and Analysis 
The data collection and analysis processes are defined in this section. The 
corresponding details are given for the data collection procedure in Appendix A and the 
data in Appendix B. After the discussion of the treatment of data related to ARIMA and 
time series data issues, the quantitative research design was reviewed for concerns 
involving validity and reliability.  
Data Collection 
The dependent variable CMO is operationalized with data representing CMO 





from the FRS report Z.1 Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States (Board of 
Governors, 2012b, 2012c, 2013a, 2013b). 
Microsoft Excel 2010 spreadsheets were used for storing the collected data that 
was consolidated and imported into statistical software for analysis. The Statistical 
Package for Social Sciences by IBM (SPSS Statistics Premium Grad Pack Version 21.0) 
included basic and advanced procedures for time series analysis (Green & Salkind, 2008; 
IBM, 2012). The functionality of this software was limited by its inclusion of statistical 
procedures and SPSS cannot replace the human intuition and judgment that is necessary 









CMOs in Federal Reserve Z.1 Flow of Funds Accounts 
_______________________________________________________________________ 




30616  Residential CMOs and other L.110 U.S.-Chartered Depository  
structured MBS Institutions, Excluding Credit 
Unions  
 
30636  Private residential CMOs and L.110 U.S.-Chartered Depository 





30617  Agency- and GSE-backed  L.124 Issuers of Asset-Backed 
  mortgage pool securities backing Securities CMOs 
backing privately issued CMOs 
 
30651  Home mortgages backing  L.124 Issuers of Asset-Backed 
privately issued pool securities Securities CMOs 
  and privately issued CMOs 
 
30654  Multifamily mortgages backing L.124 Issuers of Asset-Backed 
  privately issued pool securities  Securities CMOs 









ARIMA Modeling Statistical Procedure 
The procedure used was based on Box-Jenkins which is a multistep and iterative 
process used to fit an ARIMA model to the data (Glass et al., 2008; Key, 2012; Lopes, 
2011; NIST, 2012; Parsad et al., 2012). The steps included iteratively modeling a time 
series until it had stationary mean and variance (the basis of standard deviation), without 
trends and seasonality, by identifying differenced and distinct periods of nonrandom, 
univariate data. The data analysis was expected to take multiple iterations and included 
the portrayal and interpretation of visual data because the data were not expected to fit 
any one ARIMA model exactly. This is a process of parsimony that requires intuitive 
analysis to identify the model that requires the least change to explain the observed data 
(NEAS, 2008; StatSoft, Inc., 2013).  
Box-Jenkins. Problematic data issues in ARIMA can be addressed with Box-
Jenkins techniques (NIST, 2012; Parsad et al., 2012; StatSoft, Inc., 2013). The first step 
was to identify d, the integrated stationary periods (I) in the ARIMA model, by using 
ANOVA F-tests and t tests and that demonstrate statistically significant periods (Glass et 
al., 2008; NIST, 2012). Assuming there are two or more stationary periods d in the time 
series, the second step p was to determine the autoregressive (AR) portion of the ARIMA 
model used to identify the autocorrelation of all pairs of values according to the potential 
time interval lags. This technique is the process of comparing the variation among 
observations in order to identify its components of autocorrelation, randomness, and 





analysis is necessary to analyze these variances (NIST, 2012; Parsad et al., 2012; 
StatSoft, Inc., 2013), including Granger-caused implied and expected variances (Wang et 
al., 2011). The third step q was the moving average (MA) part of the ARIMA model the 
weighted average of current and immediate past values at a defined time interval lag, 
which is a pragmatic smoothing mechanism not directly linked to a statistical model and 
that is determined through a comparison of the graphic portrayal of the moving average 
to NIST logic tables (Glass et al., 2008; NIST, 2012). 
Validity and Reliability 
The quantitative research design included considerations of whether the test 
measures what it was intended to measure, which were related to the concerns of internal 
and external validity. Reliability in test measurement is reviewed as it is a precondition to 
achieving validity in the quantitative design. Additionally, in order to draw conclusions 
the overall structure of the quantitative research design must be unbiased and the data 
trustworthy, which is also given consideration in this section (Creswell, 2009). 
Internal validity. Construct validity is established in the quantitative research 
design by the use of the theoretical framework of public policymaking in order to develop 
the measuring instrument (Creswell, 2009), which is based upon regulatory policy type 
leading to CMO changes. Empirical validity is a concern because many factors could 
invalidate a cause and effect relationship between CDS policy periods and CMOs, so the 
instrument is limited to identifying patterns rather than the causes of patterns with claims 





modeling rather than linear regression analysis that has an assumption there is enough 
evidence to test for cause-and-effect relationships (Creswell, 2009; NIST, 2012). Despite 
the limited claims from ARIMA methods, results could yet be explained by history that 
remains a threat to the internal validity due to other, undefined events that were 
concurrent to the periods defined in ARIMA models. History is controlled for in this 
quantitative design by the use of a macroeconomic control variable, the LPR.  
Reliability is the internal consistency in test measurement and is a necessary 
condition of validity, but does not fully satisfy the requirements of validity (Creswell, 
2009). This consistency is internal to the quasiexperiment and is operationalized by 
clearly defining the variables and the data that are collected and by documenting detailed 
procedures used in the testing process in order that others may produce the same results 
in replication (Creswell, 2009). Reliability for the ARIMA model is accomplished by the 
(p,d,q) determining methodology (Glass et al., 2008). Differencing of CMO data is 
determined based on the 3 CDS regulatory policy analytical periods in order to define the 
periods d in which the mean and variance are stationary. The CMO data and control data 
for these periods were further analyzed for the p autocorrelation function to determine 
whether observations are a function of a time difference with prior observations. 
Similarly, q was derived from the NIST (2012) logic table based on the graphical 






Threats to validity were mitigated by including research literature-based variables 
and by designing a representative sample with valid data and sufficient sample sizes for 
ARIMA modeling (Yaffee, 2003; Yezer, 2010). Rigorous methodology and analyses in 
the quantitative research design was necessary to attain impartiality (Creswell, 2009), 
although this alone did not ensure the quantitative study was free from bias because 
public policy is developed inside a political system with exposure to political preferences 
and economic philosophies (Anderson, 2006, p. 2; Yezer, 2010). The most trustworthy 
source of financial system statistical data was the FRS data used in this quantitative 
design, although its trustworthiness is not definitive in either theory or practice (Creswell, 
2009; Ivry, Keoun, & Kuntz, 2011). 
External validity. The primary threat to content validity in the quantitative 
research design was the relevance of the instrument to the variable it was meant to 
measure. This is a concern of face validity that was present due to the dependent variable 
CMO being a derivative because its value is derived from another source. The 
independent variable CDS was stated in regulatory periods, so the instrument was 
designed with consideration of this limitation. The research literature reviewed in Chapter 
2 supported the content validity of this quantitative design involving CDS regulatory 
periods and CMOs as financial assets. Sampling issues related to external validity were 
adequately addressed in the design in that the quantitative research setting was the same 
as the environment to which results are generalized, and the sample was representative of 





weak due to the United States only population, set time period, and dependence on U.S. 
laws (Creswell, 2009). 
Ethical Procedures 
The safety, welfare, and rights of research participants were considered in this 
quantitative research study in order to protect the privacy of persons. Data in this study 
were used to interpret patterns in the U.S. financial system to benefit public policymakers 
constructing financial regulations. Financial results were aggregated from financial 
institutions and this analysis does not require their identification. The data for the 
quantitative research study were publicly available and may be collected from Internet 
sites; there is no identification of persons, or firms, in the data being used. The data 
observations used in the analysis have been recorded in Appendix B and are openly 
available to other scholars or researchers in electronic format for 7 years by request to 
me. The collected data are archived on a personal computer and are not publicly 
accessible. There are no human subjects involved in this quantitative research design. The 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval number for this research project is 10-18-13-
0154510. 
Summary 
This quantitative research study was designed to demonstrate empirically whether 
there are patterns in the association between CDS regulations and CMO assets in U.S. 





What is the nature of the relationship between the independent variables—CDSs 
regulations (the CFMA and the EESA) and the dependent variable—flow of capital into 
CMOs (as measured by millions of U.S. dollars each quarter) when lenders share their 
borrower-related loan risks through intermediaries with other market participants? 
The quantitative study answers this question based in a theoretical framework of 
public policymaking comparing the rational-comprehensive model and the garbage can 
model. The quantitative design was formulated from the research literature for the 
identification of variables and the quantitative methodology used. The ARIMA model fits 
the stochastic phenomenon that was being studied, which involved quarterly intervals of 
secondary data from U.S. government financial statistics. The ARIMA modeling 
parameters provided for a framework stated in CDS regulatory periods that could be 
analyzed for differences in CMO time series. Understanding the patterns of data over 
time involving CDSs and CMOs may shed light on the relationship between these two 
phenomena and aid in public policymaking to identify and contain systemic risks. The 
results of the ARIMA modeling and testing will be presented in Chapter 4 including 
tables, charts, and data output along with the analytical procedures performed. In Chapter 





Chapter 4: Results 
Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter is to present the results of the quantitative research 
study. This study was based on the following quantitative research question: What is the 
nature of the relationship between the independent variables—CDSs regulations (the 
CFMA and the EESA) and the dependent variable—flow of capital into CMOs (as 
measured by millions of U.S. dollars each quarter) when lenders share their borrower-
related loan risks through intermediaries with other market participants? 
The null (H0) and alternate (HA1 and HA2) hypotheses were based upon the 
theoretical framework in which two contrasting public policymaking models are 
considered (the garbage can model and the rational-comprehensive model) for two CDS 
regulations (the CFMA and the EESA).  
Null hypothesis (H0): There is no statistically significant relationship between the 
independent variables—CDSs regulations (the CFMA and the EESA) and the 
dependent variable—flow of capital into CMOs (as measured by millions of U.S. 
dollars each quarter) when lenders share their borrower-related loan risks through 
intermediaries with other market participants. 
The first alternate hypothesis (HA1) was derived from the garbage can policy 
model in which a reactive policy was implemented, with a negative relationship between 
CDS policy and CMO capital flows. The garbage can model is associated with reactive 





a policy result in which the presence of the regulation is associated with the measure of 
an unfavorable result. 
Alternate research hypothesis A1 (HA1): There is a negative and statistically 
significant relationship between the independent variables—CDSs regulations (the 
CFMA and the EESA) and the dependent variable—flow of capital into CMOs (as 
measured by millions of U.S. dollars each quarter) when lenders share their 
borrower-related loan risks through intermediaries with other market participants. 
The second alternate hypothesis (HA2) was derived from the rational-
comprehensive policy model in which a proactive policy was implemented, with a 
positive relationship between CDS policy and increasing CMO capital flows. The 
rational-comprehensive policy model is associated with proactive policymaking and is 
defined in detail in the Definitions section. A positive relationship is a policy result in 
which the presence of the regulation is associated with the measure of a favorable result. 
Alternate research hypothesis A2 (HA2): There is a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between the independent variables—CDSs regulations (the 
CFMA and the EESA) and the dependent variable—flow of capital into CMOs (as 
measured by millions of U.S. dollars each quarter) when lenders share their 
borrower-related loan risks through intermediaries with other market participants. 
Chapter 4 consists of data collection highlights, the results, and a summary of the 






The data were collected and analyzed with ARIMA modeling according to the 
plan I presented in Chapter 3. The dependent variable COLLMO is Collateralized 
Mortgage Obligations (CMOs; measured in millions of U.S. dollars once per quarter) and 
consisted of 95 data points. These data are summarized in Table 3 and presented 




Data Characteristics of the Sample and Three ARIMA Modeling Periods for the 
Dependent and Control Variables 
________________________________________________________________________ 
     Period 1  Period 2                    Period 3    
     1989 - 2000 2001 – 2008                 2008 - 2013   
Data characteristic   Sample  Unregulated Favorable                   Unfavorable  
________________________________________________________________________ 
Starting Quarter (Q)  3Q 1989  3Q 1989  1Q 2001  4Q 2008 
Ending Quarter (Q)  1Q 2013  4Q 2000  3Q 2008  1Q 2013 
Number of observations 95  46  31  18 
CMOs in millions of dollars 
Minimum dollar value  143,378  143,378  808,450  1,485,216  
Maximum dollar value  3,215,406  776,275  3,215,406  2,815,334 
Mean   1,242,171  448,737  1,978,773  2,001,241 
Median   830,830  444,289  1,814,582  1,910,515  
LPR 
Minimum ratio value  63.3  66.0  65.8  63.3  
Maximum ratio value  67.3  67.3  67.2  65.8 
Mean   66.1  66.7  66.2  64.4  









Figure 1. The value of CMOs in millions of dollars measured over the period of 95 
quarters 1989 to 2013. CMOs increased consistently when unregulated, grew and then 
declined under favorable regulation, and continued to decline under unfavorable 
regulation.  
 
The control variable LABORP is the LPR which is the employment-to-population 
ratio. These data are presented graphically in Figure 2 and summarized in Table 3. The 
collected data are assumed to be current, accurate, and complete when reported by the 
FRS. The sample is representative of the population of CMOs and labor participation rate 








Figure 2. The value of the labor participation rate measured over the period of 95 
quarters (1989 to 2013). The employment-to-population ratio fluctuated while declining 
over the long-term through periods of no CDS regulation, favorable CDS regulation, and 
unfavorable CDS regulation.  
 
Results of the Study 
I present the results of this quantitative study in this section, beginning with the 
data characteristics of the sample. The results of ANOVA F-tests and t tests were the 
time series was not a uniform or randomly distributed data set, so additional testing 
proceeded. Data transformation procedures consisted of analysis and correction for 
outliers, heteroskedasticity, and seasonality. The time series had no outliers, although 
these were present in some of the ARIMA model parameters. The Breusch-Pagan test 





the data was necessary. Seasonality was present in the CMO data and was corrected by 
data transformation. The spectral analysis procedure was used to confirm that no 
significant periodicities were present in the time series other than seasonality. 
Initial ARIMA modeling resulted in three distinct stationary periods of the 
dependent variable, CMOs. These stationary periods corresponded to the two CDS 
regulatory events (the independent variables) after making appropriate adjustments to the 
starting and ending quarters. The six ARIMA (p,d,q,) models evaluated consisted of three 
stationary periods with two variables, the dependent variable CMOs and the control 
variable. Statistically significant parameters were identified in the AR (autoregressive) 
and MA (moving average) components of the ARIMA (p,d,q,) models as a result of 
testing multiple configurations. ARIMA (p,d,q,) models were refined based on the 
autocorrelation and the partial autocorrelation present in these models. Statistical testing 
of these ARIMA (p,d,q,) models was performed and statistically significant covariation 
with p < .05 was found in 1 of the 6 models. The null and alternative hypotheses were 










Figure 3. The value of CMOs in billions of dollars measured over the 3 periods created 
by the CFMA and EESA regulations (1989 to 2013). Period 1 was prior to CDS 
regulation. Period 2 was after the CFMA and contained the housing peak and the onset of 
the global financial crisis. Period 3 was after the EESA.  
 
ANOVA F-Tests Results 
ANOVA F-tests were performed and it was determined that the time series of the 
dependent variable comprised two or more different periods, rather than being a uniform 
set of data. These results mean the data are not random and that the ARIMA model is not 





periods and CMOs (measured in millions of dollars). The factors tested consisted of two 
CDS regulations resulting in three CDS regulatory periods. The dependent variable was 
CMOs in U.S. financial institutions (measured in millions of dollars each quarter). The 
ANOVA was statistically significant, F(2, 92) = 95.32, p ≤ .00. The strength of the 
relationship between the CDS regulatory periods and CMOs (measured in millions of 
dollars each quarter), as assessed by ƞ2, was strong, with the CDS regulatory periods 
accounting for 67% of the variance of the dependent variable. 
Follow-up tests were conducted to evaluate differences among the means. 
Because the variances of CMOs (measured in millions of dollars) among the three 
periods ranged from 3.051 × 1010 to 7.737 × 1011, I chose not to assume the variances 
were homogenous and conducted post hoc comparisons with the use of Dunnett’s C test, 
a test that does not assume equal variances among the three CDS regulatory periods. 
There was a statistically significant difference in the means between the period in which 
there was favorable CDS (period 2) regulation with the CFMA and the period in which 
there was no regulation (period 1), but no significant differences between the periods of 
favorable CDS regulation (period 2) with the CFMA and unfavorable CDS regulation 
with the EESA (period 3). The period that had unfavorable CDS regulation with the 
EESA (period 3) showed a greater amount of CMOs (measured in millions of dollars 
each quarter) in comparison to the period in which there was no regulation (period 1). 
The 95% confidence intervals for the pairwise comparisons of the means, as well as the 







Ninety-five Percent (95%) Confidence Internals of Pairwise Comparisons in Mean 
Changes in CMOs in Millions of Dollars 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Regulatory period                                sd                  Unregulated                                Favorable regulation 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Pair 1– Period 1 Unreg            $354,072     $108,960  
Pair 1– Period 2 CFMA        $1,978,773     $879,602     -$1,910,251 to -$1,339,151* 
Pair 2– Period 1 Unreg            $282,229      $88,314 
Pairs 2, 3– Period 3 EESA    $2,001,241    $384,497      -$1,906,284 to -$1,531,739*          -$914,665 to -$472,576*  
Pair 3– Period 2 CFMA        $1,307,620    $403,670 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. An asterisk indicates that the 95% confidence interval does not contain zero, and therefore the difference in means is statistically 




Since statistically significant periods were found using ANOVA, t tests were 
performed on the data. Paired-samples t tests were conducted to evaluate whether CMOs 
(measured in millions of dollars each quarter) were different between the CDS regulatory 
periods as a check to proceed with modeling. The results for the first of three paired 
comparisons indicated that the mean for the unregulated CDS period 
(  = 354071.84, sd = 108959.96) was significantly different than the mean for the 
favorable CDS regulation period with the CFMA (  = 1978773.00, sd = 879601.61), t(30) 
= 11.62, p ≤ .00. The standardized effect size index, d, was 2.09, indicating a large 





quarterly intervals as shown in Figure 4. The 95% confidence interval for the mean 
difference between these 2 periods was 1910250.87 to 1339151.45. For the second 
paired comparison, the mean for the unregulated CDS period (  = 282229.06, sd = 
88313.84) was significantly different than the mean for the unfavorable CDS regulation 
period with the EESA (  = 2001240.61, sd = 384497.02), t(17) = 19.37, p ≤ .00. The 
standardized effect size index, d, was 4.57, indicating a large effect, with no overlap in 
the distributions of CMOs measured in millions of dollars by quarter. The 95% 
confidence interval for the mean difference between these 2 periods was 1906283.63 to 
1531739.48. For the third paired comparison, the mean for the favorable CDS 
regulation period with the CFMA (  = 1307620.33, sd = 403670.12) was different than 
the mean for the unfavorable CDS regulation period with the EESA (  = 
2001240.61, sd = 384497.02), t(17) = 6.62, p ≤ .00, but not significantly. The 
standardized effect size index, d, was 1.56, indicating a large effect, with considerable 
overlap in the distributions of CMOs measured in millions of dollars by quarter. The 95% 
confidence interval for the mean difference between periods 2 and 3 was 914664.73 to 
472575.82. Although the difference between periods 2 and 3 was not statistically 
different based on the t test, there was statistically significant negative correlation 








Figure 4. The distributions of CMOs (measured in millions of dollars) had no overlap 
between period 1 and periods 2 and 3, although period 3 fully overlapped with period 2.  
 
Data Transformation 
Data transformation preceded the ARIMA modeling, consisting of procedures for 
outliers, heteroskedasticity, and seasonality, including spectral analysis. This 
transformation was performed for the CMO time series data. The control variable was 
already stated on a nonseasonal basis.  
Outliers. The data was analyzed for outliers in the univariate time series, 
distinctly from the outlier analysis conducted in the ARIMA modeling. The data was 
normalized into z-scores, or standard scores, which is the number of standard deviations 
an observation is above the mean. The z-score threshold was set at plus or minus 3.0 
because the sample exceeded 80 observations. The lowest z-score value was -1.16760 and 





or minus 3.0 or at the lower threshold of plus or minus 2.5, which is common for small 
samples like those not exceeding 80 observations. Accordingly, no changes were made to 
the data. 
Heteroskedasticity. The Breusch-Pagan test was used to test for 
heteroskedasticity in the raw data by testing whether the estimated variance of the 
residuals from a regression was dependent on the values of the independent variables. In 
R, this test was performed by the function ncvTest in the Companion to Applied 
Regression (CAR) package. The null hypothesis that the variance was constant, 
indicating that the model error is homoskedastic, was accepted. For the 3 CDS regulatory 
periods the Chi-square ( 2) was small and there was no associated statistical significance 
measured at the .05 significance. Accordingly, no changes were made to the data. The 












Breusch-Pagan Test Results for Heteroskedasticity 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Regulatory period    Chi-squared  Significance*      Result  Finding 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Period 1 No regulation       .190  .663  Accept Null  Homoskedasticity 
Period 2 CFMA    2.958  .085  Accept Null  Homoskedasticity 
Period 3 EESA       .660  .417  Accept Null Homoskedasticity 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. An asterisk indicates that the test is significant at p < .05.  
 
Seasonality. The CMO quarterly time series was transformed into a seasonally 
adjusted series through seasonal decomposition. The data indicated mild seasonal 
influences, with seasonal adjustment factors by quarterly periods of 99.9, 99.5, 100.7, and 
99.9, respectively. Expectations about seasonality were confirmed with spectral plots and 
through this spectral analysis procedure it was verified that no other significant 
periodicities were present in the time series. 
Spectral analysis. Peaks in the periodogram around .025 and .05 indicated the 
lower frequency to be dominant, which was consistent with a smooth times series of 
nonrandom data. The periodogram is shown in Figure 5. The spectral density plot 
excluded background noise from fluctuations caused by the nonperiodic component of 
the data and was a smoothed version of Figure 5. This plot confirmed the existence of a 





periodogram was confirmed from the autocorrelation function (ACF) of the series. In 
both the raw data and seasonally adjusted series, autocorrelation was present in 5 lags at 




Figure 5. The plot of the periodogram shows dominant signals of frequency at the lower 
frequencies and some periodicity.  
 
ARIMA Modeling 
The ARIMA modeling was a multistep, iterative process that consisted of 
evaluating the data for stationarity, determining ARIMA (p,d,q,) models for evaluation, 
and analyzing the statistical results. This section includes the results of each step of the 
ARIMA modeling and the associated statistical results. The hypotheses are tested in the 





Stationarity. The seasonally adjusted series of CMO data was not stationary as a 
whole due to the presence of multiple periods and trends. As shown in Figure 6, the first 
CDS regulatory period straddles the mean, the second regulatory period is mostly above 
the mean, and the third regulatory period is below the mean. In addition to first order 
linear trends and second order quadratic trends throughout the time series, a third order 
trend was present in the initial 6 quarters of CMO data, as shown in Figure 7.  
 
 
Figure 6. The seasonally adjusted series for CMO data from 1989 to 2013 is not 
stationary after removing first order linear trends, as shown in this line chart. The 
horizontal line represents the mean of the series and the vertical lines represent the 
modeled CDS regulatory periods.  
 
The data was transformed using natural logarithms due to measurements of 





restoring symmetry to the mean and median distributions. Seasonally adjusted data at lag 
4 was used, reflecting a linkage of quarterly values.  
 
 
Figure 7. In addition to first order linear trends and second order quadratic trends, a third 
order trend was present in the start of the seasonally adjusted series for the CMO data 
transformed into natural logarithm, which is plainly seen in the far left of the chart.  
 
The CMOs time series was divided into 3 CDS regulatory periods for ARIMA 
modeling and these periods were all diagnosed to be stationary, as shown in Table 6. This 
table shows the CDS regulatory periods, stationarity, differencing, and the adjustments 
required that correspond to the revised start and end quarters. The differencing is the d 
value for ARIMA modeling. The supporting evidence for Table 6 is in Appendix C, 







CDS Regulatory Periods and Findings for ARIMA Modeling Differencing 
________________________________________________________________________ 
           Adjusted Adjusted Revised Revised          
Period Finding        Differencing (d)     start end start end          
________________________________________________________________________ 
1 Stationary  1 - 6   0 1Q 1991 4Q 2000 
2 Stationary  2   0 - 1 1Q 2001 2Q 2008 




The first CDS regulatory period was stationary at the first order differencing after 
the initial 6 quarters were eliminated, as shown in Figure 8. This was the most significant 
adjustment made to the CDS regulatory periods. The twofold rationale to the adjustment 
was the presence of a third order trend in the initial observations of the time series and 






Figure 8. The first modeled CDS regulatory period was made stationary by removing the 
third order trend contained in the first 6 quarters of the 46-quarter CMO time series. 
Conversely, the stationarity was not impacted by extending or contracting the end of this 
first period up to 3 quarters. Moderate spikes remained in this period extending .06 from 
the mean that intercepted the y-axis at .03. 
 
The second CDS regulatory period had a linear trend, shown in Figure 9, that 
made this period nonstationary in the first order differencing. After removing the last 
quarter in the modeled period, this CDS regulatory period was diagnosed to be stationary 
in the second order differencing, which is shown in Figure 10. The third CDS regulatory 
period was diagnosed to be stationary in first order differencing after removing the first 






Figure 9. The second modeled CDS regulatory period was not stationary in the first 
differencing due to a consistent downward trend in the final third of the data series. 
 
 
Figure 10. The second modeled CDS regulatory period was stationary in the second 
differencing when contracted by 1 quarter at the end of this time series (2001 to 2008). 
Moderate spikes remained in this period extending .07 from the mean that intercepted the 






Figure 11. The third modeled CDS regulatory period was stationary in the first 
differencing when contracted by a quarter at the start and end of this time series (2009 to 
2012). Moderate spikes remained in this period extending .03 from the mean that 
intercepted the y-axis at .04. 
 
The control variable contained linear trends, as shown in the labor participation 
rate in Figure 2. This variable was confirmed to have been seasonally adjusted and 
diagnosed to be stationary in the first order differencing, which is shown in Figure 12. 








Figure 12. The labor participation rate data was stationary in the first differencing. Mild 
spikes remained in this period extending .01 from the mean that intercepted the y-axis at 
.00. 
 
Best Fit Models 
Statistically significant versions of the stationary CMO and control variable 
(p,d,q) models were diagnosed for the best fit. The supporting evidence for the 
statistically significant parameters is in Appendix C, Tables C6 through C8. Choice of the 
best (p,d,q) models was based on t scores, residual autocorrelation (ACF), residual partial 
autocorrelation (PACF), and mean absolute percentage error (MAPE). The supporting 
evidence and associated discussion for these best fit models is in Appendix C, Tables C9 
through C15. The best fit (p,d,q) models by regulatory period from the statistically 





  Period 1 Model Period 2 Model Period 3 Model 
CMO  (0,1,0)  (0,2,2)  (0,1,0) 
(0,1,1)  (1,2,0)  (1,1,0)* 
(0,1,2)  (1,2,1)*  (1,1,1) 
(1,1,0)  (2,2,0)  (1,1,2) 
(1,1,1)*  (2,2,1)  (2,1,0) 
(1,1,2)    (2,1,1) 
(2,1,0)    (2,1,2) 
(2,1,2)    
control  (1,2,0)  (0,1,2)  (1,1,1) 
(1,2,2)  (1,1,2)  (1,1,2)* 
(2,2,0)  (2,1,1)  (2,1,2) 
(1,3,0)  (2,1,2)*  (0,2,2)  
  (1,3,1)  (0,2,1)  (1,2,0) 
  (1,3,2)  (0,2,2)  (1,2,1) 
  (2,3,0)*  (1,2,0)  (2,2,0) 
  (2,3,1)  (1,2,1)  (2,2,1) 
  (2,3,2)  (1,2,2) 
    (2,2,0) 
    (2,2,1) 





The best fit ARIMA (p,d,q) models for seasonally adjusted CMO were (1,1,1) in 
period 1, (1,2,1) in period 2, and (1,1,0) in period 3. CMO period 1 had a better fitting 
model without the seasonal adjustment, as measured by t score and shown in Table 7. 
The best fit ARIMA (p,d,q) models for the control variable were (2,3,0) in period 1, 
(2,1,2) in period 2, and (1,1,2) in period 3.  
The residual autocorrelation (ACF) and residual partial autocorrelation (PACF) 
charts that corresponded to the best (p,d,q) models for CMO and the control variable are 
shown in Figures 13 through 18. The residual ACF portion of the plots were within 
ARIMA tolerances and demonstrated that the lingering effects of preceding values 
impacting p did not necessitate an additional parameter to the model. The residual PACF 
portion of the plots were within ARIMA tolerances and demonstrated that the lingering 
effects of preceding random shocks impacting q did not necessitate an additional 
parameter to the model. 
 
   
Figure 13. Period 1 CMO (1,1,1)  Figure 14. Period 1 Control (2,3,0) 






   
Figure 15. Period 2 CMO (1,2,1)  Figure 16. Period 2 Control (2,1,2) 
(2001 to 2008) (2001 to 2008) 
 
   
Figure 17. Period 3 CMO (1,1,0)     Figure 18. Period 3 Control (1,1,2) 
(2009 to 2012) (2009 to 2012) 
 
CMO models. The period 1 CMO ARIMA model was (1,1,1), as shown in Figure 
13 and in Table 7, and contained 40 observations from 1Q 1991 to 4Q 2000. This 
ARIMA model is a differenced first-order, mixed model with autoregressive and moving 
average components, with details in Table C9. The nonseasonal version of this model had 
a higher t score and was a better fit than the seasonally adjusted version, as shown in 
Table C15. The model had a statistically significant autoregressive parameter of .949 





The Q-statistic of 12.316 with insignificance of .722 indicated overall goodness of fit 
based on the randomness of the autocorrelation. The time series Granger-cause CMO 
values, as shown in Table C16. 
 
Table 7 
Best Fit (p,d,q) ARIMA Models and Seasonality  
________________________________________________________________________ 
Period Variable  d (p,q) Seasonality   p-Value 
________________________________________________________________________ 
1 CMO  1 (1,1) Not Seasonally Adjusted  .000*  
2 CMO  2 (1,1) Seasonally Adjusted  .000* 
3 CMO  1 (1,0) Seasonally Adjusted   .000* 
1 Control  3 (2,0) NA    .000* 
2 Control  1 (2,2) NA    .000* 
3 Control  1 (1,2) NA    .000*  
________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. The control variable data are already seasonally adjusted. The best p-value is given in instances of multiple parameters. 
* p < .05. 
 
The period 2 CMO ARIMA model was (1,2,1), as shown in Figure 15 and Table 
7, and contained 30 observations from 1Q 2001 to 2Q 2008. This ARIMA model is a 
differenced second-order, mixed model with autoregressive and moving average 
components, with details in Table C11. The seasonally adjusted version of this model had 
a higher t score and was a better fit than the nonseasonal version, as shown in Table C15. 
The model had a statistically significant autoregressive parameter of .934 with t = 





2.228, p = .036. The Q-statistic of 18.312 with insignificance of .306 indicated overall 
goodness of fit based on the randomness of the autocorrelation. The time series Granger-
cause CMO values, as shown in Table C16. 
The period 3 CMO ARIMA model was (1,1,0), as shown in Figure 17 and Table 
7, and contained 16 observations from 1Q 2009 to 4Q 2012. This ARIMA model is a 
differenced first-order, autoregressive model, with details in Table C13. The seasonally 
adjusted version of this model had a higher t score and was a better fit than the 
nonseasonal version, as shown in Table C15. The model had a statistically significant 
autoregressive parameter of .98 with t = 32.556, p ≤ .00. The Q-statistic was 
undetermined in this period. The time series Granger-cause CMO values, as shown in 
Table C16. 
Control models. The period 1 control ARIMA model was (2,3,0), as shown in 
Figure 14 and Table 7. This ARIMA model is a differenced third-order, autoregressive 
model, with details in Table C10. The model had statistically significant autoregressive 
parameters of 1.243 with t = 9.71, p ≤ .00 and .725 with t = 5.693, p ≤ .00. The Q-
statistic of 13.692 with insignificance of .622 indicated overall goodness of fit based on 
the randomness of the autocorrelation. The time series Granger-cause labor participation 
rate values, as shown in Table C16. 
The period 2 control ARIMA model was (2,1,2), as shown in Figure 16 and Table 
7. This ARIMA model is a differenced first-order, mixed model with autoregressive and 





significant autoregressive parameters of .276 with t = 3.021, p = .006 and .93 with t 
= 11.76, p ≤ .00. The moving average parameters were 1 with t = 5.652, p ≤ .00 and 
.096 with t = .535, p = .597. The Q-statistic of 14.012 with insignificance of .449 
indicated overall goodness of fit based on the randomness of the autocorrelation. The 
time series Granger-cause labor participation rate values, as shown in Table C16.  
The period 3 control ARIMA model was (1,1,2), as shown in Figure 18 and Table 
7. This ARIMA model is a first-order differenced, mixed model with autoregressive and 
moving average parameters, with details in Table C14. The model had a statistically 
significant autoregressive parameter of .968 with t = 18.492, p ≤ .00. The moving average 
parameters were 1.488 with t = 4.254, p = .001 and .704 with t = 1.986, p = .07. The 
Q-statistic was undetermined in this period. The time series Granger-cause labor 
participation rate values, as shown in Appendix C, Table C16. 
The modeled labor participation rate was the control variable, which did not have 
significant changes during the regulatory periods. The best fit ARIMA control models 
varied across these periods, with first-order and third-order trends and varying lags of 
autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation. The control model suggested that the labor 







Figure 19. Period 1 CMO is an ARIMA model of (1,1,1) (1989 to 2000) with an AR 
parameter of .949 and some MA smoothing. This linear trend of CMO before CDSs 
regulation grows and then flattens at varying rates. 
 
 
Figure 20. Period 2 CMO is an ARIMA model of (1,2,1) (2001 to 2008) with an AR 
parameter of .934 and some MA smoothing. The AR parameter is negative, indicating a 
turn in the CMO series, and this second-order change under CDSs deregulation (the 










Figure 21. Period 3 CMO is an ARIMA model of (1,1,0) (2009 to 2012) with an AR 
parameter of .98. This linear trend of CMO under CDSs regulation (the EESA) declines 
regularly at the rate of 1 lag from the preceding value, together with MA noise.  
 
Hypotheses 
The null (H0) and alternate (HA1 and HA2) hypotheses were based upon the 
theoretical framework in which two contrasting public policymaking models were 
considered (the garbage can model and the rational-comprehensive model) for two CDS 
regulations (the CFMA and the EESA). These hypotheses are presented and tested based 
on the statistical results of the ARIMA modeling. ARIMA modeling period 2 
corresponds to the first set of hypotheses with the CFMA, and ARIMA modeling period 
3 corresponds to the second set of hypotheses with the EESA. 
Null hypothesis 1 (H01): There is no statistically significant relationship between 
the independent variables—CDSs regulations (the CFMA and the EESA) and the 





dollars each quarter) when lenders share their borrower-related loan risks through 
intermediaries with other market participants. 
Alternate research hypothesis 1 (HA1): There is a negative and statistically 
significant relationship between the independent variables—CDSs regulations (the 
CFMA and the EESA) and the dependent variable—flow of capital into CMOs (as 
measured by millions of U.S. dollars each quarter) when lenders share their 
borrower-related loan risks through intermediaries with other market participants. 
Alternate research hypothesis 2 (HA2): There is a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between the independent variables—CDSs regulations (the 
CFMA and the EESA) and the dependent variable—flow of capital into CMOs (as 
measured by millions of U.S. dollars each quarter) when lenders share their 
borrower-related loan risks through intermediaries with other market participants. 
 Test (HA1): Reject the null hypothesis. Accept the alternate research hypothesis 
A2. 
Null hypothesis 2 (H02): There is no statistically significant relationship between 
CDS regulation under the EESA and the flow of capital into CMOs (as measured 
by millions of U.S. dollars) when lenders share their borrower-related loan risks 
through intermediaries with other market participants. 
Alternate research hypothesis 3 (HA3): There is a negative and statistically 
significant relationship between CDS regulation under the EESA and the flow of 





their borrower-related loan risks through intermediaries with other market 
participants. 
Alternate research hypothesis 4 (HA4): There is a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between CDS regulation under the EESA and the flow of 
capital into CMOs (as measured by millions of U.S. dollars) when lenders share 
their borrower-related loan risks through intermediaries with other market 
participants. 
Test (HA4): Accept the null hypothesis. 
Summary 
The research study results showed mixed results for the relationship between CDS 
regulations and CMOs as measured by millions of U.S. dollars. Under the CFMA 
regulation between 1Q 2001 and 2Q 2008, there was a statistically significant and 
positive relationship between CDS regulation and CMOs when lenders shared their 
borrower-related loan risks through intermediaries with other market participants. Yet, 
for the period between 1Q 2009 and 4Q 2012, under the EESA regulation, there was no 
statistically significant relationship between CDS regulation and CMOs. The results 
under the EESA regulation were similar to the period between 1Q 1991 and 4Q 2000 
when there was no regulation concerning CDSs. Throughout the three periods analyzed, 
the labor participation rate as a control variable was not statistically significant. In 
Chapter 5 I present and interpret the research findings and limitations along with 





Chapter 5: Conclusion 
Introduction  
The purpose of this quantitative study was to better understand how the 
movement of capital in the system of privately owned financial institutions is related to 
regulatory actions. This quantitative study used a time series design incorporating an 
ARIMA model for determining the relationship between regulations and associated 
financial system results. The study was conducted to determine whether the independent 
variables of regulatory decisions involving CDSs, which are defined as the CFMA and 
the EESA, were related to the dependent variable of capital in the U.S. financial system 
that is deployed to CMOs, as measured in millions of dollars each quarter. The key 
findings are the presence of a statistically significant relationship between CDS 
regulation and CMOs results at p < .05 under the CFMA and a negative correlation 
between the CFMA and the EESA periods, with r = .91, n = 18, p < .001. In Chapter 5 I 
provide an interpretation of the research findings. Further, I consider the implications of 
the research for positive social change and make recommendations for action and for 
further research.  
Interpretation of Findings  
The findings of the quantitative research project extended knowledge in the 
discipline of financial system regulation by demonstrating a relationship between CDS 
regulation under the CFMA and CMOs results in the financial system. This relationship 





regulation though without an assertion that the capital movement was caused by 
regulation. There might have been multiple factors or causes of CMOs results that were 
not related to the CDS regulations examined in this research project. Furthermore, there 
was no evidence of such a relationship between the EESA and CMOs results, which 
supported the interpretation that CDS regulation is one factor related to CMOs results 
rather than either a universal or causal explanation. Despite the limitations surrounding 
the findings of this research project, this empirical evidence contributes to the ongoing 
development of pathway models and causal analysis involving the impact of CDS 
regulation.  
 As I discussed in the Chapter 2 literature review, capital movement is inherently 
destabilizing to the financial system. Capital stability was identified as a type of capital 
movement that included changes to the regulatory framework that cause instability. The 
CFMA was a change to the regulatory framework to the extent it was legislation that 
encouraged the use of CDS by financial institutions, even though this legislation was 
technically a matter of not regulating CDS. The quantitative research project 
demonstrated that a change in the CDS regulatory framework was related to a change in 
CMOs results. This relationship is important because it is an instance in which a change 
in the regulatory framework is linked to a U.S. financial system result that was only an 
indirect object of the regulation. Such relationships raise concerns of unintended 





 The types of capital movement discussed in Chapter 2 also included capital 
mobility and capital arbitrage. CDSs were a key financial instrument innovation 
preceding the CFMA period of 1Q 2001 to 2Q 2008 and such financial instrument 
innovation was associated with capital mobility. In addition to capital movement related 
to change in the regulatory framework and to financial instrument innovation, during this 
period there was capital arbitrage related to mortgage securities derivatives transactions, 
particularly CMOs and CDSs. Accordingly, the capital movement associated with the 
change in CMOs during the CFMA period cannot be attributed to any one type of capital 
movement. 
 The EESA period of 1Q 2009 to 4Q 2012 shared attributes of capital movement 
with the CFMA period while diverging in important ways. The EESA was related to 
change in the regulatory framework like the CFMA, but it did not share the other capital 
movement attributes. During this period, there was no innovation associated with the 
EESA to impact capital mobility. Mortgage securities derivatives transactions, including 
CDSs and CMOs, remained the same as in the CFMA period and so did not change 
capital arbitrage. Unlike the CFMA, the EESA showed no statistically significant 
relationship with CMOs in the research results and had noisy data in the (1,1,0) ARIMA 
result.  
 One interpretation of the combined CFMA and EESA results is these do not 
conflict, rather they are explained by capital movement related to innovation. The 





lack of innovation during or preceding the EESA period and a corresponding lack of a 
statistically significant relationship. Alternately, another interpretation is the analysis 
performed on the CFMA period had a definitive start and end quarter, whereas the EESA 
remains midperiod with no definitive end date yet associated with a transition to a new 
regulation. Support for this alternate interpretation is in the first period analyzed, between 
1Q 1991 and 4Q 2000, that the (1,1,1) ARIMA result showed was stable for a time before 
regulation was relaxed. 
         CFMA    EESA 
Relationship between CDS regulation and CMOs   Yes         No 
Comparisons: 
Regulatory change preceding the period                          Yes         Yes 
Innovation during or preceding the period      Yes         No 
Mortgage securities derivatives transactions during period  Yes         Yes 
 
The labor participation rate used as the control variable was not statistically 
significant for the three periods in which it was aligned to control for CDS regulation. 
Although the labor participation rate is an important macroeconomic metric, the evidence 
inferred that its explanatory power for CMOs results is limited. Despite the insignificance 
in this ARIMA model, the labor participation rate was found to contain linear and third-
order trends that may be important in other ways.  
 The theoretical basis of this quantitative research study is the stability of the U.S. 
financial system, which was examined within the public policymaking context of the 





policymaking models. The statistically significant relationship between the CFMA and 
CMOs aligned with the theoretical framework of the rational-comprehensive model. The 
rational-comprehensive model was consistent with the hypothesized relationship in which 
a proactive policy was implemented, with a positive relationship between CDS policy 
and increasing CMO capital flows. This relationship was an important finding because of 
the linkage between policymaking theory and financial results in the U.S. financial 
system. Yet, the negative turn and parabolic change in ARIMA (1,2,1) with the CFMA at 
the end of the second period suggested that capital flows can get out of control. The lack 
of a statistically significant relationship between the EESA and CMOs inferred that 
regulation alone was not the driver behind such relationships and perhaps the difference 
between the EESA and the CFMA was that the CFMA gave innovation related to CDSs 
and CMOs the force of law. The noisy results in ARIMA (1,1,0) with the EESA during 
the third period suggested that the tightened controls in the 2008 law was less of a 
rational act and more of a panic that took place during a policy window. Yet, the (1,1,0) 
model was significant and may be antifragile (Taleb, 2012) because the noise could be 
enough to perturb the system so that it learns and strengthens from having endured 
disorder. The CDSs exchange included in the EESA and implemented in 4Q 2012 under 
the DFA represents a potential antifragile outcome that is measurable. 
Limitations of the Study 
The limitations of the study that arose during the execution of the study were 





1. History was controlled for in this ARIMA design by the use of a macroeconomic 
control variable, the LPR, though the selection of a different control variable could lead 
to other findings. This quantitative model was accordingly limited by the ability to 
comprehensively control for concurrent historical events. Data analysis was used as a 
substitute for experimental controls of random sampling and a control group, which can 
provide for reliability but not necessarily empirical validity.  
Recommendations for Further Study 
The research discussed in this project is narrowly focused on the capital 
movement associated with one regulatory topic (CDSs) and one type of capital 
deployment in the U.S. financial system (CMOs). Potential research questions involving 
different parameters are left unanswered, such as whether regulations like the Basel 
Accords and the GLBA of 1999 impacted CMOs capital results and what other capital 
results were impacted by CDS regulations. New data and differing levels of data detail 
from the globalized financial system are opportunities for further in-depth study of CMOs 
and CDSs. Research of the factors influencing capital movement would be beneficial 
from both an academic and regulatory policy viewpoint. Several resulting 
recommendations for further study are considered here. 
There is a need to better understand capital movement in the U.S. financial system 
in terms of stability, mobility, and arbitrage. Stability of capital might be able to be 
detected through the systematic use of the ARIMA methodology to detect time series 





recent progress since the GFC in understanding the mobility of capital, but there remains 
the need to understand mobility and its relationship to regulations. Arbitrage analysis 
would involve structural changes in financial institutions’ capital that are the cumulative 
result of purposeful financial transactions. Capital movement could be identified from 
shifts in time series data at the financial institution level of analysis when paired with 
their regulatory options and choices. ARIMA modeling and forecasting could perhaps 
then be used to detect the affinity of capital with various regulatory structures, and 
conversely, the dissociation of capital from regulatory structures.  
There is no reason to assume that the widespread changes undergone since the 
GFC by U.S. financial institutions will cease, so consequently the further study of 
financial innovation is desirable. This quantitative research study’s subjects of CMOs and 
CDSs were mortgage derivative instruments that are exemplars of financial innovation, 
although financial innovation is therefore only indirectly considered. Greater 
understanding of financial innovation and its linkage to capital stability, mobility, and 
arbitrage could perhaps lead to improved management of the U.S. financial system. For 
example, a quantitative research study on the sales of ABSs residual values in the 
secondary market might reveal indicators of a market that was in distress before it was 
plainly evident during the GFC. 
Liquidity is the little-understood phenomenon that pervades the operation and the 
study of the U.S. financial system. Furthermore, the research literature treated liquidity 





psychologically based reactions. This quantitative research study on mortgage derivatives 
instruments could alternately have been developed into a CDS liquidity related analysis, 
rather than CMO capital movement related. Illiquidity needs to be further understood as a 
research topic in terms of what causes it and why, in addition to continuing to develop the 
research literature on how illiquidity is caused and how illiquidity is related to mortgage 
derivative instruments. 
Implications for Positive Social Change 
There is the potential for positive social change from regulation of financial 
institutions that aids in stability of the financial system. This research study has shown 
relationships of varying strength exist between regulations and financial system results. 
As posed in the research question, there is interconnectedness among lenders, borrowers, 
intermediaries, and market participants. When these and other relationships in the 
financial system are upset there can be associated instability and illiquidity in the 
financial system, with accompanying harm to individuals, families, and society. A key 
objective of financial institution regulation should be the financial system remains stable 
and depositors and borrowers mutually benefit from banking transactions with financial 
institutions. 
The EESA legislation had the practical result of socializing risk in the U.S. 
financial system, including risk that resulted from innovation and market changes. Losses 
incurred by financial institutions that were related to CDSs and CMOs and other high-





governmental actions. The EESA contained TARP, which raised important matters 
regarding liquidity as a public good and the Constitutional bounds of public policy 
actions. To maintain the liquidity of the U.S. financial system, bailouts benefitting 
financial institutions seemingly became the objective of public policy rather than a 
byproduct. To borrow an analogy from banking, for every debit there must be an 
offsetting credit, and TARP lacks the recognition of credit to the public. Liquidity was 
maintained because consumers placed their cash in a bank account rather than under a 
mattress and continued to engage in commerce rather than hoard. Yet, if the public has 
social obligations to maintain liquidity, then there ought to be comparable rights to the 
public as consumers of financial institutions’ products, including rights represented by 
governmental regulatory powers. 
A recommendation for action is for federal policymakers to determine whether 
there are unintended consequences emerging as a result of the EESA and to correct for 
imbalances of financial system competitiveness. The EESA related concerns include the 
equitable treatment of financial institutions in a way that does not favor the larger 
participants that directly benefitted from TARP. The EESA also set the direction for 
implementation of exchanges mandated under the DFA for derivatives transactions, 
including those for CDSs. A notable feature of CDSs is that these are zero-sum 
instruments in which one’s gain is another’s loss. Whether these exchanges are 
stimulating or merely enabling the potential for growth in derivatives is important to 





losses. Correspondingly, risk management practices for derivatives transactions need to 
be further developed to differentiate their use by financial institutions as a hedge against 
negative credit events versus a tool of market speculation. The derivatives exchanges 
implemented under DFA also should be evaluated as positive mechanisms for other 
possible uses to disseminate event related risk, such as operational risk, which could be 
quantified and swapped as with CDSs, foreign currency swaps, and other derivatives 
types. 
Positive social change can also result from the clarification and demarcation of 
the exercise of governmental powers. Actions taken during the GFC via TARP legislation 
and by administrative authorities in the federal government to impact financial markets 
were done in a spirit of pragmatism to resolve crisis situations. Yet, pragmatic actions 
taken by the government to address critical financial matters do not excuse the lack of 
clear, Constitutionally based rationales. The persistent presence of these concerns is an 
indication that legal boundaries can be either better defined or better justified with basis 
in the law. 
Conclusion 
Regulation of the U.S. financial system is politically charged and affected by 
policymakers’ responses to theories on the economy and government. While these 
influences should not be expected to wane, evidence based policymaking offers an 
opportunity to enhance the quality of governance of the U.S. financial system. In this 





between the financial system regulation of CDSs and the financial system results of 
CMOs. The result was empirical evidence of a relationship between the CFMA and 
CMOs that was statistically significant and based in a rational-comprehensive approach 
to policymaking. The absence of such a relationship between the EESA and CMOs 
inferred that the EESA was somehow different from the CFMA, of which one plausible 
explanation is the presence of innovation related to the capital movement associated with 
the CFMA. Yet, the regulatory mandated CDSs exchange was implemented in 4Q 2012 
under the DFA and so relationships between regulations and CMOs continue to change. 
Time will tell whether these relationships between CDS regulations and CMOs are 
insignificant or if a new regulatory era has begun with the DFA. It is clear from this 
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Appendix A: Data Collection Procedure 
The quantitative data collection procedure was provided for the purposes of 
verification through replication and to potentially assist other researchers. Data sources 
and the associated URLs were provided for each dependent variable together with a 







Sources of Data by Variable 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable Source   Years  Source of data details 
________________________________________________________________________ 
COLLMOa FRS  1989-2013 Z.1 Flow of Funds Accounts of the 
     United States statistical information 
 
LABORPb DOL, BLS  1989-2013  Labor Force Statistics from the  
     Current Population Survey 
  
________________________________________________________________________ 
a Dependent variable for Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (CMOs). 








Federal Reserve System, Z.1 Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States  
1. Open the data download page of the FRS at URL 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/Choose.aspx?rel=Z1. 
2. Go to option B “Select a preformatted data package” and select the Level series 
(L) account numbers for amounts outstanding at the end of quarterly (Q) periods. 
The data series includes “n.s.a.” in the series title for “not seasonally adjusted.” 
3. Select financial institutions tables and sum CMO accounts for each period. 
a. L.110 U.S.-Chartered Depository Institutions, Excluding Credit Unions. 
i. 30616. Residential CMOs and other structured MBS. 
ii. 30636. Priv. residential CMOs and other structured MBS. 
b. L.111 Foreign Banking Offices in U.S.  
i. No CMO accounts in this table. 
c. L.112 Banks in U.S.-Affiliated Areas. 
i. No CMO accounts in this table. 
d. L.113 Credit Unions. 
i. No CMO accounts in this table. 
e. L.114 Property-Casualty Insurance Companies. 
i. No CMO accounts in this table. 
f. L.115 Life Insurance Companies. 





g. L.124 Issuers of Asset-Backed Securities (ABS). 
i. 30617. Agency- and GSE-backed securities. 
ii. 30651. Mortgage: Home. 
iii. 30654. Mortgage: Multifamily residential. 
h. L.125 Finance Companies. 
i. No CMO accounts in this table. 
i. L.127 Security Brokers and Dealers. 
i. No CMO accounts in this table. 
4. Select “Format your package” in order to define the data file. 
5. Choose a format for the data file. Click on “Observation” and select the last 100. 
Click on “Date” and select the year from and to date range. Select “File Type” 
Excel 2003, or newer, and include “Data Labels”. Select “Layout” series in 
columns. Click on “Go to download.” 
6. Select “download file.” 
LABORP 
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force Statistics from 
the Current Population Survey 
1. Open the home page of the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
at URL http://www.bls.gov/home.htm. 
2. Select the “Databases & Tools” tab on the top navigation bar. This page was 





3. Select “Data Series” on the website navigation. This page was opened directly at 
http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/srgate. 
4. On the “Series Report” page, locate “Series ID Formats. Enter series id(s) below:” 
and enter LNS11300000. Click on “Next.” This page at http://data.bls.gov/cgi-
bin/srgate could not be opened directly due to the query being in progress. 
5. On the “Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject” page, select the data Output 
Type in the table “Text” with the dropdown “comma delimited”. Click on to 
“include graphs”. This page at http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/srgate could not be 
opened directly due to the query being in progress. 
a. Select view of the data, “Column Format” and click “Original Data 
Value.” 
b. Select the time frame for your data, clicking “Specify year range:” from 
1989 to 2013 and select “All Time Periods” to retrieve monthly 
observations. 
c. Confirm the selection of the series: “The following series id(s) were 
generated from your query” with the value LNS11300000.  
d. Click “Retrieve Data.” 
6. Results displayed on the “Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject” page titled 
“Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey,” with data 






a. Series title: (Seas) Labor Force Participation Rate. 
b. Labor force status: Civilian labor force participation rate. 





Appendix B: Data 
Table B1 
Collateralized Mortgage Obligations in U.S. Financial Institutions 
________________________________________________________________________ 




1 3Q Sep. 1989 144,685 
2 4Q Dec. 1989 143,378 
3 1Q Mar. 1990 180,868 
4 2Q Jun. 1990 191,522 
5 3Q Sep. 1990 203,275 
6 4Q Dec. 1990 213,977 
7 1Q Mar. 1991 249,691 
8 2Q Jun. 1991 264,191 
9 3Q Sep. 1991 280,039 
10 4Q Dec. 1991 294,789 
11 1Q Mar. 1992 312,389 
12 2Q Jun. 1992 324,329 
13 3Q Sep. 1992 345,350 
14 4Q Dec. 1992 353,146 
15 1Q Mar. 1993 369,355 
16 2Q Jun. 1993 387,577 
17 3Q Sep. 1993 408,105 
18 4Q Dec. 1993 413,457 
19 1Q Mar. 1994 435,767 
20 2Q Jun. 1994 439,094 
21 3Q Sep. 1994 441,972 
22 4Q Dec. 1994 440,250 
23 1Q Mar. 1995 440,606 
24 2Q Jun. 1995 446,606 
25 3Q Sep. 1995 456,853 
26 4Q Dec. 1995 459,030 
27 1Q Mar. 1996 466,719 
28 2Q Jun. 1996 467,020 












30 4Q Dec. 1996    465,180 
31 1Q Mar. 1997    470,343 
32 2Q Jun. 1997    474,174 
33 3Q Sep. 1997    484,698 
34 4Q Dec. 1997    505,522  
35 1Q Mar.  1998    529,829  
36 2Q Jun. 1998    558,288  
37 3Q Sep. 1998    606,628  
38 4Q Dec. 1998    640,396  
39 1Q Mar.  1999    682,611  
40 2Q Jun. 1999    708,248  
41 3Q Sep. 1999    726,676  
42 4Q Dec. 1999    732,821  
43 1Q Mar.  2000    739,773  
44 2Q Jun. 2000    746,726  
45 3Q Sep. 2000    753,031  
46 4Q Dec. 2000    776,275  
47 1Q Mar.  2001    808,450  
48 2Q Jun. 2001    830,830  
49 3Q Sep. 2001    872,429  
50 4Q Dec. 2001    954,909  
51 1Q Mar.  2002    991,075  
52 2Q Jun. 2002  1,001,158  
53 3Q Sep. 2002  1,070,089  
54 4Q Dec. 2002  1,114,823  
55 1Q Mar.  2003  1,204,676  
56 2Q Jun. 2003  1,252,912  
57 3Q Sep. 2003  1,293,639  
58 4Q Dec. 2003  1,386,127  
59 1Q Mar.  2004  1,525,787  
60 2Q Jun. 2004  1,603,408  
61 3Q Sep. 2004  1,705,425  
62 4Q Dec. 2004  1,814,582  
63 1Q Mar.  2005  1,984,889  
64 2Q Jun. 2005  2,121,958  












66 4Q Dec. 2005  2,434,983  
67 1Q Mar. 2006  2,600,677  
68 2Q Jun. 2006  2,744,263  
69 3Q Sep. 2006  2,891,537  
70 4Q Dec. 2006  3,010,805  
71 1Q Mar.  2007  3,122,967  
72 2Q Jun. 2007  3,215,406  
73 3Q Sep. 2007  3,195,197  
74 4Q Dec. 2007  3,188,914  
75 1Q Mar.  2008  3,134,477  
76 2Q Jun. 2008  3,034,570  
77 3Q Sep. 2008  2,939,486  
78 4Q Dec. 2008  2,815,334  
79 1Q Mar.  2009  2,653,771  
80 2Q Jun. 2009  2,493,732  
81 3Q Sep. 2009  2,365,566  
82 4Q Dec. 2009  2,248,977  
83 1Q Mar.  2010  2,139,033  
84 2Q Jun. 2010  2,046,978  
85 3Q Sep. 2010  1,979,637  
86 4Q Dec. 2010  1,928,288  
87 1Q Mar.  2011  1,892,742  
88 2Q Jun. 2011  1,864,620  
89 3Q Sep. 2011  1,831,764  
90 4Q Dec. 2011  1,781,511  
91 1Q Mar.  2012  1,718,975  
92 2Q Jun. 2012  1,643,801  
93 3Q Sep. 2012  1,593,470  
94 4Q Dec. 2012  1,538,916  















Note. CMO value was stated in millions of U.S. dollars of residential mortgage CMOs. From FRS database Z.1 Flow of Funds 
Accounts of the United States financial tables of period-end asset balances: L.110 U.S.-Chartered Depository Institutions, Excluding 
Credit Unions; L.111 Foreign Banking Offices in U.S.; L.112 Banks in U.S.-Affiliated Areas; L.113 Credit Unions; L.115 Life 
Insurance Companies; L.124 Issuers of Asset-Backed Securities (ABS); L.125 Finance Companies; L.127 Security Brokers and 
Dealers; L128 Holding Companies. These financial sector tables were included based on: GLBA financial institutions that included 
TARP recipients and posed risk of systemic illiquidity (depository banks L.110, L.111, L.112; insurance companies L.114, L.115; 
security brokers and dealers [investment banks] L.127; holding companies L.128); credit unions (L.113) that included TARP 
recipients and were dependent on depository banks, but were not GLBA financial institutions and did not pose risk of systemic 
illiquidity; finance companies (L.125) that were TARP recipients and posed risk of systemic illiquidity, but were not GLBA financial 
institutions; and issuers of asset-backed securities (L.124) that posed risk of systemic illiquidity, but were neither GBLA financial 
institutions nor TARP recipients. These financial sector tables were excluded: L.107 Financial Business, the aggregation account for 
the summation of the financial sector; L.109 Private Depository Institutions, the aggregation account for the summation of L.110, 
L.111, and L.112; L.108 Monetary Authority and L.129 Funding Corporation, used for FRS financial activity; L.116 Private Pension 
Funds, L.117 State and Local Government Employee Retirement Funds, L.118 Federal Government Retirement Funds, L.119 Money 
Market Mutual Funds, L.120 Mutual Funds, and L.121 Closed-End and Exchange-Traded Funds that were not GBLA financial 
institutions, not TARP recipients, nor posed risk of systemic illiquidity; L.122 Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) 
nationalized by the U.S. government before TARP and that were not GBLA financial institutions and did not pose risk to systemic 
illiquidity, although GSEs did pose risk to ongoing mortgage lending activity and to the ongoing issuance of agency- and GSE-backed 
mortgage pools; L.123 Agency- and GSE-Backed Mortgage Pools that were existing pools of mortgage loans owned by investors and 
were not GBLA financial institutions, not TARP recipients, nor posed risk of systemic illiquidity, but included agency- and GSE-
backed mortgage pool securities that were used as collateral for agency- and GSE-backed CMOs and privately issued CMOs identified 
in Table B2; and L.126 Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) that were existing pools of mortgage loans owned by investors and 
were not GBLA financial institutions, not TARP recipients, nor posed risk of systemic illiquidity. The excluded tables had no CMO as 
indicated by account name or footnote, other than the aggregation tables that were summations of other tables. The value of CMO in 
these level series data is the total of 5 accounts (#30636, #30616, #30617, #30651, and #30654) that were identified by account name 








Account Values of CMOs in Federal Reserve Z.1 Flow of Funds Accounts 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Observation      -------------------------- $Millions -------------------------- 
 #30636 a    #30616 b     #30617 c      #30651d        #30654e 
________________________________________________________________________ 
1           -              -     110,046        33,685          954  
2           -              -       99,100        43,325          953  
3           -       36,570   105,141        38,165          992  
4           -       41,769   105,931        42,863          959  
5           -       47,723   107,378        47,260          914  
6           -       54,828   103,252        55,029          868  
7    27,822     60,021   101,467        59,430          951  
8    28,600     67,958     94,215        72,495          923  
9    28,098     78,228     87,131        84,444       2,138  
10    28,241     89,405     76,631        96,732       3,780  
11    26,604     97,625     76,437      106,805       4,918  
12    23,884   105,592     71,788      116,694       6,371  
13    23,481   119,487     64,031      132,056       6,295  
14    21,624   122,709     59,971      142,265       6,577  
15    21,562   129,455     65,634      145,921       6,783  
16    20,842   136,421     68,924      153,845       7,545  
17    21,905   137,451     76,924      164,005       7,820  
18    19,814   133,808     83,563      167,899       8,373  
19    20,799   132,125     94,747      179,616       8,480  
20    20,644   127,363   100,988      181,026       9,073  
21    21,308   123,827   105,335      182,173       9,329  
22    21,491   119,396   106,541      183,002       9,820  
23    21,641   116,474   106,712      185,999       9,780  
24    22,573   113,937   110,928      189,046     10,122  
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Note. The value of CMO is totaled in Table B1. 
a Unique identifier Z1/Z1/FL763063665.Q; U.S.-chartered depository institutions, private residential CMOs and other structured 
MBS, asset; millions of U.S. dollars. 
b Unique identifier Z1/Z1/FL763061605.Q; U.S.-chartered depository institutions, agency issued residential CMOs and other 
structured MBS, asset; millions of U.S. dollars. 
c Unique identifier Z1/Z1/FL673061705.Q; Issuers of asset-backed securities, agency- and GSE-backed securities, asset - Footnote (1) 
Agency- and GSE-backed mortgage pool securities backing privately issued CMOs; millions of U.S. dollars. 
d Unique identifier Z1/Z1/FL673065105.Q; Issuers of asset-backed securities, home mortgages, asset - Footnote (2) Mortgages 
backing privately issued pool securities and privately issued CMOs; millions of U.S. dollars. 
e Unique identifier Z1/Z1/FL673065405.Q; Issuers of asset-backed securities, multifamily residential mortgages, asset - Footnote  (2) 







Observation      -------------------------- $Millions -------------------------- 
 #30636 a    #30616 b     #30617 c      #30651d        #30654e 
________________________________________________________________________ 
25    23,611   109,349   123,955      189,468     10,470  
26    24,943   101,036   127,368      193,759     11,924  
27    25,875     97,320   130,274      201,074     12,176  
28    25,445     90,938   129,606      208,206     12,825  
28    25,445     90,938   129,606      208,206     12,825  
29    22,210     89,801   127,020      213,851     13,782  
30    21,801     89,495   122,806      215,357     15,721  
31    21,347     92,399   116,337      224,576     15,684  
32    20,587     93,173   114,530      229,072     16,812  
33    21,701     96,865   104,957      243,766     17,409  
34    22,460   106,997   102,079      253,804     20,182  
35    28,671   108,135   100,225      268,984     23,814  
36    32,370   109,989   100,383      287,717     27,829  
37    35,051   121,373   112,592      307,746     29,866  
38    42,769   115,869   126,816      321,869     33,073  
39    44,273   123,662   144,617      334,008     36,051  
40    44,784   121,275   159,170      345,311     37,708  
41    46,656   124,362   167,850      348,527     39,281  
42    48,801   120,858   167,816      353,744     41,602  
43    46,510   120,526   175,993      354,234     42,510  
44    46,993   119,352   181,449      355,282     43,650  
45    51,019   108,901   178,979      369,762     44,370  
46    56,493   111,033   176,374      385,465     46,910  
47    57,497   114,410   186,710      402,463     47,370  
48    54,289   116,413   190,907      420,262     48,959  
49    53,837   133,950   192,701      442,000     49,941  
50    59,260   168,209   211,407      463,247     52,786  
51    60,654   166,361   216,878      494,028     53,154  
52    56,982   145,570   223,553      520,601     54,452  
53    66,264   156,353   249,330      542,312     55,830  
54    67,387   159,057   286,527      543,566     58,286  
55    79,956   179,535   316,373      569,593     59,219  
56    78,842   179,334   349,025      584,542     61,169  
57    84,155   158,472   372,049      615,860     63,103  








Observation      -------------------------- $Millions -------------------------- 
 #30636 a    #30616 b     #30617 c      #30651d        #30654e 
________________________________________________________________________ 
59  134,779   210,832   371,127      740,935     68,114  
60  131,595   200,244   367,817      834,261     69,491  
61  138,900   194,826   347,532      953,840     70,327  
62  148,475   180,109   355,494   1,057,624     72,880  
63  165,314   208,786   359,468   1,176,736     74,585  
64  179,798   200,751   341,857   1,320,663     78,889  
65  192,798   193,246   335,885   1,487,991     81,596  
66  204,767   183,024   310,501   1,647,242     89,448  
67  218,554   189,153   308,263   1,792,191     92,516  
68  225,249   191,708   295,693   1,937,174     94,439  
69  217,523   206,869   304,536   2,065,768     96,841  
70  224,599   179,947   333,567   2,170,178   102,514  
71  232,388   185,784   333,115   2,261,846   109,834  
72  251,325   178,369   337,277   2,331,058   117,377  
73  267,834   174,514   330,733   2,297,838   124,278  
74  328,907   174,090   351,971   2,209,952   123,994  
75  338,318   178,458   344,525   2,151,735   121,441  
76  325,659   184,811   342,881   2,062,650   118,569  
77  315,625   181,772   342,530   1,983,310   116,249  
78  285,572   193,930   325,342   1,897,249   113,241  
79  256,173   204,605   264,749   1,816,510   111,734  
80  213,848   219,859   226,818   1,722,101   111,106  
81  213,023   239,034   165,118   1,638,989   109,402  
82  202,901   263,997   100,430   1,574,256   107,393  
83  170,797   312,607     66,290   1,482,884   106,455  
84  157,831   333,020     30,762   1,420,583   104,782  
85  144,885   364,361       7,056   1,360,672   102,663  
86  132,338   393,444       5,047   1,298,735     98,724  
87  123,796   417,779       9,217   1,243,914     98,036  
88  116,811   450,149       7,360   1,194,875     95,425  
89  113,722   472,152       2,051   1,150,347     93,492  
90  110,379   473,762          747   1,105,564     91,059  
91    97,370   481,967          349   1,060,081     79,208  
92    93,743   460,586          339   1,012,269     76,864  
93    92,796   460,032          240      965,945     74,457  
94    88,368   454,555          220      923,405     72,368  







Labor Force Participation Rate  
________________________________________________________________________ 
 Observation Quarter Month  Year   Rate (%) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
1 3Q Sep. 1989 66.4 
2 4Q Dec. 1989 66.5 
3 1Q Mar.  1990 66.7 
4 2Q Jun. 1990 66.4 
5 3Q Sep. 1990 66.4 
6 4Q Dec. 1990 66.4 
7 1Q Mar.  1991 66.3 
8 2Q Jun. 1991 66.2 
9 3Q Sep. 1991 66.2 
10 4Q Dec. 1991 66.0 
11 1Q Mar.  1992 66.4 
12 2Q Jun. 1992 66.7 
13 3Q Sep. 1992 66.5 
14 4Q Dec. 1992 66.3 
15 1Q Mar.  1993 66.2 
16 2Q Jun. 1993 66.5 
17 3Q Sep. 1993 66.2 
18 4Q Dec. 1993 66.4 
19 1Q Mar.  1994 66.5 
20 2Q Jun. 1994 66.4 
21 3Q Sep. 1994 66.6 
22 4Q Dec. 1994 66.7 
23 1Q Mar.  1995 66.7 
24 2Q Jun. 1995 66.5 
25 3Q Sep. 1995 66.6 
26 4Q Dec. 1995 66.4 
27 1Q Mar.  1996 66.6 
28 2Q Jun. 1996 66.7 
29 3Q Sep. 1996 66.9 
30 4Q Dec. 1996 67.0 
31 1Q Mar.  1997 67.1 
32 2Q Jun. 1997 67.1 








 Observation Quarter Month  Year   Rate (%) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
34 4Q Dec. 1997 67.2 
35 1Q Mar.  1998 67.1 
36 2Q Jun. 1998 67.0 
37 3Q Sep. 1998 67.2 
38 4Q Dec. 1998 67.2 
39 1Q Mar.  1999 67.0 
40 2Q Jun. 1999 67.1 
41 3Q Sep. 1999 67.0 
42 4Q Dec. 1999 67.1 
43 1Q Mar.  2000 67.3 
44 2Q Jun. 2000 67.1 
45 3Q Sep. 2000 66.9 
46 4Q Dec. 2000 67.0 
47 1Q Mar.  2001 67.2 
48 2Q Jun. 2001 66.7 
49 3Q Sep. 2001 66.8 
50 4Q Dec. 2001 66.7 
51 1Q Mar.  2002 66.6 
52 2Q Jun. 2002 66.6 
53 3Q Sep. 2002 66.7 
54 4Q Dec. 2002 66.3 
55 1Q Mar.  2003 66.3 
56 2Q Jun. 2003 66.5 
57 3Q Sep. 2003 66.1 
58 4Q Dec. 2003 65.9 
59 1Q Mar.  2004 66.0 
60 2Q Jun. 2004 66.1 
61 3Q Sep. 2004 65.8 
62 4Q Dec. 2004 65.9 
63 1Q Mar.  2005 65.9 
64 2Q Jun. 2005 66.1 
65 3Q Sep. 2005 66.1 
66 4Q Dec. 2005 66.0 
67 1Q Mar.  2006 66.2 
68 2Q Jun. 2006 66.2 








 Observation Quarter Month  Year Rate (%) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
70 4Q Dec. 2006 66.4 
71 1Q Mar.  2007 66.2 
72 2Q Jun. 2007 66.0 
73 3Q Sep. 2007 66.0 
74 4Q Dec. 2007 66.0 
75 1Q Mar.  2008 66.1 
76 2Q Jun. 2008 66.1 
77 3Q Sep. 2008 66.0 
78 4Q Dec. 2008 65.8 
79 1Q Mar.  2009 65.6 
80 2Q Jun. 2009 65.7 
81 3Q Sep. 2009 65.1 
82 4Q Dec. 2009 64.6 
83 1Q Mar.  2010 64.9 
84 2Q Jun. 2010 64.6 
85 3Q Sep. 2010 64.6 
86 4Q Dec. 2010 64.3 
87 1Q Mar.  2011 64.2 
88 2Q Jun. 2011 64.0 
89 3Q Sep. 2011 64.2 
90 4Q Dec. 2011 64.0 
91 1Q Mar.  2012 63.8 
92 2Q Jun. 2012 63.8 
93 3Q Sep. 2012 63.6 
94 4Q Dec. 2012 63.6 
95 1Q Mar.  2013 63.3 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, series title (Seas) Labor Force Participation Rate. Labor force status: 
Civilian labor force participation rate, age 16 years and over; Series identification LNS11300000; Seasonally Adjusted data; Stated as 







Appendix C: Data Calculation and Analysis Procedure 
 The data analysis procedure was provided for the purposes of verification 
through replication and to potentially assist other researchers. 
1. Transferred raw data consisting of univariate time series from Excel spreadsheet 
into SPSS using file name NeillCMO.sav. 
a. Descriptive statistics were calculated in Excel spreadsheet for 
Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (CMO) and Labor Participation Rate 
for minimum values, maximum values, means, medians, and modes. 
2. Identified variables and manipulated data into SPSS format. 
a.  Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (COLLMO) named COLLMORT 
and measure created as scale, with the label CMOs in Millions of Dollars. 
Stated in millions of U.S. dollars with zero decimal places. 
b.  Labor Participation Rate (LABORP) named LABORPRT and measure 
created as scale, with the label Labor Participation Rate. Stated as a rate 
consisting of two digits and one decimal place. 
c.  Regulatory period named PERIODNO and measure created as nominal, 
with the label Regulatory Period. Stated in 3 periods corresponding to the 
proposed ARIMA model parameters for regulatory periods. 
d.  Calendar quarter named QUARTERS and measure created as nominal, 





3. Created figures to represent over time the Collateralized Mortgage Obligations 
and the Labor Participation Rate. 
a. Graph > Legacy dialogs > Line > select: Simple, Values of individual 
cases; Line represents: COLLMORT; Category label: QUARTERS. 
b. Graph > Legacy dialogs > Line > select: Simple, Values of individual 
cases; Line represents: LABORPRT; Category label: QUARTERS. 
c. Graph > Legacy dialogs > Population pyramid > Counts: Get counts from 
variable. 
i. SPSS using file name Neill.CMO.pop_pyramid.sav. 
ii. Variable: CMO in Billions of Dollars. Noted that labels did not fit 
when CMOs was stated in Millions of Dollars. 
iii. Show distribution over: Quarters. 
iv. Split by: Regulatory period. 
v. Click OK. 
4. Used t tests to evaluate whether CMOs (measured in millions of dollars) means 
were different between the CDS regulatory periods. 
a. Created SPSS file name Neill_CMO_t-test_r3.sav. 
b. SPSS > Analyze > Compare Means > Paired-sample t-test; where the 
symbol > denotes a dropdown box selection in SPSS. 






ii. Pair 2: Period 1 (unregulated period) and Period 3 (unfavorable 
regulation period). 
iii. Pair 3: Period 2 (favorable regulation period) and Period 3 
(unfavorable regulation period). 
c. Calculation in Excel spreadsheet of the Effect Size d for each of the pairs, 
which was the t-test result t divided by the square root of N, where N is the 
number of paired samples. 
i. The mathematical formula is: d = t / √N.  
ii. Interpretation of Effect Size d values of .2, .5, and .8 (regardless of 
sign), as small, medium, and large effect sizes, respectively. 
d. Pearson’s r correlation coefficient was computed for the pairing of Period 
2 and Period 3. 
i. SPSS > Analyze > Correlate > Bivariate. 
ii. Variables: Favorable regulation COLLMOP2 (Period 2) and 
Unfavorable regulation COLLMOP3 (Period 3). 
iii. Select: Pearson correlation coefficient, One-tailed test of 
significance, flag significant correlations. 
5. ANOVA used to evaluate whether the univariate time series was an undifferenced 
data set. 
a. Created SPSS file name Neill_CMO_ r3.sav. 





b.  Dependent variable: CMO in Millions of Dollars. 
c. Fixed factors: Regulatory Period. 
d. Options > Factors: Display Means for: PERIODNO. 
e. Display: select: Descriptive statistics, Estimates of effect size, 
Homogeneity tests. 
f.  Significance level: alpha = .05. 
g. Post Hoc > Factor: PERIODNO. 
h. Post Hoc Tests for: PERIODNO. 
i. Equal variances assumed: select: Tukey, R-E-G-W-Q. 
j. Equal variances not assumed: select: Dunnett’s C. 
k. Click OK to generate results: display results for Univariate Analysis of 
Variance: Between-Subjects Factors; Descriptive Statistics; Levene’s Test 
of Equality of Error Variances; Tests of Between-Subjects Effects; 
Estimated Marginal Means; Post Hoc Tests: Multiple Comparisons; 
Homogeneous Subsets. 
l. The regulatory periods matched the proposed ARIMA model parameters 
for regulatory periods and was statistically significant at alpha = .05. 
i. Graph > Legacy dialogs > Boxplot > select: Simple, Summaries of 
groups of cases; Variable: CMO in Millions of Dollars; Category 
Axis: Regulatory Periods. 





6. Descriptive statistics used to evaluate whether the univariate time series contained 
outlier data values. 
a. Created SPSS file name Neill_CMO_outlier.sav. 
b. SPSS > Analyze > Descriptive statistics > Descriptives. 
c. Click on CMO in Millions of Dollars (COLLMO01) and move to 
Variable(s). 
d. Check: Save standardized values as variables. 
e. Click OK to generate results for z-score values for the newly created 
variable ZCOLLMO01. 
f.  Right click on variable header to Sort Ascending values. 
7. Regression statistics used to evaluate whether the univariate time series contained 
heteroskedasticity. 
a. Created SPSS file name Neill_CMO_bp.sav. 
b. Installed plug-in statistical software R 2.14.2. 
c. Installed plug-in statistical software Essentials for R 21.0.0. 
d. SPSS > Analyze > Regression > Residual Heteroscedasticity Test. 
i. Dependent variable: CMO in Millions of Dollars (COLLMO01). 
ii. Independent variable: COLLMOP1 (Period 1). 
iii. Missing values: Omit listwise. 
iv. Repeat step (ii) using COLLMOP2 (Period 2), COLLMOP3 





8. Dates were defined in order to evaluate seasonal decomposition and perform 
spectral analysis. 
a. Created SPSS file name Neill_CMO_boxjenkins.sav. 
b. SPSS > Data > Define Dates > Cases Are: years, quarters. 
c. First case: 1989, 3Q. 
d. Click OK. 
e. Periodicity given as 4. 
9. Seasonal decomposition was performed in order to generate output of seasonal 
factors by quarter for CMO in Millions of Dollars (COLLMO01) and Labor 
Participation Rate (LABORP01). 
a. Opened SPSS file name Neill_CMO_boxjenkins.sav. 
b. SPSS > Analyze > Forecasting > Seasonal Decomposition. 
i. Click on Model Type: multiplicative. 
ii. Click on Moving average weight: All points equal.  
iii. Variable(s): CMO in Millions of Dollars. 
iv. Repeat for Variable(s): Labor Participation Rate. 
c. Click OK to create 4 new variables: 
i. Seasonal adjustment factors (SAF). 
ii. Seasonally adjusted series (SAS). 
iii. Smoothed trend-cycle component (STC). 





10. Spectral analysis was performed in order to generate output of seasonality, or 
periodicity. 
a. Opened SPSS file name Neill_CMO_boxjenkins.sav. 
b. SPSS > Analyze > Forecasting > Spectral Analysis. 
c. Select variables: CMO in Millions of Dollars (COLLMO01). 
d. Select Spectral window. 
i. Click on Spectral window: Tukey-Hamming. 
ii. Confirm Span is 5. 
e. Select Plot. 
i. Click to check-on Periodogram and Spectral density. 
ii. Click: By frequency. 
iii. Warning notice was produced and analysis proceeded: “The series 
length must be even for the fast Fourier transform. The first case 
has been removed from the analysis.” 
11. Autocorrelation function (ACF) analysis was performed in order to check the 
results from the Periodogram. 
a. Opened SPSS file name Neill_CMO_boxjenkins.sav. 
b. SPSS > Analyze > Forecasting > Autocorrelations. 
c. Select variables: CMO in Millions of Dollars (COLLMO01). 
d. Select Options. 





ii. Check: Standard error: Bartlett’s Approximation. 
iii. Do not check: Display autocorrelations at periodic lags. 
e. Transform: 
i. Check: Natural log. 
ii. Check: Difference and input the value of 1. 
1. Note the value of 0 cannot be used and resulted in an error 
message. 
iii. Do not check: Seasonally difference. 
iv. Current periodicity: 4. The value was displayed and did not require 
input. 
f. Select: Display Autocorrelations. 
12. Sequence Charts were produced to diagnose stationarity for the CMO time series. 
a. Created SPSS file name Neill_CMO_stationarity.sav. 
b. SPSS > Analyze > Forecasting > Sequence Charts. 
c. Sequence Charts specification were made: 
i. Variables: Select SASCOLLM, labeled Seasonal adjusted series 
COLLMO01. 
ii. Time Axis Labels: Select Date (in format QQ_YYYY). 
iii. Click: One chart per variable. 
iv. Time lines: Select: Lines at each change of: Regulatory period. 





1. Click: Time on the horizontal axis. 
2. Single variable chart: line chart. 
3. Single variable chart: Click: Reference line at the mean of 
the series. 
d. Transform data in Sequence Charts. 
i. Difference: Selected testing values of 1, 2, 3. 
ii. Natural log transform: Each of the Difference values were tested 
without the natural log selected and then with the natural log 
selected. 
iii. Seasonal difference: Not selected. 
iv. Current Periodicity: 4. 
e. Diagnosis was the time series was not stationary and that analysis would 
continue with regulatory periods time series. Diagnostic data for CMOs 







Diagnostic Data for CMOs by CDS Regulatory Periods 
________________________________________________________________________ 






at start b     
Adjusted 
at end b 
Y-axis 
mean Visual inspection 
________________________________________________________________________ 
All 1 3Q 1989 1Q 2013 0 0 0.03 3 distinct periods  
All 2 3Q 1989 1Q 2013 0 0 0.00 2 or 3 periods  
All 3 3Q 1989 1Q 2013 0 0 0.00 Early spikes 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Data transformed into natural logarithms for the aggregated CDS regulation periods (All).  
a Difference, according to ARIMA model of first order linear trends (1), second order quadratic trends (2), and third order trends (3). 
The limited presence of third order trends made it unnecessary to diagnose the data for fourth order or subsequent order trends. 







13. Sequence Charts were produced to diagnose stationarity for the CMO time series 
corresponding to the first CDS regulatory period to identify ARIMA model d. 
a. Created SPSS file name Neill_CMO_stationarityCDS1.sav. The date 
range of the file was 3Q 1989 to 4Q 2001. 
b. SPSS > Analyze > Forecasting > Sequence Charts. 
c. Sequence Charts specification were made: 
i. Variables: Select SASCOLLM, labeled Seasonal adjusted series 
COLLMO01. 
ii. Time Axis Labels: Select Date (in format QQ_YYYY). 
iii. Click: One chart per variable. 
iv. Time lines: Select: Lines at each change of: Regulatory period. 
v. Format:  
1. Click: Time on the horizontal axis. 
2. Single variable chart: line chart. 
3. Single variable chart: Click: Reference line at the mean of 
the series. 
d. Transform data in Sequence Charts. 
i. Difference: Selected testing values of 1, 2, 3. 
ii. Natural log transform: Difference values were tested with the 
natural log selected.  





iv. Current Periodicity: 4. 
e. Diagnosis was the time series was stationary. Diagnostic data for CMOs in 






Diagnostic Data for CMOs in CDS Regulatory Period 1 
________________________________________________________________________ 






at start b     
Adjusted 
at end b 
Y-axis 
mean Visual inspection 
________________________________________________________________________ 
1 1 3Q 1989 4Q 2000 0 0 0.04 2 early & 1 late spikes 
1 2 3Q 1989 4Q 2000 0 0 0.00 2 early spikes 
1 3 3Q 1989 4Q 2000 0 0 0.00 3 early spikes 
1 1 3Q 1989 1Q 2001 0 +1 0.04 2 early & 1 late spikes 
1 2 3Q 1989 2Q 2001 0 +1 0.00 2 early spikes 
1 3 3Q 1989 2Q 2001 0 +1 0.00 3 early spikes 
1 1 3Q 1989 2Q 2001 0 +2 0.04 2 early & 1 late spikes 
1 2 3Q 1989 2Q 2001 0 +2 0.00 2 early spikes 
1 3 3Q 1989 2Q 2001 0 +2 0.00 3 early spikes 
1 1 3Q 1989 3Q 2001 0 +3 0.04 3 early & 1 late spikes 
1 2 3Q 1989 3Q 2001 0 +3 0.00 2 early spikes 
1 3 3Q 1989 3Q 2001 0 +3 0.00 3 early spikes 
1 1 3Q 1989 4Q 2001 0 +4 0.04 3 early & 1 late spikes 
1 2 3Q 1989 4Q 2001 0 +4 0.00 2 early spikes 
1 3 3Q 1989 4Q 2001 0 +4 0.00 3 early spikes 
1 1 4Q 1989 4Q 2000 -1 0 0.04 2 early & 1 late spikes 
1 2 4Q 1989 4Q 2000 -1 0 0.00 2 early spikes 
1 3 4Q 1989 4Q 2000 -1 0 0.00 3 early spikes 
1 1 1Q 1990 4Q 2000 -2 0 0.03 1 early & 1 late spikes 
1 2 1Q 1990 4Q 2000 -2 0 0.00 2 early spikes 
1 3 1Q 1990 4Q 2000 -2 0 0.00 2 early spikes 
1 1 2Q 1990 4Q 2000 -3 0 0.03 1 early & 1 late spikes 
1 2 2Q 1990 4Q 2000 -3 0 0.00 2 early spikes 
1 3 2Q 1990 4Q 2000 -3 0 0.00 1 early spike 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Data transformed into natural logarithms for the aggregated CDS regulation periods (All).  
a Difference, according to ARIMA model of first order linear trends (1), second order quadratic trends (2), and third order trends (3). 
The limited presence of third order trends made it unnecessary to diagnose the data for fourth order or subsequent order trends. 













at start b     
Adjusted 
at end b 
Y-axis 
mean Visual inspection 
________________________________________________________________________ 
1 1 3Q 1990 4Q 2000 -4 0 0.03 1 early spike 
1 2 3Q 1990 4Q 2000 -4 0 0.00 2 early spikes 
1 3 3Q 1990 4Q 2000 -4 0 0.00 1 early spike 
1 1 4Q 1990 4Q 2000 -5 0 0.03 1 early spike 
1 2 4Q 1990 4Q 2000 -5 0 0.00 1 early spike 
1 3 4Q 1990 4Q 2000 -5 0 0.00 1 early spike 
1 1 1Q 1991 4Q 1999 -6 -4 0.03 Stationary 
1 2 1Q 1991 1Q 2000 -6 -4 0.00 Stationary 
1 3 1Q 1991 1Q 2000 -6 -4 0.00 Stationary 
1 1 1Q 1991 1Q 2000 -6 -3 0.03 Stationary 
1 2 1Q 1991 1Q 2000 -6 -3 0.00 Stationary 
1 3 1Q 1991 1Q 2000 -6 -3 0.00 Stationary 
1 1 1Q 1991 2Q 2000 -6 -2 0.03 Stationary 
1 2 1Q 1991 2Q 2000 -6 -2 0.00 Stationary 
1 3 1Q 1991 2Q 2000 -6 -2 0.00 Stationary 
1 1 1Q 1991 3Q 2000 -6 -1 0.03 Stationary 
1 2 1Q 1991 3Q 2000 -6 -1 0.00 Stationary 
1 3 1Q 1991 3Q 2000 -6 -1 0.00 Stationary 
1 1 1Q 1991 4Q 2000 -6 0 0.03 Stationary 
1 2 1Q 1991 4Q 2000 -6 0 0.00 Stationary 
1 3 1Q 1991 4Q 2000 -6 0 0.00 Stationary 
1 1 1Q 1991 1Q 2001 -6 +1 0.03 Stationary 
1 2 1Q 1991 2Q 2001 -6 +1 0.00 Stationary 
1 3 1Q 1991 2Q 2001 -6 +1 0.00 Stationary 
1 1 1Q 1991 2Q 2001 -6 +2 0.03 Stationary 
1 2 1Q 1991 2Q 2001 -6 +2 0.00 Stationary 
1 3 1Q 1991 2Q 2001 -6 +2 0.00 Stationary 
1 1 1Q 1991 3Q 2001 -6 +3 0.03 Stationary 
1 2 1Q 1991 3Q 2001 -6 +3 0.00 Stationary 














at start b     
Adjusted 
at end b 
Y-axis 
mean Visual inspection 
________________________________________________________________________ 
1 1 1Q 1991 4Q 2001 -6 +4 0.03 1 mild late spike 
1 2 1Q 1991 4Q 2001 -6 +4 0.00 1 mild late spike 








14. Sequence Charts were produced to diagnose stationarity for the CMO time series 
corresponding to the third CDS regulatory period to identify ARIMA model d. 
a. Created SPSS file name Neill_CMO_stationarityCDS3.sav. The date 
range of the file was 2Q 2008 to 1Q 2013. 
b. SPSS > Analyze > Forecasting > Sequence Charts. 
c. Sequence Charts specification were made: 
i. Variables: Select SASCOLLM, labeled Seasonal adjusted series 
COLLMO01. 
ii. Time Axis Labels: Select Date (in format QQ_YYYY). 
iii. Click: One chart per variable. 
iv. Time lines: Select: Lines at each change of: Regulatory period. 
v. Format:  
1. Click: Time on the horizontal axis. 
2. Single variable chart: line chart. 
3. Single variable chart: Click: Reference line at the mean of 
the series. 
d. Transform data in Sequence Charts. 
i. Difference: Selected testing values of 1, 2, 3. 
ii. Natural log transform: Difference values were tested with the 
natural log selected.  





iv. Current Periodicity: 4. 
e. Diagnosis was the time series was stationary. Diagnostic data for CMOs in 








Diagnostic Data for CMOs in CDS Regulatory Period 3 
________________________________________________________________________ 






at start b     
Adjusted 
at end b 
Y-axis 
mean Visual inspection 
________________________________________________________________________ 
3 1 2Q 2008 1Q 2013 +2 0 -0.04 2 peaks 
3 2 2Q 2008 1Q 2013 +2 0 0.00 Uneven spikes 
3 3 2Q 2008 1Q 2013 +2 0 0.00 Stationary 
3 1 2Q 2008 4Q 2012 +2 -1 -0.04 2 peaks 
3 2 2Q 2008 4Q 2012 +2 -1 0.00 Uneven spikes 
3 3 2Q 2008 4Q 2012 +2 -1 0.00 Stationary 
3 1 2Q 2008 3Q 2012 +2 -2 -0.04 2 peaks 
3 2 2Q 2008 3Q 2012 +2 -2 0.00 Uneven spikes 
3 3 2Q 2008 3Q 2012 +2 -2 0.00 Stationary 
3 1 2Q 2008 2Q 2012 +2 -3 -0.04 2 peaks 
3 2 2Q 2008 2Q 2012 +2 -3 0.00 Uneven spikes 
3 3 2Q 2008 2Q 2012 +2 -3 0.00 Stationary 
3 1 2Q 2008 1Q 2012 +2 -4 -0.04 2 peaks 
3 2 2Q 2008 1Q 2012 +2 -4 0.00 Uneven spikes 
3 3 2Q 2008 1Q 2012 +2 -4 0.00 Stationary 
3 1 3Q 2008 1Q 2013 +1 0 -0.04 2 peaks 
3 2 3Q 2008 1Q 2013 +1 0 0.00 Uneven spikes 
3 3 3Q 2008 1Q 2013 +1 0 0.00 Stationary 
3 1 3Q 2008 4Q 2012 +1 -1 -0.04 2 peaks 
3 2 3Q 2008 4Q 2012 +1 -1 0.00 Uneven spikes 
3 3 3Q 2008 4Q 2012 +1 -1 0.00 Stationary 
3 1 3Q 2008 3Q 2012 +1 -2 -0.04 2 peaks 
3 2 3Q 2008 3Q 2012 +1 -2 0.00 Uneven spikes 
3 3 3Q 2008 3Q 2012 +1 -2 0.00 Stationary 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Data transformed into natural logarithms for the aggregated CDS regulation periods (All).  
a Difference, according to ARIMA model of first order linear trends (1), second order quadratic trends (2), and third order trends (3). 
The limited presence of third order trends made it unnecessary to diagnose the data for fourth order or subsequent order trends. 













at start b     
Adjusted 
at end b 
Y-axis 
mean Visual inspection 
________________________________________________________________________ 
3 1 3Q 2008 2Q 2012 +1 -3 -0.04 2 peaks 
3 2 3Q 2008 2Q 2012 +1 -3 0.00 Uneven spikes 
3 3 3Q 2008 2Q 2012 +1 -3 0.00 Stationary 
3 1 3Q 2008 1Q 2012 +1 -4 -0.04 2 peaks 
3 2 3Q 2008 1Q 2012 +1 -4 0.00 Uneven spikes 
3 3 3Q 2008 1Q 2012 +1 -4 0.00 Stationary 
3 1 4Q 2008 1Q 2013 0 0 -0.04 2 peaks 
3 2 4Q 2008 1Q 2013 0 0 0.00 Uneven spikes 
3 3 4Q 2008 1Q 2013 0 0 0.00 Stationary 
3 1 4Q 2008 4Q 2012 0 -1 -0.04 2 peaks 
3 2 4Q 2008 4Q 2012 0 -1 0.00 Uneven spikes 
3 3 4Q 2008 4Q 2012 0 -1 0.00 Stationary 
3 1 4Q 2008 3Q 2012 0 -2 -0.04 2 peaks 
3 2 4Q 2008 3Q 2012 0 -2 0.00 Uneven spikes 
3 3 4Q 2008 3Q 2012 0 -2 0.00 Stationary 
3 1 4Q 2008 2Q 2012 0 -3 -0.04 2 peaks 
3 2 4Q 2008 2Q 2012 0 -3 0.00 Uneven spikes 
3 3 4Q 2008 2Q 2012 0 -3 0.00 Stationary 
3 1 4Q 2008 1Q 2012 0 -4 -0.04 2 peaks 
3 2 4Q 2008 1Q 2012 0 -4 0.00 Uneven spikes 
3 3 4Q 2008 1Q 2012 0 -4 0.00 Stationary 
3 1 1Q 2009 1Q 2013 -1 0 -0.04 Stationary 
3 2 1Q 2009 1Q 2013 -1 0 0.00 Multiple spikes 
3 3 1Q 2009 1Q 2013 -1 0 0.00 Alternating spikes 
3 1 1Q 2009 4Q 2012 -1 -1 -0.04 Stationary; Best fit 
3 2 1Q 2009 4Q 2012 -1 -1 0.00 Multiple spikes 
3 3 1Q 2009 4Q 2012 -1 -1 0.00 Consistent spikes 
3 1 1Q 2009 3Q 2012 -1 -2 -0.04 Stationary 















at start b     
Adjusted 
at end b 
Y-axis 
mean Visual inspection 
________________________________________________________________________ 
3 3 1Q 2009 3Q 2012 -1 -2 0.00 Consistent spikes 
3 1 1Q 2009 2Q 2012 -1 -3 -0.04 Stationary 
3 2 1Q 2009 2Q 2012 -1 -3 0.00 Multiple spikes 
3 3 1Q 2009 2Q 2012 -1 -3 0.00 Consistent spikes 
3 1 1Q 2009 1Q 2012 -1 -4 -0.04 Stationary 
3 2 1Q 2009 1Q 2012 -1 -4 0.00 Multiple spikes 
3 3 1Q 2009 1Q 2012 -1 -4 0.00 Consistent spikes 
3 1 2Q 2009 1Q 2013 -2 0 -0.04 Stationary 
3 2 2Q 2009 1Q 2013 -2 0 0.00 Multiple spikes 
3 3 2Q 2009 1Q 2013 -2 0 0.00 Alternating spikes 
3 1 2Q 2009 4Q 2012 -2 -1 -0.04 Stationary 
3 2 2Q 2009 4Q 2012 -2 -1 0.00 Multiple spikes 
3 3 2Q 2009 4Q 2012 -2 -1 0.00 Consistent spikes 
3 1 2Q 2009 3Q 2012 -2 -2 -0.04 Stationary 
3 2 2Q 2009 3Q 2012 -2 -2 0.00 Multiple spikes 
3 3 2Q 2009 3Q 2012 -2 -2 0.00 Consistent spikes 
3 1 2Q 2009 2Q 2012 -2 -3 -0.04 Stationary 
3 2 2Q 2009 2Q 2012 -2 -3 0.00 Multiple spikes 
3 3 2Q 2009 2Q 2012 -2 -3 0.00 Consistent spikes 
3 1 2Q 2009 1Q 2012 -2 -4 -0.04 Stationary 
3 2 2Q 2009 1Q 2012 -2 -4 0.00 Multiple spikes 








15. Sequence Charts were produced to diagnose stationarity for the CMO time series 
corresponding to the second CDS regulatory period to identify ARIMA model d. 
a. Created SPSS file name Neill_CMO_stationarityCDS2.sav. The date 
range of the file was 3Q 2000 to 1Q 2009. 
b. SPSS > Analyze > Forecasting > Sequence Charts. 
c. Sequence Charts specification were made: 
i. Variables: Select SASCOLLM, labeled Seasonal adjusted series 
COLLMO01. 
ii. Time Axis Labels: Select Date (in format QQ_YYYY). 
iii. Click: One chart per variable. 
iv. Time lines: Select: Lines at each change of: Regulatory period. 
v. Format:  
1. Click: Time on the horizontal axis. 
2. Single variable chart: line chart. 
3. Single variable chart: Click: Reference line at the mean of 
the series. 
d. Transform data in Sequence Charts. 
i. Difference: Selected testing values of 1, 2, 3. 
ii. Natural log transform: Difference values were tested with the 
natural log selected.  





iv. Current Periodicity: 4. 
e. Diagnosis was the time series was stationary. Diagnostic data for CMOs in 








Diagnostic Data for CMOs in CDS Regulatory Period 2 
________________________________________________________________________ 






at start b     
Adjusted 
at end b 
Y-axis 
mean Visual inspection 
________________________________________________________________________ 
2 1 3Q 2000 1Q 2009 +2 +2 0.04 Late downward trend 
2 2 3Q 2000 1Q 2009 +2 +2 0.00 Early spike  
2 3 3Q 2000 1Q 2009 +2 +2 0.00 Early spike  
2 1 3Q 2000 4Q 2008 +2 +1 0.04 Late downward trend 
2 2 3Q 2000 4Q 2008 +2 +1 0.00 Early spike  
2 3 3Q 2000 4Q 2008 +2 +1 0.00 Early spike  
2 1 3Q 2000 3Q 2008 +2 0 0.04 Late downward trend 
2 2 3Q 2000 3Q 2008 +2 0 0.00 Early spike  
2 3 3Q 2000 3Q 2008 +2 0 0.00 Early spike  
2 1 3Q 2000 2Q 2008 +2 -1 0.04 Late downward trend 
2 2 3Q 2000 2Q 2008 +2 -1 0.00 Early spike  
2 3 3Q 2000 2Q 2008 +2 -1 0.00 Early spike  
2 1 3Q 2000 1Q 2008 +2 -2 0.05 Late downward trend 
2 2 3Q 2000 1Q 2008 +2 -2 0.00 Early spike  
2 3 3Q 2000 1Q 2008 +2 -2 0.00 Early spike  
2 1 4Q 2000 1Q 2009 +1 +2 0.04 Late downward trend 
2 2 4Q 2000 1Q 2009 +1 +2 0.00 Early spike  
2 3 4Q 2000 1Q 2009 +1 +2 0.00 Early spike  
2 1 4Q 2000 4Q 2008 +1 +1 0.04 Late downward trend 
2 2 4Q 2000 4Q 2008 +1 +1 0.00 Early spike  
2 3 4Q 2000 4Q 2008 +1 +1 0.00 Early spike  
2 1 4Q 2000 3Q 2008 +1 0 0.04 Late downward trend 
2 2 4Q 2000 3Q 2008 +1 0 0.00 Early spike  
2 3 4Q 2000 3Q 2008 +1 0 0.00 Early spike  
__________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Data transformed into natural logarithms for the aggregated CDS regulation periods (All).  
a Difference, according to ARIMA model of first order linear trends (1), second order quadratic trends (2), and third order trends (3). 
The limited presence of third order trends made it unnecessary to diagnose the data for fourth order or subsequent order trends. 













at start b     
Adjusted 
at end b 
Y-axis 
mean Visual inspection 
________________________________________________________________________ 
2 1 4Q 2000 2Q 2008 +1 -1 0.04 Late downward trend 
2 2 4Q 2000 2Q 2008 +1 -1 0.00 Early spike  
2 3 4Q 2000 2Q 2008 +1 -1 0.00 Early spike  
2 1 4Q 2000 1Q 2008 +1 -2 0.05 Late downward trend 
2 2 4Q 2000 1Q 2008 +1 -2 0.00 Early spike  
2 3 4Q 2000 1Q 2008 +1 -2 0.00 Early spike  
2 1 1Q 2001 1Q 2009 0 +2 0.04 Late downward trend 
2 2 1Q 2001 1Q 2009 0 +2 0.00 Early spike  
2 3 1Q 2001 1Q 2009 0 +2 0.00 Early spike  
2 1 1Q 2001 4Q 2008 0 +1 0.04 Late downward trend 
2 2 1Q 2001 4Q 2008 0 +1 0.00 Early spike  
2 3 1Q 2001 4Q 2008 0 +1 0.00 Early spike  
2 1 1Q 2001 3Q 2008 0 0 0.04 Late downward trend 
2 2 1Q 2001 3Q 2008 0 0 0.00 Early spike  
2 3 1Q 2001 3Q 2008 0 0 0.00 Early spike  
2 1 1Q 2001 2Q 2008 0 -1 0.05 Late downward trend 
2 2 1Q 2001 2Q 2008 0 -1 0.00 Early spike; Best fit  
2 3 1Q 2001 2Q 2008 0 -1 0.00 Early spike  
2 1 1Q 2001 1Q 2008 0 -2 0.05 Late downward trend 
2 2 1Q 2001 1Q 2008 0 -2 0.00 Early spike  
2 3 1Q 2001 1Q 2008 0 -2 0.00 Early spike  
2 1 2Q 2001 1Q 2009 -1 +2 0.04 Late downward trend 
2 2 2Q 2001 1Q 2009 -1 +2 0.00 Early spike  
2 3 2Q 2001 1Q 2009 -1 +2 0.00 Early spike  
2 1 2Q 2001 4Q 2008 -1 +1 0.04 Late downward trend 
2 2 2Q 2001 4Q 2008 -1 +1 0.00 Early spike  
2 3 2Q 2001 4Q 2008 -1 +1 0.00 Early spike  
2 1 2Q 2001 3Q 2008 -1 0 0.04 Late downward trend 
2 2 2Q 2001 3Q 2008 -1 0 0.00 Early spike  
2 3 2Q 2001 3Q 2008 -1 0 0.00 Early spike  














at start b     
Adjusted 
at end b 
Y-axis 
mean Visual inspection 
________________________________________________________________________ 
2 2 2Q 2001 2Q 2008 -1 -1 0.00 Early spike  
2 3 2Q 2001 2Q 2008 -1 -1 0.00 Early spike  
2 1 2Q 2001 1Q 2008 -1 -2 0.05 Late downward trend 
2 2 2Q 2001 1Q 2008 -1 -2 0.00 Early spike  
2 3 2Q 2001 1Q 2008 -1 -2 0.00 Early spike  
2 1 3Q 2001 1Q 2009 -2 +2 0.04 Late downward trend 
2 2 3Q 2001 1Q 2009 -2 +2 0.00 Early spike  
2 3 3Q 2001 1Q 2009 -2 +2 0.00 Early spike  
2 1 3Q 2001 4Q 2008 -2 +1 0.04 Late downward trend 
2 2 3Q 2001 4Q 2008 -2 +1 0.00 Early spike  
2 3 3Q 2001 4Q 2008 -2 +1 0.00 Early spike  
2 1 3Q 2001 3Q 2008 -2 0 0.04 Late downward trend 
2 2 3Q 2001 3Q 2008 -2 0 0.00 Early spike  
2 3 3Q 2001 3Q 2008 -2 0 0.00 Early spike  
2 1 3Q 2001 2Q 2008 -2 -1 0.05 Late downward trend 
2 2 3Q 2001 2Q 2008 -2 -1 0.00 Early spike  
2 3 3Q 2001 2Q 2008 -2 -1 0.00 Early spike  
2 1 3Q 2001 1Q 2008 -2 -2 0.05 Late downward trend 
2 2 3Q 2001 1Q 2008 -2 -2 0.00 Early spike  








16. Sequence Charts were produced to diagnose stationarity for the Labor 
Participation Rate time series to identify ARIMA model d. 
a. Created SPSS file name Neill_CMO_stationarityLPR.sav. The date range 
of the file was 3Q 1989 to 1Q 2013. 
b. SPSS > Analyze > Forecasting > Sequence Charts. 
c. Sequence Charts specification were made: 
i. Variables: Select SASLABOR, labeled Seasonal adjusted series 
LABORP01. 
ii. Time Axis Labels: Select Date (in format QQ_YYYY). 
iii. Click: One chart per variable. 
iv. Time lines: Select: Lines at each change of: Regulatory period. 
v. Format:  
1. Click: Time on the horizontal axis. 
2. Single variable chart: line chart. 
3. Single variable chart: Click: Reference line at the mean of 
the series. 
d. Transform data in Sequence Charts. 
i. Difference: Selected testing values of 1, 2, 3. 
ii. Natural log transform: Difference values were tested with the 
natural log selected.  





iv. Current Periodicity: 4. 
e. Diagnosis was the time series was stationary at the first order differencing. 
Diagnostic data for Labor Participation Rate by CDS regulatory periods 
are in Table C5. 
i. There were no adjustments made to time periods by quarter. 







Diagnostic Data for Labor Participation Rate by CDS Regulatory Period 
________________________________________________________________________ 






at start b     
Adjusted 
at end b 
Y-axis 
mean Visual inspection 
________________________________________________________________________ 
All 1 3Q 1989 1Q 2013 0 0 0.00 Stationary  
All 2 3Q 1989 1Q 2013 0 0 0.00 Stationary 
All 3 3Q 1989 1Q 2013 0 0 0.00 Stationary 
1 1 3Q 1989 4Q 2000 0 0 0.00 Stationary  
1 2 3Q 1989 4Q 2000 0 0 0.00 Stationary 
1 3 3Q 1989 4Q 2000 0 0 0.00 Stationary 
2 1 1Q 2001 4Q 2008 0 0 0.00 Stationary  
2 2 1Q 2001 4Q 2008 0 0 0.00 Stationary 
2 3 1Q 2001 4Q 2008 0 0 0.00 Stationary 
3 1 1Q 2009 1Q 2013 0 0 0.00 Stationary  
3 2 1Q 2009 1Q 2013 0 0 0.00 Stationary 
3 3 1Q 2009 1Q 2013 0 0 0.00 Stationary 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Data transformed into natural logarithms for the aggregated CDS regulation periods (All).  
a Difference, according to ARIMA model of first order linear trends (1), second order quadratic trends (2), and third order trends (3). 
The limited presence of third order trends made it unnecessary to diagnose the data for fourth order or subsequent order trends. 







17. ARIMA models were produced to diagnose p and q values for CMOs and Labor 
Participation Rate by CDS regulatory periods. 
a. Created SPSS files for each stationary CDS regulatory period. 
i. File name Neill_pdq1.sav. The date range of the file was 1Q 1991 
to 4Q 2000. 
ii. File name Neill_pdq2.sav. The date range of the file was 1Q 2001 
to 2Q 2008. 
iii. File name Neill_pdq3.sav. The date range of the file was 1Q 2009 
to 4Q 2012. 
b. SPSS > Analyze > Forecasting > Create Model > Time Series Modeler to 
select specifications for: Variables, Statistics, Plots, Output Filter, Save, 
Options. 
c. SPSS > Analyze > Forecasting > Create Model > Time Series Modeler: 
Variables: 
i. Dependent Variable Select labeled Seasonal adjusted series 
COLLMO01. Repeat for Labor Participation Rate. 
ii. Method: Select ARIMA.  
1. ARIMA Criteria: Model: ARIMA Orders with current 
periodicity of 4: Nonseasonal Structure of Autoregressive 
(p), Difference (d), Moving Average (q).  





b. Include constant in model: Do not click (i.e., a 
constant is excluded) unless ARIMA (0,d,0). 
2. ARIMA Criteria: Model: Outliers: Click to detect outliers 
automatically and select Outliers (Additive, Level shift, 
Innovational, Transient, Seasonal additive, Local trend, 
Additive patch).  
d. SPSS > Analyze > Forecasting > Create Model > Time Series Modeler: 
Statistics: 
i. Click: Display fit measures, Lung-Box statistic, and number of 
outliers by model. 
ii. Select Fit Measures: Stationary R square, R square, Root mean 
square error, Mean absolute percentage error, Mean absolute error, 
Maximum absolute percentage error, Maximum absolute error, 
Normalized BIC. 
iii. Select Statistics for Comparing Models: Goodness of fit, Residual 
autocorrelation function (ACF), Residual partial autocorrelation 
function (PACF). 
iv. Select Statistics for Individual Models: Parameter estimates, 
Residual autocorrelation function (ACF), Residual partial 
autocorrelation function (PACF). 





e. SPSS > Analyze > Forecasting > Create Model > Time Series Modeler: 
Plots: 
i. Select Plots for Comparing Models: Stationary R square, R square, 
Root mean square error, Mean absolute percentage error, Mean 
absolute error, Maximum absolute percentage error, Maximum 
absolute error, Normalized BIC, Residual autocorrelation function 
(ACF), Residual partial autocorrelation function (PACF). 
ii. Select Plots for Individual Models: Series, Residual autocorrelation 
function (ACF), Residual partial autocorrelation function (PACF). 
1. Select Each Plot Displays: Observed values, Fit values, 
Confidence intervals for fit values. 
f. SPSS > Analyze > Forecasting > Create Model > Time Series Modeler: 
Output Filter: 
i. Click: Include all models in output. 
g. SPSS > Analyze > Forecasting > Create Model > Time Series Modeler: 
Save: no selection is necessary. 
h. SPSS > Analyze > Forecasting > Create Model > Time Series Modeler: 
Options:  
i. Forecast Period: No selection is necessary. 
ii. User-Missing Values: Treat as invalid. 





iv. Prefix for Model Identifiers in Output: Model. 
v. Maximum Number of Lags Shown in ACF and PACF Output: 10. 
i. Model data for CMOs and the control variable (Labor Participation Rate) 
by CDS regulatory periods are in tables: 
i. Regulatory period 1 is in Table C6. 
ii. Regulatory period 2 is in Table C7. 







Model Data for CMOs and Control Variable for Regulatory Period 1 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable Difference (p, q)a Parameter Estimate SE t p-Value 
________________________________________________________________________ 
CMO 1 (0,0) none 0.029 0.004 7.786 0.000 *** 
CMO 1 (0,1) Θ -0.597 0.143 -4.189 0.000 ***† 
CMO 1 (0,2) Θ1 -0.654 0.162 -4.032 0.000 ***† 
CMO 1 (0,2) Θ2 -0.290 0.165 -1.756 0.088 
CMO 1 (1,0) Φ 0.912 0.063 14.585 0.000 *** 
CMO 1 (1,1) Φ 0.945 0.051 18.473 0.000 *** 
CMO 1 (1,1) Θ 0.189 0.181 1.047 0.302 
CMO 1 (1,2) Φ 0.939 0.059 15.897 0.000 *** 
CMO 1 (1,2) Θ1 0.219 0.182 1.200 0.238   
CMO 1 (1,2) Θ2 -0.083 0.181 -0.459 0.649   
CMO 1 (2,0) Φ1 0.749 0.168 4.471 0.000 *** 
CMO 1 (2,0) Φ2 0.181 0.168 1.075 0.289 
CMO 1 (2,1) Φ1 1.760 no value no value no value 
CMO 1 (2,1) Φ2 -0.760 no value no value no value 
CMO 1 (2,1) Θ 0.990 no value no value no value 
CMO 1 (2,2) Φ1 1.487 0.203 7.335 0.000 *** 
CMO 1 (2,2) Φ2 -0.607 0.193 -3.150 0.003 ** 
CMO 1 (2,2) Θ1 1.080 77.015 0.014 0.989 
CMO 1 (2,2) Θ2 -1.000 142.627 -0.007 0.994 
Control 1 (0,0) none 0.000 0.000 0.647 0.521 
Control 1 (0,1) Θ 0.305 0.155 1.965 0.057 
Control 1 (0,2) Θ1 0.240 0.162 1.481 0.147 
Control 1 (0,2) Θ2 0.204 0.164 1.249 0.220 
Control 1 (1,0) Φ  -0.173 0.160 -1.081 0.287   
Control 1 (1,1) Φ  0.376 0.419 0.899 0.375 
Control 1 (1,1) Θ 0.653 0.347 1.882 0.068 
Control 1 (1,2) Φ -0.034 0.816 -0.042 0.967 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Difference is the ARIMA d; SE is the standard error of the estimate. Due to outliers at d=2, analysis was performed at d=3 to 
determine whether the outliers indicated a trend.  
a ARIMA p is the autoregressive (AR) portion of the model and its estimate is represented by the mathematical symbol Φ; ARIMA q 
is the moving average (MA) portion of the model and its estimate is represented by the mathematical symbol Θ. 
† Parameter includes ARIMA outlier. 







Variable Difference (p, q) a Parameter Estimate SE t p-Value 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Control 1 (1,2) Θ1 0.207 0.799 0.260 0.797 
Control 1 (1,2) Θ2 0.216 0.282 0.769 0.447  
Control 1 (2,0) Φ1 -0.210 0.161 -1.310 0.198 
Control 1 (2,0) Φ2 -0.224 0.163 -1.376 0.177 
Control 1 (2,1) Φ1 0.261 0.503 0.520 0.606 
Control 1 (2,1) Φ2 -0.145 0.226 -0.641 0.525 
Control 1 (2,1) Θ 0.506 0.499 1.015 0.317 
Control 1 (2,2) Φ1 0.208 1.632 0.127 0.899 
Control 1 (2,2) Φ2 -0.102 0.875 -0.117 0.908 
Control 1 (2,2) Θ1 0.453 1.637 0.277 0.784 
Control 1 (2,2) Θ2 0.056 1.253 0.045 0.964 
Control 2 (0,0) none 7.903E-005 0.001 0.140 0.890 
Control 2 (0,1) Θ 1.000 20.413 0.049 0.961 
Control 2 (0,2) Θ1 0.855 187.359 0.005 0.996 
Control 2 (0,2) Θ2 0.145 27.248 0.005 0.996 
Control 2 (1,0) Φ -0.456 0.155 -2.941 0.006 **† 
Control 2 (1,1) Φ 0.187 0.219 0.856 0.398 
Control 2 (1,1) Θ 1.000 71.905 0.014 0.989 
Control 2 (1,2) Φ -0.888 0.206 -4.316 0.000 *** 
Control 2 (1,2) Θ1 0.005 8.442 0.001 0.999 
Control 2 (1,2) Θ2 0.992 8.115 0.122 0.903 
Control 2 (2,0) Φ1 -1.117 0.144 -7.761 0.000 ***† 
Control 2 (2,0) Φ2 -0.569 0.141 -4.039 0.000 ***† 
Control 2 (2,1) Φ1 -0.193 0.180 -1.071 0.291 
Control 2 (2,1) Φ2 -0.215 0.179 -1.205 0.236 
Control 2 (2,1) Θ 0.995 2.058 0.483 0.632 
Control 2 (2,2) Φ1 -0.720 0.734 -0.981 0.333 
Control 2 (2,2) Φ2 -0.221 0.180 -1.227 0.228 
Control 2 (2,2) Θ1 0.444 5.154 0.086 0.932 
Control 2 (2,2) Θ2 0.553 3.154 0.175 0.862 
Control 3 (0,0) none 8.025E-005 0.001 0.094 0.925 
Control 3 (0,1) Θ 0.997 5.717 0.174 0.863 
Control 3 (0,2) Θ1 1.983 4.993 0.397 0.694 
___________________________________________________________________ 
† Parameter includes ARIMA outlier. 







Variable Difference (p, q) a Parameter Estimate SE t p-Value 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Control 3 (0,2) Θ2 -0.997 4.978 -0.200 0.842 
Control 3 (1,0) Φ -0.597 0.142 -4.214 0.000 ***† 
Control 3 (1,1) Φ -0.414 0.184 -2.250 0.031 *† 
Control 3 (1,1) Θ 0.987 1.631 0.605 0.549 
Control 3 (1,2) Φ -0.255 0.263 -0.970 0.339 
Control 3 (1,2) Θ1 1.586 0.440 3.602 0.001 *** 
Control 3 (1,2) Θ2 -0.608 0.280 -2.168 0.037 
Control 3 (2,0) Φ1 -1.243 0.128 -9.710 0.000 ***† 
Control 3 (2,0) Φ2 -0.725 0.127 -5.693 0.000 ***† 
Control 3 (2,1) Φ1 -1.064 0.164 -6.484 0.000 ***† 
Control 3 (2,1) Φ2 -0.528 0.158 -3.349 0.002 **† 
Control 3 (2,1) Θ 0.999 19.011 0.053 0.958 
Control 3 (2,2) Φ1 -1.045 0.309 -3.380 0.002 **† 
Control 3 (2,2) Φ2 -0.516 0.239 -2.153 0.039 *† 
Control 3 (2,2) Θ1 1.089 2.104 0.517 0.608 
Control 3 (2,2) Θ2 -0.096 0.348 -0.275 0.785 
___________________________________________________________________ 
† Parameter includes ARIMA outlier. 







Model Data for CMOs and Control Variable for Regulatory Period 2 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable Difference (p, q) a Parameter Estimate SE t p-Value 
________________________________________________________________________ 
CMO 2 (0,0) none -0.002 0.004 -0.517 0.609   
CMO 2 (0,1) Θ 0.373 0.191 1.956 0.061 
CMO 2 (0,2) Θ1 0.532 0.201 2.653 0.014 *† 
CMO 2 (0,2) Θ2 -0.193 0.212 -0.909 0.372 
CMO 2 (1,0) Φ -0.465 0.173 -2.694 0.012 *† 
CMO 2 (1,1) Φ -0.934 0.098 -9.492 0.000 ***† 
CMO 2 (1,1) Θ -0.550 0.247 -2.228 0.036 *† 
CMO 2 (1,2) Φ -0.789 0.465 -1.697 0.102 
CMO 2 (1,2) Θ1 -0.492 99.240 -0.005 0.996 
CMO 2 (1,2) Θ2 0.507 50.307 0.010 0.992 
CMO 2 (2,0) Φ1 -0.263 0.177 -1.483 0.152 
CMO 2 (2,0) Φ2 0.604 0.186 3.254 0.004 **† 
CMO 2 (2,1) Φ1 -0.724 0.407 -1.780 0.087 
CMO 2 (2,1) Φ2 -0.489 0.201 -2.427 0.023 * 
CMO 2 (2,1) Θ -0.284 0.467 -0.607 0.549 
CMO 2 (2,2) Φ1 -0.726 0.461 -1.574 0.129 
CMO 2 (2,2) Φ2 -0.444 0.360 -1.234 0.229 
CMO 2 (2,2) Θ1 -0.282 0.507 -0.555 0.584 
CMO 2 (2,2) Θ2 0.062 0.513 0.121 0.904 
Control 2 (0,0) none 0.000 0.001 0.315 0.775 
Control 2 (0,1) Θ 0.943 0.162 5.818 0.000 *** 
Control 2 (0,2) Θ1 1.342 0.188 7.127 0.000 *** 
Control 2 (0,2) Θ2 -0.463 0.187 -2.471 0.020 * 
Control 2 (1,0) Φ -0.483 0.167 -2.889 0.008 ** 
Control 2 (1,1) Φ -0.292 0.208 -1.402 0.173 
Control 2 (1,1) Θ 0.900 0.134 6.707 0.000 *** 
Control 2 (1,2) Φ -0.905 0.332 -2.728 0.011 * 
Control 2 (1,2) Θ1 -0.058 24.989 -0.002 0.998 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Difference is the ARIMA d; SE is the standard error of the estimate.  
a ARIMA p is the autoregressive (AR) portion of the model and its estimate is represented by the mathematical symbol Φ; ARIMA q 
is the moving average (MA) portion of the model and its estimate is represented by the mathematical symbol Θ. 
† Parameter includes ARIMA outlier. 







Variable Difference (p, q) a Parameter Estimate SE t p-Value 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Control 2 (1,2) Θ2 0.941 23.508 0.040 0.968 
Control 2 (2,0) Φ1 -0.790 0.154 -5.138 0.000 *** 
Control 2 (2,0) Φ2 -0.665 0.140 -4.754 0.000 *** 
Control 2 (2,1) Φ1 -0.515 0.201 -2.570 0.017 * 
Control 2 (2,1) Φ2 -0.524 0.186 -2.815 0.009 ** 
Control 2 (2,1) Θ 0.731 0.174 4.196 0.000 *** 
Control 2 (2,2) Φ1 -0.494 0.372 -1.329 0.196 
Control 2 (2,2) Φ2 -0.520 0.201 -2.592 0.016 * 
Control 2 (2,2) Θ1 0.757 0.433 1.748 0.093 
Control 2 (2,2) Θ2 -0.031 0.406 -0.077 0.939 
Control 1 (0,0) none -0.001 0.001 -1.052 0.302 
Control 1 (0,1) Θ 0.320 0.183 1.747 0.092   
Control 1 (0,2) Θ1 0.445 0.194 2.300 0.029 * 
Control 1 (0,2) Θ2 -0.132 0.194 -0.681 0.502 
Control 1 (1,0) Φ -0.260 0.182 -1.431 0.164 
Control 1 (1,1) Φ 0.994 1.321 0.752 0.458 
Control 1 (1,1) Θ 0.991 1.481 0.669 0.509 
Control 1 (1,2) Φ -0.834 0.293 -2.851 0.008 ** 
Control 1 (1,2) Θ1 -0.634 5.343 -0.119 0.906 
Control 1 (1,2) Θ2 0.363 1.889 0.192 0.849 
Control 1 (2,0) Φ1 -0.335 0.193 -1.734 0.094 
Control 1 (2,0) Φ2 -0.328 0.181 -1.810 0.081 
Control 1 (2,1) Φ1 -0.567 -0.457 -1.240 0.226 
Control 1 (2,1) Φ2 -0.414 0.188 -2.206 0.036 * 
Control 1 (2,1) Θ -0.272 0.500 -0.544 0.591 
Control 1 (2,2) Φ1 -0.276 0.091 -3.021 0.006 ** 
Control 1 (2,2) Φ2 -0.930 0.079 -11.760 0.000 *** 
Control 1 (2,2) Θ1 -0.096 0.179 -0.535 0.597 
Control 1 (2,2) Θ2 -1.000 0.177 -5.652 0.000 *** 
___________________________________________________________________ 
† Parameter includes ARIMA outlier. 








Model Data for CMOs and Control Variable for Regulatory Period 3 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable Difference (p, q) a Parameter Estimate SE t p-Value 
________________________________________________________________________ 
CMO 1 (0,0) none -0.036 0.004 -9.176 0.000 *** 
CMO 1 (0,1) Θ -0.985 4.596 -0.214 0.834 
CMO 1 (0,2) Θ1 -1.002 1.992 -0.503 0.624 
CMO 1 (0,2) Θ2 -0.978 3.887 -0.252 0.806 
CMO 1 (1,0) Φ 0.980 0.030 32.556 0.000 ***† 
CMO 1 (1,1) Φ 0.977 0.038 25.881 0.000 *** 
CMO 1 (1,1) Θ 0.293 0.284 1.032 0.321 
CMO 1 (1,2) Φ 0.968 0.054 17.916 0.000 *** 
CMO 1 (1,2) Θ1 0.275 0.304 0.904 0.384 
CMO 1 (1,2) Θ2 -0.103 0.314 -0.329 0.748 
CMO 1 (2,0) Φ1 0.636 0.263 2.415 0.031 * 
CMO 1 (2,0) Φ2 0.330 0.266 1.243 0.236 
CMO 1 (2,1) Φ1 -0.028 0.106 -0.267 0.794 
CMO 1 (2,1) Φ2 0.970 0.093 10.429 0.000 *** 
CMO 1 (2,1) Θ -0.975 1.933 -0.504 0.623 
CMO 1 (2,2) Φ1 -0.033 0.142 -0.231 0.821 
CMO 1 (2,2) Φ2 0.966 0.149 6.477 0.000 *** 
CMO 1 (2,2) Θ1 -1.081 2.903 -0.372 0.717 
CMO 1 (2,2) Θ2 -0.108 0.371 -0.290 0.777 
Control 1 (0,0) none -0.002 0.001 -2.126 0.052 
Control 1 (0,1) Θ 0.252 0.224 1.129 0.283 
Control 1 (0,2) Θ1 0.180 0.256 0.701 0.499 
Control 1 (0,2) Θ2 0.199 0.265 0.750 0.470 
Control 1 (1,0) Φ -0.311 0.250 -1.242 0.240 
Control 1 (1,1) Φ 0.947 0.180 5.276 0.000 ***† 
Control 1 (1,1) Θ 0.811 0.323 2.506 0.029 *† 
Control 1 (1,2) Φ 0.968 0.052 18.492 0.000 *** 
Control 1 (1,2) Θ1 1.488 0.350 4.254 0.001 *** 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Difference is the ARIMA d; SE is the standard error of the estimate.  
a ARIMA p is the autoregressive (AR) portion of the model and its estimate is represented by the mathematical symbol Φ; ARIMA q 
is the moving average (MA) portion of the model and its estimate is represented by the mathematical symbol Θ. 
† Parameter includes ARIMA outlier. 







Variable Difference (p, q) a Parameter Estimate SE t p-Value 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Control 1 (1,2) Θ2 -0.704 0.354 -1.986 0.070 
Control 1 (2,0) Φ1 0.100 0.234 0.427 0.678 
Control 1 (2,0) Φ2 0.342 0.254 1.346 0.206 
Control 1 (2,1) Φ1 0.456 0.337 1.352 0.213 
Control 1 (2,1) Φ2 0.430 0.279 1.537 0.163 
Control 1 (2,1) Θ 0.473 0.291 1.627 0.142 
Control 1 (2,2) Φ1 -0.052 0.267 -0.193 0.851 
Control 1 (2,2) Φ2 -0.436 0.283 -1.538 0.158 
Control 1 (2,2) Θ1 0.040 0.302 0.133 0.897 
Control 1 (2,2) Θ2 -0.964 0.299 -3.224 0.010 **† 
Control 2 (0,0) none 0.000 0.002 -0.065 0.950 
Control 2 (0,1) Θ 1.000 734.956 0.001 0.999 
Control 2 (0,2) Θ1 0.988 0.232 4.261 0.002 **† 
Control 2 (0,2) Θ2 -0.342 0.231 -1.483 0.169 
Control 2 (1,0) Φ -0.702 0.078 -9.019 0.000 ***† 
Control 2 (1,1) Φ -0.444 0.287 -1.550 0.156 
Control 2 (1,1) Θ 0.512 0.220 2.323 0.045 *† 
Control 2 (1,2) Φ 0.123 0.425 0.290 0.777 
Control 2 (1,2) Θ1 1.703 77.620 0.022 0.983 
Control 2 (1,2) Θ2 -0.999 91.051 -0.011 0.991 
Control 2 (2,0) Φ1 -0.995 0.252 -3.951 0.002 ** 
Control 2 (2,0) Φ2 -0.578 0.225 -2.571 0.024 * 
Control 2 (2,1) Φ1 -1.210 0.087 -13.905 0.000 ***† 
Control 2 (2,1) Φ2 -0.664 0.066 -10.005 0.000 ***† 
Control 2 (2,1) Θ -0.174 0.114 -1.524 0.171 
Control 2 (2,2) Φ1 0.006 0.373 0.017 0.987 
Control 2 (2,2) Φ2 -0.410 0.317 -1.295 0.224 
Control 2 (2,2) Θ1 1.601 118.357 0.014 0.989 
Control 2 (2,2) Θ2 -0.999 147.768 -0.007 0.995 
___________________________________________________________________ 
† Parameter includes ARIMA outlier. 







18. ARIMA models with significant parameters were tested to identify the best 
models for CMOs and Labor Participation Rate by CDS regulatory periods. 
a. Data from Tables C6 through C8 was selected for those models with 
significant parameters and shown in Tables C9 through C14.  
i. A model was tested if at least one of the parameters had a 
significant p-value. 
1. If a model with multiple parameters, such as (2,1,2), had 
one significant parameter, then the other parameters could 
be insignificant.  
b. Best models were indicated based on the criteria of the t score, mean 
absolute percentage error (MAPE), residual autocorrelation (ACF), and 
residual partial autocorrelation (PACF) values.   
i. Unambiguous results had the best t score (the highest absolute 
value) and the lowest MAPE. 
ii. Ambiguous results were tested with the rules-based diagnostic 
guidance by Nau (2014).  
1. MAPE indicates the best model more so than the t score. 
a. MAPE is a model-level statistic, compared to the t 
score and standard error of the estimate (SE) that 





comparison between models with multiple 
parameters.  
2. Plots were reviewed for indications of ACF and PACF 
patterns that would indicate that a parameter change was 
needed to improve the model.  
c. Best models were chosen for the 6 periods that resulted from the 3 
regulatory periods and 2 variables (dependent and control). 
i. Discussions regarding the best model fit are footnoted in each of 
the best model tables, including outliers and comparisons to 
closely related models.  
1. Best model for Regulatory Period 1 for CMOs is discussed 
in Table C9. 
2. Best model for Regulatory Period 1 for Control Variable is 
discussed in Table C10. 
3. Best model for Regulatory Period 2 for CMOs is discussed 
in Table C11. 
4. Best model for Regulatory Period 2 for Control Variable is 
discussed in Table C12. 
5. Best model for Regulatory Period 3 for CMOs is discussed 





6. Best model for Regulatory Period 3 for Control Variable is 







Regulatory Period 1 Best Model for CMOs (Seasonally Adjusted) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable Difference (p, q)a Parameter Estimate MAPE t p-Value 
________________________________________________________________________ 
CMO 1 (0,0) none 0.029 2.041 7.786 0.000 *** 
CMO 1 (0,1) Θ -0.597 1.643 -4.189 0.000 ***b 
CMO 1 (0,2) Θ1 -0.654 1.516 -4.032 0.000 ***b 
CMO 1 (0,2) Θ2 -0.290 1.516 -1.756 0.088 
CMO 1 (1,0) Φ 0.912 1.420 14.585 0.000 *** 
CMO 1 (1,1) Φ 0.945 1.420 18.473 0.000 ***‡ 
CMO 1 (1,1) Θ 0.189 1.420 1.047 0.302 ‡ 
CMO 1 (1,2) Φ 0.939 1.414 15.897 0.000 *** 
CMO 1 (1,2) Θ1 0.219 1.414 1.200 0.238   
CMO 1 (1,2) Θ2 -0.083 1.414 -0.459 0.649   
CMO 1 (2,0) Φ1 0.749 1.417 4.471 0.000 *** 
CMO 1 (2,0) Φ2 0.181 1.417 1.075 0.289 
CMO 1 (2,2) Φ1 1.487 1.115 7.335 0.000 *** 
CMO 1 (2,2) Φ2 -0.607 1.115 -3.150 0.003 ** 
CMO 1 (2,2) Θ1 1.080 1.115 0.014 0.989 
CMO 1 (2,2) Θ2 -1.000 1.115 -0.007 0.994 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Difference is the ARIMA d; MAPE is the Mean Absolute Percentage Error that is shown at the model level rather than at the 
parameter level so that the (p,d,q) models may be compared.  
a ARIMA p is the autoregressive (AR) portion of the model and its estimate is represented by the mathematical symbol Φ; ARIMA q 
is the moving average (MA) portion of the model and its estimate is represented by the mathematical symbol Θ. 
b Outlier is 2Q 1991 (Local Trend). 
‡ Best model. Model (1,1,1) has the highest t scores (18.473 and 1.047) and the MAPE (1.42) is better than or equal to the other 
models except Model (1,1,2) and Model (2,1,2). Model (1,1,0) displays a sharp cutoff of the residual ACF (autocorrelation function) 
after the first lag, indicating the need for the MA term in Model (1,1,1). With the addition of the second MA term in Model (1,1,2), the 
MAPE lowers from 1.42 in Model (1,1,1) to 1.414, while the t scores decline to 15.897, 1.2, and -0.459. With the inclusion of the 
second AR and MA terms in Model (2,1,2), the t scores for all parameters worsen compared to Model (1,1,1) while the MAPE 
improves to 1.115. The p-values for the MA parameters also worsen progressively as the model shifts from Model (1,1,1) to Model 
(1,1,2) and to Model (2,1,2). The best model is (1,1,1). See Table C15 for the Non-Seasonally Adjusted (NSA) version of the best 
model. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 






Regulatory Period 1 Best Model for Control Variable 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable Difference (p, q) a Parameter Estimate MAPE t p-Value 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Control 2 (1,0) Φ -0.456 0.234 -2.941 0.006 **b 
Control 2 (1,2) Φ -0.888 0.226 -4.316 0.000 * 
Control 2 (1,2) Θ1 0.005 0.226 0.001 0.999 
Control 2 (1,2) Θ2 0.992 0.226 0.122 0.903 
Control 2 (2,0) Φ1 -1.117 0.215 -7.761 0.000 ***c 
Control 2 (2,0) Φ2 -0.569 0.215 -4.039 0.000 ***d 
Control 3 (1,0) Φ -0.597 0.327 -4.214 0.000 ***e 
Control 3 (1,1) Φ -0.414 0.243 -2.250 0.031 *f 
Control 3 (1,1) Θ 0.987 0.243 0.605 0.549 
Control 3 (1,2) Φ -0.255 0.281 -0.970 0.339 
Control 3 (1,2) Θ1 1.586 0.281 3.602 0.001 *** 
Control 3 (1,2) Θ2 -0.608 0.281 -2.168 0.037 
Control 3 (2,0) Φ1 -1.243 0.286 -9.710 0.000 ***g‡ 
Control 3 (2,0) Φ2 -0.725 0.286 -5.693 0.000 ***h‡ 
Control 3 (2,1) Φ1 -1.064 0.253 -6.484 0.000 ***i 
Control 3 (2,1) Φ2 -0.528 0.253 -3.349 0.002 **i 
Control 3 (2,1) Θ 0.999 0.253 0.053 0.958 
Control 3 (2,2) Φ1 -1.045 0.250 -3.380 0.002 **j 
Control 3 (2,2) Φ2 -0.516 0.250 -2.153 0.039 *j 
Control 3 (2,2) Θ1 1.089 0.250 0.517 0.608 
Control 3 (2,2) Θ2 -0.096 0.250 -0.275 0.785 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Difference is the ARIMA d; MAPE is the Mean Absolute Percentage Error that is shown at the model level rather than at the 
parameter level so that the (p,d,q) models may be compared.  
a ARIMA p is the autoregressive (AR) portion of the model and its estimate is represented by the mathematical symbol Φ; ARIMA q 
is the moving average (MA) portion of the model and its estimate is represented by the mathematical symbol Θ. 
b Outliers are 4Q 1991 (Additive) and 2Q 1993 (Additive). 
c Outlier is 2Q 1992 (Additive). 
d Outlier is 2Q 1992 (Additive). 
e Outliers are 1Q 1992 (Local Trend) and 2Q 1993 (Additive). 
f Outliers are 4Q 1991 (Additive) and 2Q 1993 (Additive). 
g Outlier is 3Q 1993 (Local Trend). 
h Outlier is 3Q 1993 (Local Trend). 
i Outlier is 2Q 1991 (Additive). 
j Outlier is 2Q 1992 (Additive). 
‡ Best model. Model (2,3,0) has the highest t scores (-9.71 and -5.693) with MAPE of .286. Model (2,2,0) has lower t scores (-7.761 
and -4.039) than Model (2,3,0) but also a lower MAPE (.215). The best model is (2,3,0). 







Regulatory Period 2 Best Model for CMOs (Seasonally Adjusted) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable Difference (p, q) a Parameter Estimate MAPE t p-Value 
________________________________________________________________________ 
CMO 2 (0,2) Θ1 0.532 1.539 2.653 0.014 *b 
CMO 2 (0,2) Θ2 -0.193 1.539 -0.909 0.372 
CMO 2 (1,0) Φ -0.465 1.547 -2.694 0.012 *c 
CMO 2 (1,1) Φ -0.934 1.123 -9.492 0.000 ***d‡ 
CMO 2 (1,1) Θ -0.550 1.123 -2.228 0.036 *d‡ 
CMO 2 (2,0) Φ1 -0.263 0.968 -1.483 0.152 
CMO 2 (2,0) Φ2 0.604 0.968 3.254 0.004 **e 
CMO 2 (2,1) Φ1 -0.724 1.718 -1.780 0.087 
CMO 2 (2,1) Φ2 -0.489 1.718 -2.427 0.023 * 
CMO 2 (2,1) Θ -0.284 1.718 -0.607 0.549 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Difference is the ARIMA d; MAPE is the Mean Absolute Percentage Error that is shown at the model level rather than at the 
parameter level so that the (p,d,q) models may be compared.  
a ARIMA p is the autoregressive (AR) portion of the model and its estimate is represented by the mathematical symbol Φ; ARIMA q 
is the moving average (MA) portion of the model and its estimate is represented by the mathematical symbol Θ. 
b Outlier is 4Q 2011 (Additive). 
c Outlier is 4Q 2011 (Additive). 
d Outliers are 4Q 2001 (Transient) and 3Q 2003 (Additive). 
e Outliers are 4Q 2001 (Transient) and 3Q 2003 (Transient). 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
‡ Best model. Model (1,2,1) has the highest t scores (-9.492 and -2.228), but also a higher MAPE (1.123) than other models and 
positive residual autocorrelation at lag-1, suggestive of the need for an additional AR term in the model. Model (2,2,1) has both lower 
t scores and higher MAPE than Model (1,2,1), making it a worse alternative. Model (2,2,0) has a lower MAPE (.968) than Model 
(1,2,1), but also  lower t scores (3.254 and -1.483). Model (1,2,0) has only 1 outlier, compared to 2 outliers in both Model (1,2,1) and 
Model (2,2,0), but has a lower t score and higher MAPE than both those models. The best model is (1,2,1). See Table C15 for the Non-
Seasonally Adjusted (NSA) version of the best model. 








Regulatory Period 2 Best Model for Control Variable 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable Difference (p, q) a Parameter Estimate MAPE t p-Value 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Control 1 (0,2) Θ1 0.445 0.226 2.300 0.029 * 
Control 1 (0,2) Θ2 -0.132 0.226 -0.681 0.502 
Control 1 (1,2) Φ -0.834 0.205 -2.851 0.008 ** 
Control 1 (1,2) Θ1 -0.634 0.205 -0.119 0.906 
Control 1 (1,2) Θ2 0.363 0.205 0.192 0.849 
Control 1 (2,1) Φ1 -0.567 0.209 -1.240 0.226 
Control 1 (2,1) Φ2 -0.414 0.209 -2.206 0.036 * 
Control 1 (2,1) Θ -0.272 0.209 -0.544 0.591 
Control 1 (2,2) Φ1 -0.276 0.167 -3.021 0.006 **‡ 
Control 1 (2,2) Φ2 -0.930 0.167 -11.760 0.000 ***b‡ 
Control 1 (2,2) Θ1 -0.096 0.167 -0.535 0.597 ‡ 
Control 1 (2,2) Θ2 -1.000 0.167 -5.652 0.000 ***b‡ 
Control 2 (0,1) Θ 0.943 0.263 5.818 0.000 *** 
Control 2 (0,2) Θ1 1.342 0.259 7.127 0.000 *** 
Control 2 (0,2) Θ2 -0.463 0.259 -2.471 0.020 * 
Control 2 (1,0) Φ -0.483 0.333 -2.889 0.008 ** 
Control 2 (1,1) Φ -0.292 0.264 -1.402 0.173 
Control 2 (1,1) Θ 0.900 0.264 6.707 0.000 *** 
Control 2 (1,2) Φ -0.905 0.257 -2.728 0.011 * 
Control 2 (1,2) Θ1 -0.058 0.257 -0.002 0.998 
Control 2 (1,2) Θ2 0.941 0.257 0.040 0.968 
Control 2 (2,0) Φ1 -0.790 0.255 -5.138 0.000 *** 
Control 2 (2,0) Φ2 -0.665 0.255 -4.754 0.000 *** 
Control 2 (2,1) Φ1 -0.515 0.229 -2.570 0.017 * 
Control 2 (2,1) Φ2 -0.524 0.229 -2.815 0.009 ** 
Control 2 (2,1) Θ 0.731 0.229 4.196 0.000 *** 
Control 2 (2,2) Φ1 -0.494 0.230 -1.329 0.196 
Control 2 (2,2) Φ2 -0.520 0.230 -2.592 0.016 * 
Control 2 (2,2) Θ1 0.757 0.230 1.748 0.093 
Control 2 (2,2) Θ2 -0.031 0.230 -0.077 0.939 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Difference is the ARIMA d; MAPE is the Mean Absolute Percentage Error that is shown at the model level rather than at the 
parameter level so that the (p,d,q) models may be compared.  







a ARIMA p is the autoregressive (AR) portion of the model and its estimate is represented by the mathematical symbol Φ; ARIMA q 
is the moving average (MA) portion of the model and its estimate is represented by the mathematical symbol Θ. 
b Outlier is 2Q 2001 (Innovational). 







Regulatory Period 3 Best Model for CMOs (Seasonally Adjusted) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable Difference (p, q) a Parameter Estimate MAPE t p-Value 
________________________________________________________________________ 
CMO 1 (0,0) none -0.036 1.174 -9.176 0.000 *** 
CMO 1 (1,0) Φ 0.980 0.998 32.556 0.000 ***b‡ 
CMO 1 (1,1) Φ 0.977 1.292 25.881 0.000 *** 
CMO 1 (1,1) Θ 0.293 1.292 1.032 0.321 
CMO 1 (1,2) Φ 0.968 1.322 17.916 0.000 *** 
CMO 1 (1,2) Θ1 0.275 1.322 0.904 0.384 
CMO 1 (1,2) Θ2 -0.103 1.322 -0.329 0.748 
CMO 1 (2,0) Φ1 0.636 1.297 2.415 0.031 * 
CMO 1 (2,0) Φ2 0.330 1.297 1.243 0.236 
CMO 1 (2,1) Φ1 -0.028 1.253 -0.267 0.794 
CMO 1 (2,1) Φ2 0.970 1.253 10.429 0.000 *** 
CMO 1 (2,1) Θ -0.975 1.253 -0.504 0.623 
CMO 1 (2,2) Φ1 -0.033 1.254 -0.231 0.821 
CMO 1 (2,2) Φ2 0.966 1.254 6.477 0.000 *** 
CMO 1 (2,2) Θ1 -1.081 1.254 -0.372 0.717 
CMO 1 (2,2) Θ2 -0.108 1.254 -0.290 0.777 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Difference is the ARIMA d; MAPE is the Mean Absolute Percentage Error that is shown at the model level rather than at the 
parameter level so that the (p,d,q) models may be compared.  
a ARIMA p is the autoregressive (AR) portion of the model and its estimate is represented by the mathematical symbol Φ; ARIMA q 
is the moving average (MA) portion of the model and its estimate is represented by the mathematical symbol Θ. 
b Outlier is 1Q 2010 (Seasonal Additive). 
‡ Best model. Model (1,1,0) has the highest t score (32.556) and the lowest MAPE (.998), with 1 outlier. See Table C15 for the Non-
Seasonally Adjusted (NSA) version of the best model. 







Regulatory Period 3 Best Model for Control Variable 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable Difference (p, q) a Parameter Estimate MAPE t p-Value 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Control 1 (1,1) Φ 0.947 0.179 5.276 0.000 ***b 
Control 1 (1,1) Θ 0.811 0.179 2.506 0.029 *b 
Control 1 (1,2) Φ 0.968 0.291 18.492 0.000 ***‡ 
Control 1 (1,2) Θ1 1.488 0.291 4.254 0.001 ***‡ 
Control 1 (1,2) Θ2 -0.704 0.291 -1.986 0.070 † 
Control 1 (2,2) Φ1 -0.052 0.166 -0.193 0.851 
Control 1 (2,2) Φ2 -0.436 0.166 -1.538 0.158 
Control 1 (2,2) Θ1 0.040 0.166 0.133 0.897 
Control 1 (2,2) Θ2 -0.964 0.166 -3.224 0.010 **b 
Control 2 (0,2) Θ1 0.988 0.157 4.261 0.002 **b 
Control 2 (0,2) Θ2 -0.342 0.157 -1.483 0.169 
Control 2 (1,0) Φ -0.702 0.092 -9.019 0.000 ***c 
Control 2 (1,1) Φ -0.444 0.108 1.550 0.156 
Control 2 (1,1) Θ 0.512 0.108 2.323 0.045 *d 
Control 2 (2,0) Φ1 -0.995 0.358 -3.951 0.002 ** 
Control 2 (2,0) Φ2 -0.578 0.358 -2.571 0.024 * 
Control 2 (2,1) Φ1 -1.210 0.047 -13.905 0.000 ***e 
Control 2 (2,1) Φ2 -0.664 0.047 -10.005 0.000 ***e 
Control 2 (2,1) Θ -0.174 0.047 -1.524 0.171 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Difference is the ARIMA d; MAPE is the Mean Absolute Percentage Error that is shown at the model level rather than at the 
parameter level so that the (p,d,q) models may be compared.  
a ARIMA p is the autoregressive (AR) portion of the model and its estimate is represented by the mathematical symbol Φ; ARIMA q 
is the moving average (MA) portion of the model and its estimate is represented by the mathematical symbol Θ. 
b Outliers are 3Q 2009 (Innovational) and 4Q 2009 (Additive). 
c Outliers are 3Q 2009 (Local Trend), 1Q 2010 (Innovational), and 3Q 2011 (Transient). 
d Outliers are 3Q 2009 (Innovational), 4Q 2009 (Additive), and 3Q 2011 (Level Shift). 
e Outliers are 3Q 2009 (Innovational), 4Q 2009 (Additive), 3Q 2011 (Innovational), and 1Q 2012  (Level Shift). 
‡ Best model. Model (1,1,2) has the highest t score (18.492; also 4.254 and -1.986) and  MAPE of .291, with no outliers. Model (2,2,1) 
has a lower MAPE (.047), but has 4 outliers with n = 16. The best model is (1,1,2).  






19. The CMOs best fit models based on the seasonally adjusted (SA) data were tested 
for the effect of seasonality by using the original data series that was not 
seasonally adjusted (NSA). 
a. Repeat step 17 for best fits, by period, with original data (NSA). 







Best Models for CMOs Using Non-Seasonally Adjusted Data 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Period Difference (p, q)a Parameter Estimate MAPE t p-Value 
________________________________________________________________________ 
1 1 (1,1) Φ 0.949 1.336 19.407 0.000 ***‡ 
1 1 (1,1) Θ 0.189 1.336 1.041 0.305 ‡ 
2 2 (1,1) Φ 0.002 2.091 0.005 0.996 
2 2 (1,1) Θ 0.478 2.091 1.158 0.257 
3 1 (1,0) Φ 0.908 0.566 18.322 0.000 *** 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Difference is the ARIMA d; MAPE is the Mean Absolute Percentage Error that is shown at the model level rather than at the 
parameter level so that the (p,d,q) models may be compared.  
a ARIMA p is the autoregressive (AR) portion of the model and its estimate is represented by the mathematical symbol Φ; ARIMA q 
is the moving average (MA) portion of the model and its estimate is represented by the mathematical symbol Θ. 
‡ Best model. The NSA (non-seasonally adjusted) version of the model is better than the SA (seasonally adjusted) version of the 
model, as shown in Tables C9, C11, and C13. Period 1 Model (1,1,1) has higher t scores and lower MAPE with NSA data. Period 2 
Model (1,2,1) is insignificant with NSA data. Period 3 Model (1,1,0) has a lower t score and proportionately lower MAPE with NSA 
data.  






20. Granger causality testing was performed on the best fit models. 
a. Opened SPSS files by CDS regulatory periods to retrieve CMOs and 
Labor Participation Rate data. 
b. Opened R-based calculator (Wessa, 2013) that was retrieved from 
http://www.wessa.net/rwasp_grangercausality.wasp.  
i. Y series data was CMOs and Labor Participation Rate.  
ii. X series data was number of quarters corresponding to the CMOs 
and Labor Participation Rate data. 
iii. Set the Y series parameter to 1. 
iv. Set the X series parameter to 1. 
v. Set the non-seasonal time lags to 1. 
vi. Set the seasonal period to 1. (The same results were achieved when 
repeated at seasonal period equal to 4.)  







Granger Causality Test Statistic 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Period Variable  F (df, lag) F-Statistic Seasonality          p-Value  
________________________________________________________________________ 
1 CMO  F(37, lag 1) 5.620  Non Seasonal .03*  
2 CMO  F(27, lag 1) 8.386  Seasonal  .01**  
3 CMO  F(13, lag 1) 9.940  Seasonal  .01**  
1 Control  F(37, lag 1) 7.939  Seasonal  .01**  
2 Control  F(27, lag 1) 6.018  Seasonal  .02*  
3 Control  F(13, lag 1) 5.596  Seasonal  .04* 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Seasonal indicates seasonally adjusted data. Non Seasonal indicates original data, without seasonal adjustment.  













Financial and risk manager successful at building high-performance businesses and 
leading both production and support organizations with P&L and balance sheet 
responsibility of $5 billion in assets. A strategic visionary with tactical planning skills 
able to manage through economic cycles of growth and contraction by identifying 
emerging risks and opportunities. Leadership skills to influence and motivate staff toward 
common goals. Combines entrepreneurial approach with a focus on operational controls 
and risk management. Skilled at implementing capital structures to benefit from 
regulatory structures, and at planning and executing simultaneous initiatives to improve 
market share, revenues, labor productivity, and margins.  
 
Citigroup, Tampa, FL, August 2011 to Present  
Senior Vice President 
Global responsibilities as the Operations & Technology Program Manager for Supplier 
Risk Reporting. Identify and investigate supplier performance issues and coordinate 
executive action for remediation. Implemented strategic enhancements to enterprise-wide 
governance with remediation programs for supplier performance and customer 
complaints monitoring. Evaluate key risks involving supplier financial condition, 
information security, exit strategy and continuity of business plans. 
 Created processes for the identification and remediation of supplier-caused 
technology outages and information security incidents, leading to a 60% decrease 
in these incidents over a 2-year period. 
 Developed a comprehensive database consisting of outages, security incidents, 
and risk events that captured 240 variables per incident used for a risk model that 
prioritized residual risk for remediation. 
 
Independent Consultant, Tampa, FL, January 2009 to August 2011 
Consultant 
Financial consultant and capital planning adviser for community banks. Assisted bank 
executives with capital raising, investment portfolio management, liquidity, loss reserves, 
and asset and liability risk management. Capital management expertise including Basel II 






Contractors Financial Warehouse, Tampa, FL, June 2007 to January 2009 
Chief Executive Officer  
Held P&L and capital-raising responsibility for start-up commercial lending financial 
company serving subcontractors in the commercial construction industry. Formulated the 
corporate vision, led the strategic planning process, developed the product’s credit 
underwriting and risk-based pricing, and directed capital creation efforts.  
 Raised capital from venture capitalists led by an Ohio state-backed investor 
group. 
 
Homegate Mortgage, West Chester, OH, & Tampa, FL, August 2004 to June 2007 
Chief Executive Officer  
Founding partner of licensed financial institution for the retail origination of residential 
mortgage loans with full P&L responsibilities. Mortgage banking correspondent of FHA, 
VA, Reverse Mortgage, Prime, Alt A, Jumbo, and Subprime loan production. 
Responsible for all areas of lending operations, product pricing and loan delivery, 
regulatory compliance to federal and state regulations, marketing, television advertising, 
sales, finance, accounting, human resources, technology, information systems and 
administrative matters.  
 Achieved profitability in the second quarter of operations and grew the company 
to 30 employees in two locations producing $75 million of annual loan volume. 
 Earned a perfect regulatory record with zero consumer complaints, and no loan-
premium recaptures for blemished loans or loan buybacks for defaulted loans.  
 
Provident Bank, Cincinnati, OH, & Morristown, NJ, Nov. 1995 to August 2004 
Chief Financial Officer & Senior Vice President 
Executive manager of a start-up mortgage business that created $100 million in annual 
earnings to fuel bank growth from a $5 billion regional bank into a Top 50 U.S. bank 
when sold nine years later. The business achieved Top 10 ranking in Non-Conforming 
securitization, Warehousing, and Servicing. Administrative responsibility for budgeting, 
forecasting, variance analysis, capital planning for assets and liabilities, product 
development and pricing, credit loss analysis, headcount, productivity planning, and 
performance metrics. Operational responsibility for the Warehousing business that 
generated in excess of $1 billion in monthly volume of commercial loan product. Led the 
negotiations for the bank’s investment in Home 123, a mortgage brand with Bob Vila as 
celebrity spokesman, and ran the retail mortgage business with 140 employees at sites in 
Ohio and New Jersey.  
 Led the company exit from securitization ahead of the market in 2001, based upon 
risk modeling of pricing, adverse selection, interest rate trends and Case-Shiller 





General Electric, Cincinnati, OH, November 1989 to November 1995 
Senior Financial Analyst 
Controlled cost in the Research and Development department of GE Aviation, with a $50 
million annual operating budget. Conducted investigations into alleged violations of 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and issued findings for adjudication.  
 Saved $2 million of cost annually by outsourcing 100 union jobs of tool 
fabricators.  
 
The Huntington National Bank, Cincinnati, OH, February 1987 to November 1989 
Bank Manager 
 
Wells Fargo Financial, Jacksonville, FL, October 1985 to January 1987 
Credit Manager 
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funded specialty loan finance company providing credit to subcontractors in the 
construction industry. 
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Effect on Microcomputer Acquisition; Capital Decision-Making: Analysis and Judgment 
in Public Budgeting and Financial Management. 
 
Family history publications include: Phillip Board: Bluegrass Pioneer 1760-1850, 
Decorah, Iowa: Anundsen, 1992; Co-author with Ray O. Pleasant, ‘Exoduster’ Sally 
Board. An American Heritage: From Kentucky Slavery to a Kansas Homestead 1805-
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